Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Herchel Huff was driving a motor vehicle when he struck and killed a pedestrian. Huff was convicted of several charges in connection with the accident, including manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide. The primary issue on appeal was whether Huff's convictions for manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions because, as Huff argued, manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of motor vehicle homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part vacated, holding that, under Blockburger v. United States, unlawful act manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of motor vehicle homicide, and therefore, Huff was subjected to multiple punishments in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court then vacated Huff's conviction and sentence for manslaughter and remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Huff" on Justia Law

Susan Schwerdtfeger became pregnant by in vitro fertilization, and after giving birth, she and Teri Latham lived with the child for five years. The parties then separated and Latham moved out of the home. After Latham's visitation with the child stopped, Latham brought an action seeking custody and visitation, alleging that she had standing based on the doctrine of in loco parentis. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Schwerdtfeger and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it concluded that the doctrine of in loco parentis did not apply to the facts of this case, and therefore, Latham had standing to seek custody and visitation of the child; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact whether Latham should be granted custody and/or visitation of the child. View "Latham v. Schwerdtfeger" on Justia Law

Thirteen-year-old Efrain Ramos-Domingo was killed by a Union Pacific Railroad Company train. Two days later, Efrain's mother, Manuela Gonzalez signed a document releasing Union Pacific from liability for Efrain's death in exchange for $15,000. Manuela later filed a complaint in district court for wrongful death and breach of fiduciary duty. Union Pacific filed a motion to dismiss Manuela's complaint, arguing that the release barred Manuela's claims. The district court sustained the motion to dismiss with respect to the wrongful death claim but overruled the motion with respect to the fiduciary duty claim. The district court then granted Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim, finding that there was no fiduciary duty owed by Union Pacific to Manuela. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in dismissing Manuela's wrongful death claim because Manuela alleged facts that, if proved, could demonstrate that the release was void on the basis of its failure to represent a binding mutual understanding of the parties or was voidable as the product of fraud, overreaching or duress; and (2) the district court correctly concluded that Union Pacific owed no fiduciary duty to Manuela. Remanded. View "Gonzalez v. Union Pacific RR. Co." on Justia Law

In preparation for filing for a dissolution action, Elizabeth Johnson prepared several documents, including a petition for dissolution, a voluntary appearance for her then-husband, Kari Johnson, and a proposed dissolution decree. Kari signed the voluntary appearance and proposed decree. Elizabeth filed the petition for dissolution and Kari's voluntary appearance in the district court. The district court held a hearing that Kari did not attend, but the court found that the voluntary appearance signed by Kari established personal jurisdiction. The district court entered the decree, which required Kari to pay child support and alimony to Elizabeth. Kari moved to vacate the decree of dissolution, arguing that the decree was void because the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Kari when Elizabeth failed to serve Kari with process and Kari never waived service. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the voluntary appearance waived service, and thus, the court had jurisdiction. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Joni Mueller, an employee of the Lincoln Public Schools (LPS), sought workers' compensation benefits after she suffered a whole body injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. At issue was how to calculate Mueller's average weekly wage for workers' compensation purposes. As a school employee, Mueller worked only during the school year and did not work during summer vacation, but her salary was spread out so that she was paid every month of the year, including the summer months. The trial court determined the the basis of calculation should be what Mueller earned during the six months before her injury, not necessarily what she was paid, and awarded Mueller temporary and permanent disability benefits based upon its determinations. The review panel of the Workers' Compensation Court affirmed the award. On appeal, the reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not calculating Mueller's average weekly wage based upon her actual weekly income. Remanded. View "Mueller v. Lincoln Public Schools" on Justia Law

McKinnis Roofing and Sheet Metal and homeowner Jeffrey Hicks entered into two contracts. The first contract related to Hicks' roof, and the second contract related to copper awnings on Hicks' residence. McKinnis filed a complaint in the district court alleging that Hicks breached both contracts after Hicks refused McKinnis' demand for advance payment. After trial, he district court determined that Hicks had breached both contracts, awarding McKinnis damages in the amount of $4,419 with regard to the roofing contract and $789 with regard to the awning contract. McKinnis appealed, arguing that the district court erred in calculating the amount of damages to which it was entitled. Hicks cross-appealed and claimed that the district court erred when it determined that he breached the contracts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that based on the facts and contract language, Hicks did not breach either contract. View "McKinnis Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Hastings State Bank sought to enforce a commercial guaranty against Miriam Misle in her capacity as trustee of the Julius Misle Revocable Trust. The bank claimed that Julius had signed a guaranty in favor of the Bank, which guaranteed debt owed by a limited liability company. The district court determined that Julius' trust was liable for up to $500,000 in principal on the commercial guaranty and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the bank. After a trial, the district court found in favor of the bank and entered judgment in the amount of $500,000. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it granted partial summary judgment in the bank's favor and denied Miriam's motion for summary judgment; and (2) the district court's factual determination that the trust was liable for the full amount of the guaranty, $500,000, was supported by the evidence and was not clearly wrong. View "Hastings State Bank v. Misle" on Justia Law

Chicago Lumber recorded a construction lien on JoAnn Selvera's home and sued to foreclose the lien. Selvera brought a counterclaim under Neb. Rev. Stat. 52-157, which provides a remedy against claimants who, in bad faith, file liens, overstate liens, or refuse to release liens. Chicago Lumber eventually withdrew its foreclosure action and released its lien, but Selvera maintained her suit. The district court granted summary judgment to Selvera, concluding that (1) because Selvera had not received a copy of Chicago Lumber's lien within ten days of its recording, the lien was invalid; and (2) Chicago Lumber's failure to dismiss its action and to release the lien before it received Selvera's documents clarifying that she had paid her debt in full constituted bad faith. The court awarded Selvera $10,000 in attorney fees. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Chicago Lumber had a reasonable belief that its lien was valid, at least before it received Selvera's clarifying documents, Chicago Lumber did not act in bad faith. The Court concluded that after Chicago Lumber received the clarifying documents, questions of fact existed whether Chicago Lumber was acting in bad faith. Remanded. View "Chicago Lumber Co. of Omaha v. Selvera" on Justia Law