Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of theft by shoplifting, $200 or less. The district court relied on two prior county court convictions to enhance the crime for punishment as a Class IV felony. In the second of these two prior proceedings, the county court had refused to enhance the conviction and had treated it as a first offense. Defendant argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel required the district court to treat the instant conviction as only a second offense, and thus, as a Class I misdemeanor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for enhancement as a third or subsequent offense, the plain language of the relevant statute required only that Defendant have been previously convicted of two instances of theft by shoplifting, whether the earlier convictions were called first offense or second offense; and (2) Defendant's two prior convictions clearly satisfied this requirement. View "State v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and no drug tax stamp. The principle issue on appeal was whether a reasonable person would understand that a general consent to search a vehicle for illegal drugs authorized the opening of a gift-wrapped box in the vehicle's storage area. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the possession of a controlled substance conviction, holding that because (i) the object of the search was clearly disclosed, (ii) the container was not equivalent to a locked container and was not destroyed, and (iii) the consent was not withdrawn after the officer's interest in the container was communicated to its owner, the search did not exceed the scope of the consent; but (2) reversed the no drug tax stamp conviction, holding that the record contained no evidence of the absence of a drug tax stamp. View "State v. Howell" on Justia Law

This appeal, filed by brothers Gary and Dennis Baasch (Appellants), concerned disputed land located in Howard County. After a bench trial, the district court for Howard County denied Gary Baasch's counterclaim for quiet title. The court found that husband and wife Paul and Betty Lou Obermiller (Appellees) owned all the land they claimed to own, that the fence constructed by Appellants was on Appellees' land, and that Gary Baasch did not own any of the disputed land. The court also found that Appellants had trespassed, ordered them to remove the fence, and enjoined them from blocking access to the land owned by Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) Appellees were the rightful owners of the disputed land; (2) because Appellees owned the land, Appellants' intentional installation of a fence on the land constituted a continuous trespass; and (3) Appellees were entitled to an injunction. View "Obermiller v. Baasch" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of one count of attempted first degree sexual assault and one count of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child. During the proceedings, the jurors were addressed by juror number instead of by name, with a few exceptions. Noting plain error, the court of appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial after determining that the district court abused its discretion in impaneling an "anonymous jury." The Supreme court reversed, holding that Defendant waived any objection to the jury that was impaneled, and plain error review was improper because the record did not plainly show that the district court impaneled an anonymous jury. Remanded. View "State v. Nadeem" on Justia Law

The parties here were the surviving children of Decedent. Under Decedent's will, they were beneficiaries of a joint life estate interest in farmland. The will provided that no life tenant or remainderman could partition the property during the existence of any life tenancy. Through a codicil, Decedent later added a provision disinheriting any child who contested his will. After the probate court entered the final order in the probate proceeding, Appellees brought a partition action to divide the property. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that Appellees were not bound by the will's restriction against a partition because they had not contested the will during the probate proceeding. Appellants then filed a declaratory judgment, claiming that Appellees had forfeited their inheritance by contesting the will through the partition action. The district court dismissed Appellants' action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that Appellants' partition action was not a will contest because it was filed after the estate was closed. View "Martin v. Ullsperger" on Justia Law

The district court placed Appellant's corporation, a cemetery association, into receivership and approved the winding up of the business and its dissolution. The court then fashioned an equitable remedy for distribution of the resulting funds, which Appellant challenged on appeal. At issue was whether the district court had the power to take these actions. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the district court properly appointed the receiver; but (2) because the statutory requirements for judicial dissolution were not met, the receiver's actions in winding up Floral Lawns and selling its assets were improper and outside the power of the court to approve. The Court then crafted a remedy according to equitable principles. View "Floral Lawns Mem'l Gardens Ass'n v. Becker" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with numerous crimes, including first degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and two weapons charges. A jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Defendant appealed, asserting (1) the prosecutor improperly removed a prospective juror from the jury pool because the of the juror's race, (2) the police did not properly advise him of his Miranda rights, and (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his criminal conspiracy conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor's reasons for striking the prospective juror were race neutral and, overall, persuasive; (2) although the Miranda warnings did not expressly state that Defendant was entitled to appointed counsel before questioning, that information was obviously implied from the warnings that the police read to him; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the criminal conspiracy conviction. View "State v. Nave" on Justia Law

After successfully appealing his conviction for first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony, Appellant pled guilty upon remand to manslaughter and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Appellant asserted that the second judge was vindictive because of Appellant's successful appeal and, thus, imposed a harsher sentence for the weapons conviction in violation of Appellant's due process rights. At issue was whether the presumption of vindictiveness applies when a different judge gives a greater sentence after the defendant successfully appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a vindictiveness presumption does not apply when there is a different sentencing judge after a successful appeal; and (2) furthermore, the second district court judge did not act with actual vindictiveness. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

Owners of a duplex insured a building through two concurrently issued, identical policies - one for each unit. A fire damages the entire structure, and Insurer paid the owners' claims under both policies. Insurer then brought this action to determine its subrogation rights against the tenant (Tenant) of one of the duplex units, who was allegedly negligent in starting the fire. Insurer conceded the pursuant to Tri-Par Investments v. Sousa, Tenant was an implied coinsured under the policy covering the unit he lived in. Therefore, Insurer sought to recoup payments made for the damage only to the unit Tenant did not live in. The district court granted Tenant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting Tenant's motion for summary judgment, as the rule in Tri-Par Investments applies to bar subrogation against a duplex tenant as to both sides of the building; (2) ruling that Tenant was a coinsured with Owners under Nebraska law; (3) failing to rule that Insurer was allowed to subrogate against Tenant; and (4) denying Insurer's request for declaratory judgment. View "Buckeye State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Humlicek" on Justia Law

This was an appeal after summary judgment in a medical malpractice action. A kidney donor brought suit after his donated kidney was rendered useless by allegedly negligent medical treatment provided to the donee. At issue was whether a duty of care is owed to a kidney donor by the physicians providing posttransplant treatment to the donee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in this instance, a physician does not owe a duty of care to a kidney donor during the posttransplant treatment and care of the donee, and therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Olson v. Wrenshall" on Justia Law