Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Ronald Smith was convicted of murder in the second degree and related offenses. Smith appealed his conviction for second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed after (1) reaffirming the holdings of State v. Pettit and Bosche v. State that an intentional killing committed without malice upon a sudden quarrel constitutes the offense of manslaughter, and overruling the holding of State v. Jones that the distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel is the presence or absence of an intention to kill; (2) holding that the step instruction given in this case was not a correct statement of the law because it (i) required the jury to convict on second degree murder if it found that Smith killed the victim intentionally but (ii) did not permit the jury to consider the alternative possibility that the killing was intentional but provoked by a sudden quarrel and, therefore, constituted manslaughter; and (3) concluding that because there was no evidence in the record upon which the jury could have concluded that Smith committed sudden quarrel manslaughter instead of second degree murder, the improper jury instruction did not prejudice Smith or affect his substantial rights. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Richard Halverstadt was convicted of violating Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6.294 and 60-6,300 after being cited for hauling an overweight load on a Nebraska roadway. Halverstadt's load exceeded both the weight limits of his special county permit and the statutory weight limits on two axles and in gross weight. The district court affirmed. Halverstadt appealed, contending that the statutes did not apply to his actions because he possessed a special permit. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Halverstadt's convictions under section 60-6,294 for axle weight violations, holding that Halverstadt was properly cited and convicted under that statute; (2) held that the county court improperly revoked Halverstadt's special permit when his violation consisted solely of exceeding the weight limitations specified by the county permit; and (3) reversed Halverstadt's conviction for violating section 60-6,300 for a statutory gross weight violation because he was operating under a special permit. Remanded. View "State v. Halverstadt" on Justia Law

Terry Graff was convicted of violating a protection order and was sentenced to twelve months' probation. Graff appealed to the district court, which affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a defendant can be convicted of knowingly violating a protection order of which he has actual notice if he was not personally served with that order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) personal service was specifically required by Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-311.09 and hence was an element of the crime; and (2) because personal service was required, but did not occur, there was insufficient evidence to convict Graff. Remanded with instructions to dismiss the charge. View "State v. Graff" on Justia Law

Appellant Tymar, LLC filed an application with the Nebraska Public Service Commission seeking authority to operate as a common carrier of household goods in intrastate commerce. Appellees, other common carriers in the area, filed protests to Tymar's application. After a hearing, the Commission denied the application, determining that Tymar had failed to establish its prima facie case that it met the standards for approval of its application under the regulatory scheme imposed by Neb. Rev. Stat. 75-301. The district court affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether requests for admissions Tymar tendered to Appellees but which Appellees did not answer should have been deemed admitted under Neb. R. Civ. P. R. 36. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission erred when it did not give legal effect to the substance of the unanswered requests, and the district court erred as a matter of law when it failed to correct the Commission's rulings regarding these requests for admissions. Remanded with directions to reconsider Tymar's application. View "Tymar, LLC v. Two Men and a Truck" on Justia Law

Appellees, record owners of surface property, brought an equitable action pursuant to Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes, claiming the property's severed mineral interests had been abandoned pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 57-229 and seeking an order vesting title to all several mineral rights in them. The district court entered an order finding Appellants, the owners of the severed mineral rights, had abandoned the mineral interests under section 57-229 because for more than twenty-three years preceding the filing of the complaint, Appellants had not publicly exercised rights of ownership. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes were not applied retroactively to Appellants and the district court did not err in determining that those interests had been abandoned under the provisions of section 57-229. View "Peterson v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Danny O'Neall was injured while working for Sadler Line Construction, a subcontractor of Alliance Construction. Sadler had commercial general liability (CGL) coverage with Federated Service Inusrance Company. In the underlying personal injury action, O'Neall sued Alliance and Sadler for negligence. In the instant action, Federated filed a declaratory judgment action against Alliance, alleging that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Alliance against O'Neall's personal injury action. The district court granted summary judgment for Federated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the parties, by requiring Sadler to name Alliance as an additional insured on its CGL policy, intended that Sadler would insure against loss caused by Alliance's negligence; and (2) Sadler's additional insured endorsement, which provided coverage for liability arising out of Sadler's operations, was broad enough to include coverage for Alliance's negligence even if Sadler was not negligent. Remanded. View "Federated Serv. Ins. Co. v. Alliance Constr." on Justia Law

Under a plea bargain, Donald Lee pleaded nolo contendere to one count of second degree murder. The district court sentenced Lee to a term of seventy years to life in prison. Lee subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, claiming violations of his right to a speedy trial, his right to due process, and his right to effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion without granting an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the record did not affirmatively show that Lee's ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his speedy trial rights was without merit. Remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Darlene Howsden was injured on premises that were leased to her employer by a legally distinct entity that was owned and operated by the same shareholders as her employer. Plaintiff sued Defendant, the entity that owned the premises, for negligence. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the exclusive remedy rule extended to Defendant because (1) Defendant was a legally separate entity from Plaintiff's employer, despite their corporate kinship, and there was no equitable basis to justify piercing the corporate veil between the two entities; and (2) therefore, Defendant was a third party to the employment relationship between Plaintiff and her employer, so Plaintiff's third-party claim against Defendant was not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act. View "Howsden v. Roper's Real Estate Co." on Justia Law

The County of Dixon did work on Landowners' property, including grading and removing fences and trees, as part of a road maintenance project. Landowners eventually brought an inverse condemnation proceeding. The district court awarded Landowners damages of $4,049 and attorney fees in the amount of $5,600. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the court of appeals' decision that affirmed the award of attorney fees, holding that the court of appeals misconstrued the controlling statutes; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded with directions to award reasonable attorney fees under both Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-720 and 76-726(2). View "Armstrong v. County of Dixon" on Justia Law

The City of Scottsbluff implemented changes to police officers' health insurance coverage and related benefits without bargaining with the Scottsbluff Police Officers Association (the Union). The Union filed a petition with the Nebraska Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), alleging that the City violated Nebraska's Industrial Relations Act (IRA) by unilaterally implementing changes in the health insurance hazardous activities exclusion and by unilaterally changing the group health care benefits. The CIR (1) determined that the City violated the IRA, ordered the City to return the parties to the status quo ante, and ordered the parties to commence good faith negotiations within thirty days; and (2) determined that the Union had not violated the IRA in refusing to execute a previously ratified agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the portion of the CIR's order requiring the parties to commence good faith negotiations on the health insurance issues was affirmed; and (2) the Union's refusal to execute the previously ratified agreement constituted a prohibited practice under the IRA. Remanded to determine what remedies were available to the City for the Union's violation. View "Scottsbluff Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Scottsbluff" on Justia Law