Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The juveniles in these two cases, Charlicia H. and Jauvier P., were both adjudicated for law violations. Following an evaluation, Charlicia was placed with the Office of Juvenile Services (OJC), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Subsequently, the juvenile court discharged OJS, and Charlicia was transferred to Office of Probation Administration (Probation). Jauvier was temporarily placed at OJS, but after Jauvier was placed with an aunt, the juvenile court discharged OJS and transferred Jauvier to Probation. DHHS appealed, arguing that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to transfer a juvenile from OJS to Probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court had the authority to discharge the OJS and instead place the juveniles in the instant cases on probation. View "In re Charlicia H." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose from a paternity action in which the lower court issued a parenting time order. The district court found that Father was in contempt of the parenting time order and ordered him to pay certain related expenses incurred by Mother. The court also found Mother in "technical contempt" of the parenting time order but did not impose any sanction on her. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in finding both parties in contempt of orders pertaining to parenting time; (2) did not abuse its discretion in imposing a monetary sanction against Father for his contempt; and (3) abused its discretion in not imposing a monetary sanction against Mother for her comparable contempt. Remanded with directions to determine the appropriate sanction to be imposed for Mother's contempt. View "Hossaini v. Vaelizadeh" on Justia Law

While Husband and Wife were married, Wife conceived Child. After Child was born, Husband signed the birth certificate as Child's father. Husband and Wife subsequently divorced, and the district court incorporated the provisions of a custody agreement signed by Husband that acknowledged Husband to be Child's father. Later, Husband underwent a paternity test demonstrating that Husband was not Child's father. Husband then filed a complaint to set aside legal determination of paternity, alleging a decree modifying or setting aside the custody and child support order in the decree of dissolution was warranted on the grounds of fraud or newly discovered evidence, or under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1401 to 43-1418. The district court denied the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Husband could not rely on section 43-1412.01, which gives the court discretion to determine whether disestablishment of paternity is appropriate in light of the adjudicated father's interests and best interests of the child, because he was married to Wife when Child was conceived. Remanded. View "Alicia C. v. Jeremy C." on Justia Law

Randal R. was the father of Ryder J. The State twice charged Randal for abusing Crue J., Ryder's half brother who was not related to Randal. Randal pled no contest both times. The State moved to terminate Randal's parental rights to Ryder, arguing that the repeated abuse of Crue was grounds for termination even though Randal never abused Ryder. Following trial, the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, terminated Randal's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sufficient statutory grounds existed for the termination; and (2) the State proved that Randal was an unfit parent and termination was in Ryder's best interests. View "In re Ryder J." on Justia Law

John Doe filed a lawsuit arising from the termination of his enrollment as a medical student at the University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC) against the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska and several faculty members (Defendants). During the pendency of the case, all causes of action except the claim for breach of contract were dismissed. The district court determined that Doe's dismissal was not in violation of a contract between Doe and UNMC regarding the conditions of Doe's continued enrollment. The court then sustained Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing Doe's cause of action for breach of contract and thereby dismissing the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that UNMC did not breach its contract with Doe when it terminated his enrollment, and although the Court's reasoning differed from that of the district court, the court did not err when it sustained Defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Doe v. Bd. of Regents" on Justia Law

A jury convicted LeRoy Parmar of first degree murder for the 1987 killing of Frederick Cox, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment. In 2005, Parmar moved to have the DNA testing performed on evidence used at trial. The laboratory's analysis of the DNA samples from Cox's bedsheet excluded Parmar as a contributor to the DNA found in those samples. Parmar subsequently filed a motion requesting the court to vacate his conviction or grant him a new trial. The district court overruled Parmar's motion, concluding (1) Parmar was not entitled to have his conviction vacated because the DNA testing did not conclusively establish his innocence; and (2) Parmar was not entitled to a new trial because the evidence would not have produced a substantially different result. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the DNA evidence did not exonerate Parmar of guilt, but the evidence excluded Parmar's DNA from a crucial piece of evidence and contradicted the eyewitness testimony crucial to the State's conviction; and (2) thus, the DNA evidence probably would have produced a substantially different result if it had been available at trial. Remanded with direction to grant Parmar a new trial. View "State v. Parmar" on Justia Law

Adam Martensen filed a negligence action against Rejda Brothers, alleging that he was injured in an accident when he was working in a pasture on a ranch owned and operated by Rejda and that Rejda, as his employer, was negligent when it failed to make a timely effort to search for, discover, and rescue him. The court entered judgment in favor of Martensen and awarded damages of $750,000, plus taxable court costs and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court (1) held that the district court did not err when it concluded Rejda owed a duty to Martensen; (2) found no prejudicial evidentiary rulings; (3) determined that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence; (4) affirmed the award based on the jury verdict and the award of taxable costs; and (5) reversed the amount of prejudgment interest awarded, concluding that the district court erred in its reading of Neb. Rev. Stat. 45-103.02(1). Remanded for a recalculation of prejudgment interest. View "Martensen v. Rejda Bros." on Justia Law

S.C. was convicted of sexual assault of a child. The mental health board subsequently found S.C. to be a dangerous sex offender under the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA) and ordered him to undergo secure inpatient treatment. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) S.C.'s due process rights were not violated when the State did not allow him to undergo sex offender treatment while still incarcerated, as obtaining treatment was not necessary to affect S.C.'s release from prison, no statutory language existed to create a substantive right to treatment, and SOCA was civil and nonpunitive in nature; and (2) The State presented clear and convincing evidence that S.C. was a dangerous sex offender and that secure inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative. View "In re Interest of S.C." on Justia Law

Heritage Bank sued Jerome Bruha on promissory notes that it had purchased from the FDIC. The FDIC had obtained the notes after it became a receiver for the failed bank that had initially lent the money to Bruha. The notes secured lines of credit for Bruha's benefit. The district court granted summary judgment to Heritage and awarded it $61,384 on one of the notes. The primary issues on appeal were whether the holder-in-due-course rule of Nebraska's Uniform Commercial Code or federal banking law barred Bruha's defenses to the enforcement of the note. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed in part, concluding that federal law barred Bruha's defenses; and (2) reversed in part because of a minor error in the court's calculation of interest. Remanded. View "Heritage Bank v. Bruha" on Justia Law

Marco Torres was convicted by jury of two counts of first degree murder, one count of robbery, three counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and one count of unauthorized use of a financial transaction device. Torres was sentenced to death on each count of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Torres' conviction and death sentence, holding (1) the district court (i) did not err in making certain evidentiary rulings, and where it did err in admitting certain evidence, the error was harmless, and (ii) did not err in overruling Torres' motion to suppress; and (2) the sentencing panel, among other things, (i) did not err by receiving for purposes of the State's proof of aggravating circumstances the trial court's bill of exceptions over Torres' objections, (ii) did not err in finding certain statutes challenged by Torres to be constitutional, (iii) incorrectly considered the mental suffering of one of Torres' victims in determining whether an aggravating circumstance was in existence, but the failure of this one finding did not affect the existence of the aggravator, and (iv) did not err in concluding that no statutory or nonstatutory mitigating factors existed. View "State v. Torres" on Justia Law