Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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A mother, Leah, relinquished her parental rights to her young son, Jordon, after Jordon had been removed from her home over concerns about her and the father’s ability to care for him. Leah had previously relinquished rights to two older children, who were adopted by her father and stepmother, and Jordon was ultimately placed with a relative of his father. In November 2022, Leah executed a written relinquishment of her rights, witnessed by her attorney and social workers. Afterwards, Jordon was adopted by the relative. Months later, Leah sought to rescind her relinquishment, alleging she did not act voluntarily due to her intellectual disability and claimed she was subjected to threats, coercion, and promises by her ex-husband, his family, and the adoptive parent.Her initial attempt to invalidate the relinquishment in the County Court for Dodge County was denied without an evidentiary hearing. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a hearing. On remand, the juvenile court received testimony from Leah, her ex-husband, his relatives, social workers, and her attorney. The court found Leah’s relinquishment was not the result of fraud, duress, threats, or coercion. The court gave weight to evidence that Leah initiated and insisted on relinquishment, understood its consequences, and was not unduly pressured by others. Leah’s intellectual disability was considered, but the court found she comprehended the act’s meaning and effect.On de novo review, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's order, holding that Leah did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that her relinquishment was invalid. The Court clarified that a properly executed, voluntary relinquishment is irrevocable absent proof of threats, coercion, fraud, or duress, and that subsequent changes of heart or noncompliance with informal contact agreements do not invalidate such relinquishments. View "In re Interest of Jordon B." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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A man was charged with burglary after allegedly breaking into the home of a woman with whom he had a prior romantic relationship. The State’s amended information accused him of willfully, maliciously, and forcibly entering her residence with the intent to commit stalking or, alternatively, with intent to steal property. The incident occurred after the man had engaged in a pattern of harassment, including posting the woman’s personal information online and breaking into her house multiple times.The District Court for Douglas County heard the case after the defendant filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that stalking could not be the underlying felony for burglary. He asserted that stalking is generally a misdemeanor that becomes a felony only via enhancement and that stalking’s required “course of conduct” cannot be established in a single burglary incident. The court treated his arguments as constitutional challenges to the burglary statute and found no merit in either an as-applied or facial challenge, overruling the motion to quash. The defendant then pled guilty as part of a plea agreement, and the court found a factual basis for the plea and sentenced him to imprisonment.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether the information was sufficient to charge burglary, specifically if stalking could serve as the felony intent element. The court held that the information was sufficient, as stalking can constitute a felony under certain circumstances and the information adequately notified the defendant of the charges. The court rejected the argument that stalking could not qualify as the underlying felony and found no error in the district court’s decision to overrule the motion to quash or in convicting and sentencing the defendant. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "State v. Dicken" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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A group of juveniles, including the defendant, participated in a series of criminal acts over several days in June 2021. The incidents began with the theft of a vehicle from Emmanuel Jacinto Franco outside a public pool, during which one juvenile brandished a handgun and forcibly took the vehicle. The defendant, present during the planning and execution of the theft, later joined the others in fleeing with the stolen car. Over the following days, the group committed additional crimes, including multiple shootings targeting individuals they believed were affiliated with a rival gang. One person was killed, others were injured, and the group later stole another vehicle. Law enforcement eventually apprehended the defendant and his associates, aided by tracking technology.The District Court for Douglas County conducted a joint jury trial for the defendant and a co-defendant. The defendant faced several felony charges, including first-degree murder, robbery, assault, and multiple counts involving the use of a firearm. The State presented extensive evidence, including witness testimony and forensic analysis. The defendant did not testify. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The court denied the defendant’s proposed jury instruction on “mere presence” and sentenced him to consecutive prison terms totaling 320 years to life. Each sentence fell within the statutory limits. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficiency of the evidence for certain convictions, error in jury instructions, and that his sentences were excessive and amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for robbery and use of a firearm under an aiding and abetting theory. The court found no error in the district court’s refusal to give the defendant’s proposed jury instruction, as the instructions provided were adequate and not misleading. The court also held that the sentences imposed were not excessive nor did they constitute cruel and unusual punishment, even though they amounted to a de facto life sentence. The judgment and sentences of the district court were affirmed. View "State v. Flores" on Justia Law

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An employee of a railroad company suffered an ankle injury while descending stairs at her workplace. She claimed the injury occurred due to unsafe conditions maintained by her employer. The employee had a history of a preexisting foot condition and prior ankle surgery, but asserted she was asymptomatic before the workplace incident. After the incident, she underwent multiple surgeries and missed work, for which she received short-term disability payments from her employer’s plan.The District Court for Douglas County presided over a jury trial in July 2024. During trial, the court allowed evidence and argument regarding the employee’s preexisting condition, and permitted the jury to consider whether damages should be apportioned due to that condition. The court also excluded the employee’s expert's specific opinion about the number of work years lost, finding insufficient methodological foundation. Both parties moved for directed verdicts, which were denied. The jury found the railroad 5% at fault and the employee 95% at fault, awarding $287,600 in damages. The employee’s motions for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting erroneous jury instructions and exclusion of expert testimony, were denied. The railroad’s post-trial motion to reduce the verdict by the employee’s fault percentage and to set off disability payments was also denied.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the jury instructions correctly stated the law under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), and there was sufficient evidence to submit questions of comparative fault and apportionment to the jury. The court found no error in the exclusion of the expert’s specific lost worklife expectancy opinion, due to lack of reliable methodology. The court also concluded that the employer’s disability plan language did not entitle the railroad to a setoff from the jury award. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Cramer v. Union Pacific RR. Co." on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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The case involved a medical negligence and wrongful death claim arising from care provided to a resident at a county-owned skilled nursing facility in Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the decedent’s personal representative and surviving spouse, alleged that substandard care by the facility’s staff caused fatal injuries. The suit was initiated against several entities purportedly associated with the facility, but only two remained as defendants after some were dismissed for procedural reasons.After the complaint was filed in the District Court for Merrick County, the primary remaining defendant, identified as Litzenberg Memorial Long Term Care, moved to dismiss the case. The defendant argued that the complaint failed to demonstrate compliance with the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act’s presuit notice requirement, claiming that notice was not properly served on the appropriate official. Before the court ruled on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to clarify factual allegations regarding compliance with presuit notice and to correct the defendant’s name. The proposed amendment included details suggesting that the Merrick County clerk was an appropriate recipient for notice, and asserted that the defendant should be estopped from contesting notice due to representations made by the clerk.The district court denied the motion for leave to amend and granted the motion to dismiss, finding the amendment would be futile because the notice had not been properly served. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that under the applicable procedural rule, the plaintiffs were entitled to amend their complaint once as a matter of course prior to any responsive pleading. The court held that filing a motion for leave to amend did not waive this right. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing that the plaintiffs be allowed to amend their complaint. View "Cyboron v. Merrick County" on Justia Law

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After the Governor of Nebraska issued an executive order in November 2023 generally prohibiting state executive branch employees from working remotely—with certain exceptions left to agency heads—a union representing state employees demanded to bargain with the State regarding this new policy. The State refused, asserting that the existing collective bargaining agreement already gave it the authority to determine work locations, so it had no further obligation to bargain over remote work. In response, the union filed a petition with Nebraska’s Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), alleging the State committed a prohibited labor practice by refusing to negotiate over a mandatory subject of bargaining.The CIR reviewed the petition and received evidence, including the relevant collective bargaining agreement and testimony about the parties’ negotiations. The CIR found that the agreement expressly gave the State the right to change the site of its workforce, which included the authority to require employees to work at assigned locations and discontinue remote work. The CIR also concluded that, even if remote work was a mandatory subject of bargaining, the matter was already “covered by” the agreement, so the State was not required to bargain further. Alternatively, the CIR found the union had waived its right to bargain by withdrawing a remote work proposal during contract negotiations. The CIR dismissed the union’s petition with prejudice and, finding the petition frivolous and brought in bad faith, ordered the union to pay over $40,000 in attorney fees and costs.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the CIR’s dismissal of the union’s petition, holding that the contract coverage rule applied: because the collective bargaining agreement authorized the State to change employees’ work locations, the State had no obligation to bargain further over the executive order. However, the court reversed the award of attorney fees, concluding that the union’s legal position was not frivolous under Nebraska law. The decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Nebraska Assn. of Pub. Employees v. State" on Justia Law

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The case involved a defendant who was charged in two separate criminal complaints, filed by different prosecutors, for conduct arising out of the same incident. The first complaint, brought by a city prosecutor in county court, alleged violations of municipal ordinances—specifically assault and battery, and disorderly conduct. The defendant entered a no contest plea to disorderly conduct as part of a plea agreement, and the assault and battery charge was dismissed with prejudice. Shortly before this plea, the county attorney’s office had filed a separate complaint charging the defendant with felony assault based on the same incident. After the case was later amended to charge first degree felony assault, the defendant argued that prosecuting the felony charge would violate double jeopardy protections.In the District Court for Douglas County, the defendant filed a plea in bar, contending that double jeopardy attached to the dismissed municipal assault and battery charge, thus barring the subsequent felony prosecution. The district court denied the plea, finding that jeopardy never attached to the dismissed charge because the defendant did not plead guilty or face trial on that offense, and the dismissal did not entail a determination of the merits.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the plea in bar de novo. The court held that jeopardy did not attach to the municipal assault and battery charge because the defendant did not enter a plea to that charge, nor did the court make any factual findings regarding it. The court further explained that a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to a plea agreement does not amount to an acquittal or the attachment of jeopardy unless the court resolves factual elements of the offense. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the plea in bar, holding that double jeopardy protections did not bar the felony assault prosecution. View "State v. Holland" on Justia Law

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Law enforcement responded to a situation at Christopher McKinney’s home after he threatened self-harm and subsequently engaged in an armed standoff. During the incident, Christopher pointed a shotgun at officers and made threats involving several firearms and large amounts of ammunition. Law enforcement executed search and arrest warrants, seizing numerous firearms and thousands of rounds of ammunition. Christopher later pleaded no contest to a charge of terroristic threats, with other charges—including use of a firearm to commit a felony—dismissed as part of the agreement. Following his conviction and sentence, the State sought court authorization to destroy the seized firearms and ammunition.After Christopher’s direct appeal concluded, the State filed a petition in the District Court for Otoe County to destroy the seized property, claiming it had been used in the commission of a crime and was no longer needed as evidence. David McKinney, Christopher’s father, moved to intervene, asserting that Christopher had gifted him all interest in the seized property before sentencing. The State objected, arguing David had no ownership interest and thus lacked standing. The district court allowed David to intervene but ultimately ordered destruction of all seized property, finding that most items were derivative contraband used in the commission of a crime, and that Christopher could not transfer ownership while the property was in custody.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether David had standing and whether the property was properly classified as contraband. The Supreme Court held that David had standing because he claimed ownership. The Court affirmed the destruction order for all items except one firearm—the Marlin .17 HMR—which had not been used in the crime. As to that item, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine if a valid transfer to David occurred, which would determine proper disposition of that firearm. View "State v. McKinney" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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After the death of Paul A. Knapp, his son Lance, as personal representative of Paul’s estate, sought to probate Paul’s 2010 will, which primarily left property to his first wife and, if she predeceased him, to his children and grandchildren. Paul’s widow, Barbara, filed claims against the estate, specifically for a share of the marital residence’s proceeds and a statutory maintenance fund. These claims were based on a premarital agreement executed before Barbara and Paul’s marriage, as well as a purported subsequent oral agreement that Barbara would receive 40% of the marital residence due to her financial contributions to its remodel and refinancing.The County Court for Dodge County reviewed the case after Lance, as personal representative, disallowed Barbara’s claims. At trial, evidence showed that while Barbara contributed funds to remodel the residence and participated in refinancing, title to the home remained solely in Paul’s name. The premarital agreement referred to certain rights in a non-existent “Article 9.4” and generally maintained that separate property would remain separate unless jointly titled. The county court found the agreement unambiguous, concluded there was no evidence of a mutual mistake justifying reformation, and determined that Barbara was not entitled to proceeds from the marital residence or a maintenance fund. The court also found insufficient evidence of an enforceable oral contract for transfer of the property.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the county court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the premarital agreement was unambiguous and did not entitle Barbara to the claimed property interests, nor was reformation appropriate. Additionally, the Court found that Barbara had not proven the existence or terms of an enforceable oral contract by clear and convincing evidence. The disallowance of Barbara’s claims was affirmed. View "In re Estate of Knapp" on Justia Law

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A man was charged with multiple felonies after he fired gunshots at two social workers who approached his home in a marked government vehicle. Two days earlier, he had been involved in a physical altercation with two teenage girls at a community center, leading to misdemeanor assault charges. After that incident, he and his family experienced public scrutiny, and he reported feeling threatened by comments made by a crowd outside the community center. The day of the shooting, after a call from the mother of his children, two Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) employees arrived at his home to conduct a welfare check. His eldest son, who was not wearing his glasses, believed one of the men had a gun and relayed this to his father, who then fired two shots, injuring one of the social workers.The District Court for Lancaster County conducted a jury trial on the felonies; the defendant pleaded no contest to the misdemeanors. The district court refused to instruct the jury on self-defense or defense of others, concluding the defendant was the only aggressor and lacked an objectively reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary. The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of attempted first-degree assault and two counts of using a firearm to commit a felony. The court imposed consecutive sentences within statutory limits.On direct appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing self-defense instructions, imposed excessive sentences, and that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence supporting a reasonable belief in the immediate necessity to use deadly force, affirming the refusal to instruct on self-defense. It found the sentences were not an abuse of discretion. It rejected one ineffective assistance claim, found two others insufficiently specific, and concluded the last could not be resolved on the record. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "State v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law