Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, claiming that the State violated his due process rights by presenting fabricated evidence during his trial, and alleging several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the following two claims required an evidentiary hearing: (1) that the State presented fabricated forensic evidence at Defendant's trial; and (2) that Defendant's trial counsel had a conflict of interest because of his relationship with the officer accused of fabricating evidence. View "State v. Edwards" on Justia Law

An hourly employee who worked part-time while attending college sustained a work-related injury. At issue before the Supreme Court was how to calculate the employee's average weekly wage in order to determine the appropriate vocational rehabilitation priority - using his part-time wages, as the employer contended, or wages calculated using a forty-hour workweek, as the court below ruled. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of the compensation court, holding that under the circumstances of this case, a vocational rehabilitation plan seeking an average weekly wage based on a forty-hour week - the calculation used for purposes of permanent disability - best restored the employee to suitable employment. View "Becerra v. UPS" on Justia Law

The district court gave a pro se inmate notice of the court's intent to dismiss the inmate's marital dissolution proceeding but identified two ways of avoiding dismissal. The inmate timely performed one of the court's specified actions. Despite this compliance and without explanation, the court dismissed the inmate's complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that because the prison previously had denied the inmate transportation and telephone access to the court, the inmate would be unable to attend any hearing no matter how many motions he made. The Supreme Court reversed where (1) the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the inmate's complaint without explanation even though the inmate did what the court instructed, and (2) the court of appeals erred in basing its decision on predictions of future events. Remanded. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

This was an action for partition of the real property in the estate of Ronald McKillip. At the time of his death, McKillip owned four tracts of land. McKillip's will left the property to his three daughters, "share and share alike." The probate court confirmed ownership of the real estate to the daughters in equal shares. One daughter brought an action to partition the real estate. A referee appointed by the county court determined that a partition in kind of the real estate was not possible and recommended a public sale. The court approved the report and concluded that the real estate could not be partitioned in kind "without great prejudice to the owners." The court ordered the referee to sell the real estate, and the personal representative appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the real estate should be partitioned in kind. Remanded with directions. View "In re Estate of McKillip" on Justia Law

Erick M., a juvenile, requested that the juvenile court enter an order finding that under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), he was eligible for "special immigrant juvenile" (SIJ) status. SIJ status allows a juvenile immigrant to remain in the United States and seek lawful permanent resident status if federal authorities conclude that the statutory conditions are met. The conditions include a court order determining that the juvenile's reunification with "1 or both" parents is not feasible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The juvenile court found Erick did not satisfy that requirement. At issue on appeal was the meaning of the phrase "1 or both" parents. Erick lived only with his mother when the juvenile court adjudicated him as a dependent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when ruling on a petitioner's motion for an eligibility order under section 1101(a)(27)(J), a court should generally consider whether reunification with either parent is feasible; and (2) therefore, the juvenile court did no err in finding that because reunification with Erick's mother was feasible, he was not eligible for SIJ status. View "In re Interest of Erick H." on Justia Law