Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved an allegedly void trust that was executed and recorded in 1979 and to which several parcels of real property were purportedly deeded. The trust terms provided that it would terminate in 2004. In 2008, the trustees of the questioned trust deeded the property to the trust's purported beneficiaries. One of the settlor's children sued to set aside the trust and deeds and to quiet title in the property to the settlor's heirs at law. The district court determined that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. At issue on appeal was when the applicable statute of limitations began to run. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations for the plaintiff's claims had expired. View "Newman v. Liebig" on Justia Law

Jeffrey McCave was in his car, parked in the driveway of his father's house, when his father told him to leave. After McCave refused, his father called the police, who arrested McCave. McCave was subsequently convicted of DUI, refusing to submit to a chemical test, trespass, and possessing an open container. The district court affirmed the judgment of the county court. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of conviction for DUI, refusing to submit, and possessing an open container and remanded with directions to vacate those convictions and sentences, holding (1) McCave's arrest for DUI was unlawful because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest McCave, and therefore, the county court erred in failing to suppress evidence derived from the arrest, and the error was not harmless; (2) the unlawful arrest also rendered McCave's conviction for refusing to submit unlawful; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain McCave's conviction for possessing alcohol in an open container; and (4) the county court erred in excluding evidence relevant to the trespass charge and the statutory defense to that charge, and because the error was not harmless, the Court reversed this conviction and remanded for a new trial only on that charge. View "State v. McCave" on Justia Law

Two children were adjudicated and placed in the care and custody of their paternal Grandparents after their parents neglected them. Grandparents were eventually appointed the children's guardians. Subsequently, the children's Father, after completing drug court and obtaining counseling, sought to have the guardianship terminated and his children returned to him. The county court, finding that Father was not an unfit parent, ordered that the guardianship terminate. Grandparents appealed, arguing that the county court erred in incorrectly placing the burden of proof upon them instead of upon Father and applying the incorrect standard of proof in focusing upon parental unfitness instead of the best interests of the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the county court (1) correctly applied the parental preference principle, which serves to establish a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of a child are served by reuniting the child with his or her parent, and properly reasoned that the guardianship should be terminated in the absence of clear and convincing evidence by the Grandparents that Father was an unfit parent; and (2) correctly concluded that given the evidence, Father had not been proved unfit. View "In re Lakota Z." on Justia Law

Krista Rosencrans was severely injured when a train collided with a motor vehicle in which she was a passenger. Rosencrans and her mother (collectively, Appellants) brought a negligence action against Union Pacific and the operator of the motor vehicle. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, determining, among other things, that the claims that the train crew failed to maintain a proper lookout and failed to slow or stop the train to avoid a specific hazard were excessive speed claims and thus preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in finding that Appellants' state law negligence claim based on failure to slow the train was preempted where Appellants' claim based on Union Pacific's alleged failure to exercise ordinary care once it appeared that a collision would probably occur was not necessarily speed based and thus preempted. Remanded. View "Dresser v. Union Pacific R.R. Co." on Justia Law

John and Betty Vlasin leased the oil and gas rights to their land to Ranch Oil Company. Ranch Oil operated on one-half of the land in the lease and Byron Hummon operated on the other half. After the primary term of the lease expired and the wells stopped producing oil, the Vlasins entered into a new lease agreement with Hummon which encompassed the entirety of their land. Thereafter, Ranch Oil took action to revive one of its dormant wells, relying on a savings provision of the lease, which stated that the lease shall not terminate if the lessee commences operations for drilling a well within sixty days from such cessation. Plaintiffs, the Vlasins and Hummon, brought suit against Ranch Oil for declaratory judgment, trespass, and conversion. The court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs but awarded only nominal damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding (1) Ranch Oil's activities on the Vlasins land did not operate so as to extend Ranch Oil's interest in the lease, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to prove they were entitled to damages under trespass and conversion claims, and the Vlasins were entitled only to nominal damages. View "Bedore v. Ranch Oil Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Arthur Perina was charged with, among other things, motor vehicle homicide under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-306. Perina filed a motion to quash the motor vehicle homicide charge, asserting that section 28-306 was unconstitutional on the ground that it criminalized negligent acts. The county court overruled Perina's motion. Perina pled guilty to both charges, after which he renewed his constitutional challenge. It was again overruled. The district court affirmed Perina's convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in rejecting Perina's constitutional arguments or affirming the county court's decision to convict him of motor vehicle homicide without proof of mens rea because motor vehicle homicide is a public welfare offense that does not require proof of mens rea. View "State v. Perina" on Justia Law

Cesar Penado was charged with murder in the first degree, use of a weapon to commit a felony, and burglary. The district court found that Penado was not competent to stand trial and determined that there was not a substantial likelihood that he may become competent in the foreseeable future. The State appealed. After concluding that the competency order was not a final order for the purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2315.05, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the State did not appeal from a final order as required by section 29-2315.01. View "State v. Penado" on Justia Law

Joshua Alfredson was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual assault and second degree false imprisonment. The trial court subsequently determined that an aggravated offense had been established and, as a result, subjected Alfredson to lifetime community supervision as part of his sentence. The court of appeals affirmed Alfredson's convictions and sentences, concluding (1) the trial court erred by failing to submit to the jury the aggravated offense determination regarding whether the offense included the use of force or the threat of serious violence pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 83-174.03, but (2) the error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court's error was not harmless because the Court could not say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have found that Alfredson used force or the threat of serious violence in compelling the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. Remanded. View "State v. Alfredson" on Justia Law

Employee of Union Pacific Railroad Company brought an action against Union Pacific, claiming that Union Pacific's negligence resulted in toxic fume exposures that led to health problems for Employee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, finding that under McNeel v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., Employee had not presented sufficient evidence of causation because he had not identified a specific toxin to which he was exposed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because although McNeel was applicable to Employee's case, Employee presented sufficient evidence of a toxic exposure to present a genuine issue of material fact. Remanded. View "Golden v. Union Pacific R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Jerad Parks was charged with first degree sexual assault on a child. Although Parks was twenty-four years old at the time he was charged, he filed a motion to transfer to the juvenile court because he was a juvenile at the time of the offenses. The district court denied the motion. Parks then pled no contest to attempted second degree sexual assault and felony child abuse. The district court ordered Parks to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Parks' motion to transfer because under the plain language of the juvenile code, the juvenile court's jurisdiction ends when the juvenile reaches the age of majority; and (2) because Parks pled no contest to a registrable offense under SORA, the plain language of the statute required Parks to register as a sex offender. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law