Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lender made loans to Borrower that were secured by deeds of trust describing real estate owned by Borrower. As additional security for the loans to Borrower, Guarantor promised payment of the indebtedness on the promissory notes. Borrower subsequently defaulted, and Lender sought payment of the indebtedness from Guarantor. Guarantor moved to amend his answer to assert he was not liable to Lender because Lender was barred by section 76-1013 of the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act (Act) from pursuing a deficiency action against Borrower. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lender. At issue on appeal was whether a guaranty of a promissory note secured by a deed of trust is subject to the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Guarantor's guaranty was not subject to the Act, and under the terms of the guaranty, Guarantor was liable for the total amount of Borrower's debt, less the trustee's sale price. View "Mut. of Omaha Bank v. Murante" on Justia Law

Rylee, age sixteen, was nonverbal and autistic. A juvenile petition was filed because Rylee was excessively absent from school. The State placed no fault on Lisa, Rylee's mother. The juvenile court entered an order adjudicating Rylee as a child defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). As part of the adjudication, Lisa was ordered to complete a pretreatment assessment and to sign releases of information to allow the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) an opportunity to access information from her therapist and treatment providers. Lisa appealed, challenging the reasonableness of the juvenile court's order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decision of the juvenile court ordering Lisa to submit to a pretreatment assessment and to sign releases of information to allow the DHHS to access her mental health information was unreasonable. Remanded. View "In re Interest of Rylee S." on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff attended an aquatic physical therapy session at Premier Physical Therapy (Premier), an off-site clinic owned by Columbus Community Hospital (Columbus). Plaintiff slipped and fell on the wet floor above the clinic's pool, injuring her arm and wrist. In 2011, Plaintiff filed an action against Columbus and Premier, claiming negligence. Plaintiff's action was based upon a theory of premises liability that would be subject to a four-year statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding the action was subject to a two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff's claims arose from her professional relationship with her physical therapist, they were subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-222. View "Churchill v. Columbus Cmty. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Employee suffered a shoulder injury arising out of the course of his employment with Employer. Employee subsequently resigned his employment with Employer and began working for another company. Employee later filed a petition against Employer in the compensation court, seeking temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The compensation court awarded Employee TTD benefits for the periods he was unable to work due to postsurgery restrictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of TTD benefits, holding that an employee who leaves a job with an employer responsible for an injury in order to pursue more desirable employment does not waive TTD benefits simply because the employer responsible for the injury would have accommodated light-duty restrictions during postsurgical recovery periods necessitated by the injury. View "Zwiener v. Becton Dickinson-East" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were divorced pursuant to a decree of dissolution that awarded joint legal and physical custody of their minor children. Father subsequently filed an amended complaint to modify the decree, seeking full custody of the children. The district court found in favor of Mother, declined to modify the parenting plan, and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied Father's request for modification of custody; and (2) the court did not err when it observed that the issue of modifying the parenting plan was not properly before it. View "Watkins v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Lozier Corporation (Lozier) claimed that the Douglas County Board of Equalization (Board) overvalued three parcels of land it owned. Lozier mailed three appeals to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). Although Lozier mailed the appeals before the filing deadline, TERC did not receive the appeals until after the deadline had passed. TERC dismissed the appeals as untimely, concluding that the mailing did not meet the requirements under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-5013(2). At issue on appeal was whether a postage meter stamp is a "postmark" for purposes of section 77-5013(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a postage meter stamp is a "postmark" within the meaning of section 77-5013(2); and (2) therefore, Lozier's mailing met the jurisdictional requirements under section 77-5013(2). View "Lozier Corp. v. Douglas County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a resident of Nebraska. In 1963, Plaintiff received a copy of the book "Revolutionary Road," which was inscribed to her by the late author Richard Yates. Plaintiff's inscribed copy of the book was later stolen. Ken Lopez and his company, Ken Lopez Bookseller (KLB), bought the book in 2009 from a seller in Georgia and sold it to a customer not in Nebraska. Plaintiff later learned that Lopez had used the inscription in the book for advertising purposes on his website. Plaintiff brought suit against Lopez and KLB for violating her right to privacy. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's complaint failed to plead facts to demonstrate that Lopez and KLB had sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Nebraska, as (1) the contacts created by the website were unrelated to Plaintiff's cause of action, and (2) under the Calder v. Jones foreseeable effects test, the pleadings failed to establish that Lopez and KLB expressly aimed their tortious conduct at the state of Nebraska. View "Abdouch v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, first degree assault, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the first degree murder conviction and the conviction on the charge of being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon; (2) any error with respect to the jury instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct; (4) Defendant received effective assistance of counsel at trial; (5) the district court did not err in finding that one of the exhibits used at trial was sufficient to establish a prior felony conviction; and (6) the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant, but the court plainly erred in the allocation of credit for time served, and therefore, Defendant's sentences were modified by ordering that the credit for time served be applied against the sentence for first degree assault. View "State v. Watt" on Justia Law

Mother and Father entered into a marital settlement agreement in 2007 that provided for joint legal custody of the children and stated that no child support was to be paid. The district court entered an order dissolving the married in 2008, and custody and visitation were ordered as provided in the agreement. Later in 2008, the district court found there had been a material change in circumstances and modified the decree, ordering Father to pay child support for the three children. Mother remarried in 2010. In 2011, Mother filed an application to modify the decree. The district court (1) granted Mother's request to remove the minor children to Alaska and awarded custody of the children to Mother, and (2) terminated Father's child support obligations because of the increased visitation expenses necessitated by the children's move to Alaska. The Supreme Court remanded the case because the district court's order did not include a worksheet showing the methodology utilized by the court in determining that the child support obligation should be terminated. View "Pearson v. Pearson" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were rental property owners in the City of La Vista. Appellant sought a declaration that the City's ordinance establishing a rental housing licensing and inspection program was unconstitutional. Appellants claimed that the ordinance's application to rental property residences only, and not to owner-occupied residences, was an arbitrary and unreasonable classification that violated Nebraska's constitutional prohibition against special legislation. The district court entered summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City's ordinance did not violate the prohibition against special legislation, as (1) the distinction between rental property residences and owner-occupied residences presented a real difference in circumstances; and (2) the City's regulation of rental properties was reasonably related to its legitimate goal of maintaining safe rental housing and livable neighborhoods. View "D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista" on Justia Law