Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant Jorge Vigil was found guilty of sexual assault of a child. Vigil appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in overruling his motion in limine and allowing a video-recorded interview of the victim to be heard by the jury after finding that the interview was admissible under Neb. R. Evid. 803(3), a hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. At issue was whether the statements were admissible when some time had passed since the sexual assaults and the victim did not see the physician the day of the interview. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that the elements of the medical purpose exception found in Rule 803(3) were met. View "State v. Vigil" on Justia Law

The Lesiaks were farmers who suffered a reduced corn yield, allegedly due to the overapplication of herbicide to their crops by Central Valley Ag Cooperative, Inc. (CVA). The Lesiaks filed this action against CVA, asserting multiple theories of recovery, including negligence, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of implied warranty of services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CVA on the implied warranty of services and negligence claims. Following the Lesiaks' presentation of their case, the district court granted CVA's motion for a directed verdict on the Lesiaks' remaining claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of CVA as there was evidence in the record which would allow a jury to find the overapplication of the herbicide damaged the Lesiaks' fields and also to reasonably estimate the extent of the damage; and (2) the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Lesiaks' negligence claim, as it was not barred by the economic loss doctrine. View "Lesiak v. Central Valley Ag Coop., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Joshua Nolan was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony in connection with the killing of Justin Gaines. Nolan, relying primarily on inconsistencies among the statements and testimony of the State's witnesses, argued that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Nolan had shot and killed Gaines. A jury convicted Nolan of both charges. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial judge did not err in failing to recuse himself; (2) the step instruction used in this case was not constitutionally infirm; (3) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict; and (4) trial counsel did not perform in a deficient manner. View "State v. Nolan" on Justia Law

Timothy Jimenez pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Jimenez was arrested in Colorado. He failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, and the county attorney obtained a warrant for his arrest. Thereafter, a detainer was placed on Jiminez in Nebraska. Jimenez then requested a final disposition or an order directing the State to release the detainer. The district court denied Jimenez's request, determining that the interstate Agreement on Detainers, which allows a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged to demand a speedy disposition of outstanding charges, did not apply because Jimenez had no untried matters pending in Nebraska. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding Jimenez was not eligible to invoke the Agreement, as a detainer for a person who has been convicted of a criminal offense but not sentenced does not relate to an "untried indictment, information or complaint" under the Agreement and thus does not trigger the procedural requirements of the Agreement. View "State v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

Prime Home Care, LLC sought a permanent injunction pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 87-217, part of the statutes governing the protection of trade names, and Neb. Rev. Stat. 87-303, part of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, to prevent Pathways to Compassion, LLC from using the name "Compassionate Care Hospice." The district court granted Prime Home Care a permanent injunction and attorney fees. Pathways appealed, arguing that "Compassionate Care Hospice" was merely descriptive and had not acquired secondary meaning. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the name had acquired secondary meaning as it concerned Prime Home Care's hospice services; (2) the district court did not err when it granted Prime Home Care's request for a permanent injunction where confusion existed as a result of Pathways' use of Prime Home Care's protected trade name; and (3) the trial court did not err in granting Prime Home Care's request for attorney fees under either section 87-217 or section 87-303, and Prime Home Care was not entitled to additional attorney fees. View "Prime Home Care, LLC v. Pathways to Compassion, LLC" on Justia Law

Thomas & Thomas Court Reporters sued Douglas Switzer, an attorney, and his law firm, Hathaway & Switzer (Hathaway Switzer), for failure to pay for court reporting services. The district court entered judgment for Thomas & Thomas. At issue on appeal was whether Hathaway Switzer was liable to Thomas & Thomas for its fees or whether Hathaway Switzer's clients were. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's judgment to the extent that it held Hathaway Switzer rather than Hathaway Switzer's clients liable, as Hathaway Switzer had not disclaimed liability for those fees; and (2) reversed the court's judgment to the extent that it held Switzer personally liable. Remanded with directions to dismiss Thomas & Thomas' claim against Switzer as an individual. View "Thomas & Thomas Court Reporters, LLC v. Switzer" on Justia Law

Alma Gonzalez was convicted of fraudulently obtaining public assistance benefits based upon a no contest plea that she entered pursuant to a plea agreement. Over two years after her sentencing, Gonzalez filed a motion to withdraw her plea, alleging that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney had not explained that her plea would result in automatic deportation. The district court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) procedurally, Gonzalez was permitted to move for withdrawal of her plea; but (2) Gonzalez failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that withdrawal of her plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Robert Dunkin pled no contest to the charge of murder in the second degree. The district court accepted Dunkin's plea, entered a judgment of guilty, and sentenced Dunkin to forty years to life imprisonment. Dunkin filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) Dunkin was not pressured or coerced to enter his plea; (2) Dunkin failed to establish that counsel's preparation for the case was unreasonable or inadequate; (3) Dunkin's counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue of competency; (4) Dunkin's allegation that a specific sentence was promised or that the plea agreement was conditioned on such a sentence was without merit; and (5) Dunkin's counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal where Dunkin and counsel had no contact following the sentencing proceedings. View "State v. Dunkin" on Justia Law

On March 21, 2006, Julie Lovelace was injured in the course of her employment with the City of Lincoln. Lovelace continued to work after her injury up until June 22, 2006, the date of the surgery on her knee. Lovelace returned to work on October 2, 2006 until November 6, 2007, when she was again injured. Lovelace had another surgery on her left knee on December 19, 2007. Lovelace did not return to work, and the City subsequently terminated her employment. Lovelace sought payments for temporary total disability. The workers' compensation court found Lovelace had been temporarily totally disabled from June 22, 2006 through October 1, 2006, and again from December 19, 2007 through August 19, 2009, and thereafter became permanently and totally disabled. A three-judge panel of the compensation court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Lovelace was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits for the period of time after she was injured and while she was working between October 2, 2006 and December 18, 2007; and (2) Lovelace was entitled to permanent total disability payments from December 19, 2007 onward. View "Lovelace v. City of Lincoln" on Justia Law

Chad Norman pled no contest to third degree assault and was sentenced to probation for two years and jail for thirty days. After a hearing, the district court also ordered Norman to register under Nebraska's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Norman appealed the portion of his sentence requiring him to register, claiming he was denied due process. The Supreme Court reversed the registration order, holding (1) before a court orders a defendant to be subject to SORA pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4003(1)(b)(i), the court must make a finding whether the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact as part of the incident that gave rise to the defendant's conviction for one of the offenses not sexual in nature listed in section 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B); (2) the court must provide procedural due process when it makes this finding, including proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and (3) although the court in this case provided Norman with notice and a hearing, the court erred when it based its finding solely on statements in the State's factual basis for Norman's plea and explicitly ignored the evidence at the hearing. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Norman" on Justia Law