Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tyler Britt was convicted in the county court of first-offense driving under the influence with a concentration of more than .15 of one gram alcohol per 210 liters of breath. The district court affirmed the conviction. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that the admission of a certificate containing a chemical analysis certification of the alcohol breath simulator solution used to test the machine that was used to test Britt's breath did not violate the confrontation clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err when it concluded that the certificate was not testimonial, and therefore not subject to confrontation analysis; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion when it did not note plain error with regard to Britt's hearsay objections. View "State v. Britt" on Justia Law

This proceeding arose from an objection filed on March 6, 2012 by Appellant, the Nebraska Republican Party, with the Nebraska Secretary of State in which it challenged, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 32-624, the candidate filing of Bob Kerrey for the U.S. Senate. The Secretary of State issued his determination opinion concluding that Kerrey's name could appear on the May 15, 2012 primary election ballot. Appellant filed a petition for review of the determination opinion. The district court dismissed the case on March 21, 2012 with prejudice. At issue on appeal was whether section 32-624, which requires that an order be made by a judge "on or before the fifty-fifth day preceding the election" in order to reverse a decision of the Secretary of State, would prohibit the Supreme Court from granting relief after that fifty-five-day limitation period had run. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under the statutory procedure established by the Legislature, it lacked the authority to grant the relief sought by Appellant because the fifty-five limitation period had run. View "Neb. Republican Party v. Gale" on Justia Law

The juvenile court signed written orders committing and transferring a juvenile to the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center (YRTC). The orders were made in error and did not reflect the court's orally pronounced intention to pursue foster placement for the juvenile. In a subsequent written order, the court vacated and corrected the erroneous orders, but the juvenile had already been transferred to the YRTC. Despite the court's insistence that the juvenile be returned, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) refused to do so and appealed the juvenile court's order. While the appeal was pending, DHHS obtained an order from the court of appeals staying the juvenile court's corrected order. This left the juvenile in the YRTC, where she completed her program, was paroled, and was subsequently discharged from parole. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals as moot, as there was no longer an actual case or controversy requiring judicial resolution. View "In re Shaleia M." on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Benjamin Sprunger was convicted of four counts of possessing child pornography. Sprunger appealed, challenging the search that uncovered the images and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court should have suppressed the fruits of the search, as (1) probable cause did not support the warrant to search Sprunger's computers for child pornography; and (2) the warrant was lacking probable cause to such a degree that the officers' reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable and thus did not bring it within the U.S. v. Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. View "State v. Sprunger" on Justia Law

A jury found William Kinser guilty of felony flight to avoid arrest and found Kinser to be a habitual criminal. Kinser appealed, contending that the habitual criminal determination was erroneous because the flight to avoid arrest conviction was enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony based upon Kinser's willful reckless operation of a motor vehicle and that any further enhancement under the habitual criminal statute would result in an improper double enhancement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Kinser was properly sentenced as a habitual criminal; and (2) the district court did not impose an erroneous sentence for Kinser's flight to avoid arrest conviction. View "State v. Kinser" on Justia Law

This case arose from the settlement of a personal injury lawsuit filed by Edward Smalley, who was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident. Although Smalley qualified for Medicaid as a result of the accident, the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Nebraska's Medicaid administrator, refused to pay Smalley's outstanding medical bills prior to the disposition of his third-party liability claims. To facilitate a settlement of those claims, Smalley's attorney agreed that if DHHS paid the medical bills at the discounted Medicaid rate, Smalley would reimburse DHHS dollar-for-dollar out of the settlement proceeds. After DHHS paid the bills as agreed, Smalley objected to full reimbursement as contrary to federal law. The district court determined that under federal law, DHHS was entitled to reimbursement of only a portion of the Medicaid payments it had made. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that DHHS was entitled to full reimbursement. View "Smalley v. Neb. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Karlie D.'s mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Karlie, and Karlie's father later died. The Nebraska Deaprtment of Health and Human Services placed Karlie in foster care, but Karlie's parental grandmother, Martha D., moved to have Karlie placed with her and her husband and to become Karlie's guardian. The juvenile court adopted a transition plan, against the Department's recommendation, which permanently moved Karlie to live with her grandparents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the court's order affected a substantial right of the State, the order was final and appealable; and (2) because Martha was fully capable of caring for Karlie, had established a relationship with her, and was her grandmother, it was in Karlie's best interests to be placed with Martha. View "In re Karlie D." on Justia Law

The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) provided Medicaid benefits for Virginia Lee Cushing during the final years of her life. After her death, DHHS filed a claim against Cushing's estate for recovery of the benefits pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 68-919. The personal representative of the estate appealed from an order of the county court allowing the claim and awarding interest. At issue on appeal was whether DHHS timely presented its claim and, if so, whether it was proved as a matter of law. The Supreme Court concluded the claim was both timely presented and proved as a matter of law but modified the award of interest. View "In re Estate of Cushing" on Justia Law

Dwight Trumble owned property in Sarpy County and paid two levies for the support of school districts in the Learning Community of Douglas and Sarpy Counties (Learning Community). Trumble subsequently brought suit under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1735 against the school districts in the Learning Community, claiming the levies were unconstitutional. The district court determined it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a suit to recover unconstitutional taxes cannot be brought under section 77-1735; (2) Trumble filed suit outside the tax year in which the challenged taxes were levied or assessed, so the district court did not have jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,149; and (3) since the district court lacked jurisdiction, it properly dismissed the action. View "Trumble v. Sarpy County Board" on Justia Law

David and Wilai Burden provided childcare services in their home. The Southwind Homeowners Association filed suit against the Burdens, alleging that the childcare services as provided violated several restrictive covenants applicable to the premises and asking that the Burdens be enjoined from providing those services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association, concluding that the childcare services were in violation of several restrictive covenants, and granted an injunction. The Burdens appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate where no genuine issues of material fact remained, and as a matter of law, the Burdens' activities on the property violated the Association's covenants. View "Southwind Homeowners Ass'n v. Burden" on Justia Law