Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee, an undocumented worker, was injured while working for Employer. Employee was awarded temporary total disability benefits. Employer later petitioned the workers' compensation court to discontinue the temporary benefits. While the action was pending, Employee returned to his county of origin. The compensation court concluded (1) Employer's obligation to pay Employee temporary total disability should cease because Employee had reached maximum medical improvement; and (2) there was no credible evidence which could be used to determine Employee's loss of earning capacity in his new community, and therefore, Employee's request for benefits for his claim of permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity was denied. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the compensation court's conclusion that Employee had reached maximum medical improvement; but (2) reversed the denial of Employee's claim of permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity because where no credible data exists for the community to which the employee has relocated, the community where the injury occurred can serve as the hub community. Remanded. View "Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a Defendant who was sentenced by two different judges at different times in two criminal cases. At issue was how to properly credit Defendant with time served on both cases. The record showed that 498 days of Defendant's presentence confinement qualified as credit in either case. Defendant asserted that the sentencing judge in the first case erred in crediting all 498 days to his one-year sentence and that the sentencing judge in the second case erred in failing to credit him with the would-be remaining time. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) because a court cannot credit more time to a sentence than the length of the sentence, the court improperly credited all 498 days of Defendant's time served to his one-year sentence in the first case; and (2) on remand, the court should credit any applicable remaining time to Defendant's sentences in the second case. View "State v. Wills" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State pleading guilty to ten counts of possession of child pornography. The court found Defendant guilty on all counts. After the State gave its sentencing recommendation, Defendant objected, reminding the court that the State was bound by the plea agreement to give an unqualified recommendation of probation. The court sentenced Defendant to thirty months' to four years' imprisonment on each count, determining that Defendant was not fit to be sentenced to a term of probation. The court of appeals vacated Defendant's sentences and remanded for resentencing, concluding that the State had violated the plea agreement by recommending a term of incarceration as a condition of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in enforcing an implied promise by the State not to recommend an additional condition of probation; but (2) the State violated its plea agreement with Defendant not by recommending incarceration as a condition of probation but by effectively arguing for incarceration instead of probation. View "State v. Landera" on Justia Law

Appellees brought this negligence action in the district court against Appellant, the County of Madison, under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act after two of Appellees were injured in a single-vehicle accident after they drove into a washout on a vacated county road. Appellees claimed the County should have maintained a "Road Closed" warning sign at the entrance to the road. The district court found the County liable for negligence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it based its negligence determination in favor of Appellees on its erroneous determination that the County breached its duty to maintain the road, as the central issue in this case was whether the County had met its obligations relative to the warning sign it had chosen to erect. Remanded with directions to find whether the County had actual or constructive notice that its warning sign was down on the date of the accident and whether the County had reasonable time to correct the problem. View "Blaser v. County of Madison" on Justia Law

While in the course and scope of her employment, Appellant suffered and injury and incurred medical expenses. The Workers' Compensation Court ordered Appellant's employer (Employer) to pay the expenses. Employer made payments directly to Appellant's health care providers within thirty days of the court's order. Because she was not personally reimbursed for the medical expenses within thirty days, Appellant sought a waiting-time penalty, attorney fees, and interest pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-125. The Workers' Compensation Court denied relief, and Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because section 48-125 did not apply to Appellant's request for a waiting-time penalty, the compensation court did not err in overruling her motion for a waiting-time penalty; and (2) Employer in this case was not subject to liability for attorney fees, and therefore, Appellant was not entitled to an award of interest. View "VanKirk v. Cent. Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of third degree assault. The district court sentenced Defendant to twenty-four months of probation and ordered him to pay restitution to the victim. Defendant appealed, challenging the restitution order and alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Defendant to pay restitution for the victim's medical expenses for a broken jaw and lost income; and (2) Defendant's claims of error regarding the effectiveness of trial counsel were not appropriate for review on direct appeal, as the record was insufficient to address the claims. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of discharging a firearm at a dwelling while in or near a motor vehicle, second degree assault, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant waived his objection to testimony given at trial concerning whether he possessed firearms after a second shooting; (2) the court did not err in admitting photographs of Defendant possessing the firearms; (3) the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the convictions; (4) Defendant was precluding from raising an objection to an instruction given to the jury during trial regarding voluntary flight; and (5) Defendant was given lawful sentences within the statutory range, even though the sentences were contrary to the court's intentions. View "State v. Castillas" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence. Defendant unsuccessfully sought to suppress evidence of the traffic stop leading to his arrest, alleging that law enforcement did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop his vehicle. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the traffic stop was based upon erroneous information contained in the records of the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), and therefore, the stop was unlawful; and (2) the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the good faith exception did not apply. Remanded for consideration of Defendant's remaining assignments of error. View "State v. Bromm" on Justia Law

Father and Mother were unmarried when Mother became pregnant. The couple's child was born on February 9, 2012, but Father was not told about the birth. Father attempted to contact Mother several times and to gain information about the child but was unsuccessful. On February 23, 2012, five days after the child's original due date, Father filed a "petition to establish necessity of father's consent to adoption" with the county court. The court sustained Mother's motion for summary judgment because Father failed to object to the adoption within five business days after the birth of the child, as required by law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a material fact existed whether Mother was estopped from relying on the five-day filing requirement in Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-104.02 because she intentionally misled Father to prevent him from complying with the requirements of section 43-104.02. Remanded. View "Jeremiah J. v. Dakota D." on Justia Law

Turbines, Ltd. purchased a replacement part for a helicopter engine from Transupport, Inc., intending to use the part to fill an order Turbines had received from a customer in Singapore to be shipped to Malaysia. Turbines later learned that filling the order could subject it to criminal liability, Turbines attempted to return the part of Transupport and obtain a refund of the purchase price. Transupport refused to refund the payment. Turbines then brought this action seeking rescission of the purchase order. The district court entered default judgment in favor after Transupport failed to appear at a pretrial conference and the trial. The court of appeals reversed the default judgment against Transupport and ordered that Turbines' complaint be dismissed, concluding that the evidence adduced at trial did not support rescission as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the uncontroverted facts provided no legal basis for rescission; and (2) thus, although Transupport failed to appear for trial, the district court abused its discretion in entering default judgment in favor of Turbines. View "Turbines Ltd. v. Transupport Inc." on Justia Law