Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State brought a petition before the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging that Christopher T., who was fifteen years old at the time, was a juvenile within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247(3)(b), in that he deported himself so as to injure or danger seriously the morals or health of himself or others, and under Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247(3)(c), in that he was a mentally ill and dangerous juvenile. The State alleged that Christopher unlawfully subjected his stepbrothers to sexual contact without consent. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the juvenile court did not err in (1) adjudicating under section 435-427(3)(c) using the clear and convincing standard of evidence to find that Christopher was a mentally ill and dangerous person; (2) in finding that the State had adduced sufficient evidence to adjudicate Christopher under either section 435-427(3)(b) or (c); (3) in overruling the objection to certain testimony on Daubert-Schafersman grounds; and (4) finding certain testimony satisfied the reasonable degree of medical certainty standard set forth in In re Interest of G.H. View "In re Interest of Christopher T." on Justia Law

In 2006, Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved pursuant to a decree of dissolution, which included a provision providing that Husband was awarded a profit-sharing plan, and Wife was awarded a portion of the plan. By 2008, when no QDRO had been entered to facilitate transfer of the funds, the district court entered an amended QDRO, which awarded Wife interest on her portion from 2006 to 2008. The court of appeals affirmed. During the appeal process, Wife did not execute on the QDRO. Wife then filed motions to reopen the case and to enter an amended QDRO, arguing that the QDRO should provide for interest that had accrued during the appeal of the prior orders. The district court ordered the case reopened and entered an amended QDRO that provided for interest from the date of the decree of dissolution through the 2010 date of the hearing on the motions. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it extended Wife's award of postjudgment interest through the 2010 date because Wife was entitled to postjudgment interest from the date of the decree until she received her share of the profit-sharing plan. View "Fry v. Fry" on Justia Law

An irrigation district (FCID) petitioned the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to reevaluate a portion of the Republican River Basin according to the criteria in Neb. Rev. Stat. 46-713 and to determine whether the basin met the criteria to be considered "overappropriated" rather than "fully appropriated." If the status of the basin was changed to "overappropriated," the DNR could assert more authority over the basin. The DNR denied FCID's petition, finding the statute allowed the DNR to declare a river basin overappropriated only if it was subject to an interstate cooperative agreement. Because the basin was subject to an interstate compact, the DNR declared it did not have the authority to change the status as an interstate compact was not the equivalent of an interstate cooperative agreement. The FCID appealed. The DNR cross-appealed, alleging that FCID failed to demonstrate an injury in fact for standing purposes. The Supreme Court found the FCID failed to plead an injury in fact and therefore did not have standing. The Court dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction and did not reach the merits of the litigation. View "Frenchman-Cambridge Irr. Dist. v. Dep't of Nat. Res." on Justia Law

After Alicia L. gave birth to Jaime, Cesar C. and Alicia signed an acknowledgment of paternity form acknowledging that Cesar was Jaime's biological father. The signatures were notarized. Cesar and Jaime lived together for two years. Cesar filed a complaint to establish paternity, custody, and child support with respect to Jaime. Cesar then filed a motion for temporary custody, which the court granted. After genetic testing excluded Cesar as being Jaime's biological father and after Alicia filed a separate complaint, the court awarded custody of Jaime to Alicia based on its application of the parental preference doctrine. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the district court erred when it failed to give proper legal effect to the notarized acknowledgment of paternity. In the absence of a successful challenge directed at the acknowledgment, the acknowledgment had the effect of establishing that Cesar was the legal father of Jaime and matters of custody and child support should have been considered within this legal framework. Remanded. View "Cesar C. v. Alicia L." on Justia Law

Thunder Collins was convicted of first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, and use of a weapon to commit a felony. At the conclusion of the trial and after Collins' case was submitted to the jury, the jury was permitted to separate for the weekend and return to deliberate the next Monday, at which point it rendered its verdicts. On appeal, Collins contended that the district court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial on the basis that the court allowed the jury to separate during deliberations without Collins' express agreement or consent. The Supreme Court concluded that the rule stated in State v. Robbins, which holds that express agreement or consent is required by a defendant in order to waive his rights to have a jury kept together until they reach a verdict or are discharged by the court, was inconsistent with judicial efficiency and sound policy and, therefore, overruled Robbins to the extent it requires defendant consent to jury separation. Because the overruling of Robbins was prospective only, the court applied the Robbins rule and held that Collins was entitled to a presumption that he was prejudiced by the jury's separation. Remanded. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

Jamyia, a minor child of Navajo decent, was removed from her parents' home after doctors discovered that Jamyia suffered injuries consistent with shaken baby syndrome. The juvenile court entered a dispositional order that terminated the parents' parental rights. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the State had not proved it made active efforts pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1505(4) to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts had been unsuccessful; and (2) the State was required to provide active efforts to both parents to prevent the breakup of the family within the meaning of the statute when aggravated circumstances were present. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to reach the active efforts issue, and it erred when it reversed the juvenile court's determination that the State had satisfied the statute before terminating the parents' parental rights. View "In re Interest of Jamyia M." on Justia Law

A jury found Stephen Pullens guilty of killing his mother by throwing her over a balcony. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing hearsay evidence of a prior attempt by Pullens to throw his mother off a balcony; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence emails written by Pullens after finding that the State had made a showing that the emails were what the State purported them to be; (3) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on voluntary flight because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer flight; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Pullens' request for a continuance on the day of the sentencing hearing or in refusing to appoint a public defender for the sentencing hearing; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not affording Pullens an opportunity to review his presentence investigation report and by considering a letter written by someone not involved in the case; and (6) Pullens' arguments concerning ineffective assistance of counsel were not appropriate for review on direct appeal. View "State v. Pullens" on Justia Law

David Kass was found guilty of enticement by an electronic communication device under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-833, which proscribes a person age nineteen or older from knowingly and intentionally using an electronic communication device to contact a child under age sixteen or a peace officer whom the person believe to be a child under age sixteen, and using language that conjures up repugnant sexual images. The district court sentenced Kass to one year in prison and ordered him to register as a sex offender. Kass appealed, arguing that section 28-833 was facially overbroad, that the court erred in its jury instructions, and that his sentence was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad; (2) there was no plain error in the court's instruction on the elements of the crime or in the court's denial of Kass's request for a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment; and (3) given Kass's age, his education, the offense, and the fact that he was a police officer, the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Kass to one year in prison. View "State v. Kass" on Justia Law

After it was discovered that Katrina R., who was fifteen years old at the time, sent nude photographs of herself to her boyfriend's cellular phone, Katrina was adjudicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(b) as a child who deports herself so as to injure or endanger seriously the morals or health or herself or others. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered that Katrina serve six months' probation, that she be placed in the legal custody of The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and that she participate in counseling and community service. DHHS appealed the order, contending that the juvenile court erred in simultaneously committing Katrina to DHHS and placing her on probation in the same juvenile court case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that is within the juvenile court's statutory power to issue a dispositional order for juveniles adjudicated under section 43-247(3)(b) that includes both legal custody with DHHS and supervision by a probation officer. View "In re Interest of Katrina R." on Justia Law

After D.I. was convicted of sexual assault of a child and was adjudged to be a dangerous sex offender, D.I. was committed to secure inpatient treatment. Three years later, D.I. filed a motion for reconsideration before the mental health board, alleging that cause no longer existed to keep him in secure inpatient treatment. The mental health board denied D.I.'s motion for reconsideration, and the district court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the denial of a motion for reconsideration is a final, appealable order under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1902, the Court had jurisdiction to address D.I.'s claims; (2) the mental health board did not err when it found D.I. was still a dangerous sex offender; and (3) the mental health board did not err when it determined there was no less restrictive treatment alternative. View "In re Interest of D.I." on Justia Law