Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced on nine counts involving actual or attempted violence or physical abuse upon persons with intellectual disabilities who required residential care. All counts arose from Defendant's employment at a developmental center and involved three adult residents at that facility. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the district court erred in permitting the jury to take into the jury room for use during deliberations the State's "road map," a chart admitted for demonstrative purposes only. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the use of this demonstrative exhibit during jury deliberations without providing adequate limiting instructions or employing any other safeguards against prejudice. View "State v. Pangborn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault, use of a weapon to commit a felony, and robbery. Defendant was determined to be a habitual criminal and sentenced to eighty to 140 years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) overruling Defendant's two motions for mistrial; (2) overruling Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the victim's identification of him as her assailant and in admitting her identification testimony at trial over Defendant's objection; (3) overruling Defendant's motion for a directed verdict; (4) determining that Defendant was a habitual criminal and sentencing him accordingly; and (5) sentencing Defendant. View "State v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The City of Papillion condemned property owned by Appellant for a road project. The City built a new road on Appellant's new property along with an iron fence on the north side of the road, which abutted Appellant's remaining property. Appellant brought suit. The trial court concluded that the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and that the City's building of the fence was not a second taking that limited Appellant's access to the new road. Appellant appealed these issues. The City cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting Appellant interest, fees, expenses, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to timely appeal its claims that the trial court erred in concluding the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and the City's building of the fence was not a second taking; and (2) the court's award of interest, fees, expenses, and costs was proper. View "Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion" on Justia Law

The County Board of Equalization determined that land owned by Ladd Krings was not agricultural or horticultural land. On appeal, the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) upheld the Board's decision but further concluded that the value of Krings' property should be equalized with the value of agricultural and horticultural land. Determining that the assessor's assessments of agricultural and horticultural land to be impermissibly low, TERC subsequently equalized Krings' property by reducing its assessed value. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of TERC's order determining that Krings' land was nonagricultural and nonhoricultural; but (2) reversed the portion of the order in which TERC equalized the value of Krings' nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land with the value of agricultural and horticultural land in the county, as this decision did not conform to the law. Remanded. View "Krings v. Garfield County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several counts of child abuse and sexual assault of a child. Defendant appealed, asserting, among other things, that the district court erred in receiving evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-414. Before trial, the trial court heard testimony from Defendant's prior victims, compared the testimony to the current charges, and made a conditional ruling of admissibility under 27-414. The court, however, prohibited the State from mentioning or presenting the section 27-414 evidence at trial until after the evidence of the current alleged victims. At trial, the State first presented the current evidence and then, outside the presence of the jury, the State alerted the court of its intent to call a prior victim as a witness, which the court allowed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in receiving evidence under section 27-414; and (2) Defendant's other assignments of error were rejected. View "State v. Valverde" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault of a child and four counts of child abuse. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of conviction and vacated the sentences, holding (1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to sever the sexual abuse charge from the child abuse charges, and Defendant was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a limiting instruction that the jury could not consider the evidence of sexual assault to prove the charges of child abuse and vice versa, and Defendant was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance. Remanded. View "State v. Rocha" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendants relating to "forward corn contracts." Counsel for Defendants conveyed confidential information to a grain industry expert in attempting to retain him. Plaintiff's counsel later retained that same expert. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to disqualify the expert from testifying and moved to disqualify Plaintiffs' counsel. The district court disqualified the expert but did disqualify Plaintiffs' counsel, finding that Defendants failed to advance any evidence that Defendants' trial strategy, work product, or mental impressions had been communicated by the expert to Plaintiffs' counsel. Thereafter, Defendants applied for leave to file an original action for a writ of mandamus requiring the district court to disqualify Plaintiffs' counsel. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Plaintiffs rebutted the presumption that the expert shared confidences gained from Defendants' counsel with Plaintiffs' counsel, and therefore, disqualification of Plaintiffs' counsel was not required. View "Mid Am. Agri Products/Horizon, LLC v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff's former husband filed for dissolution, the parties reconciled and entered into two postmarital agreements specifying how their property would be divided in the event of a future dissolution. The district court approved the agreements and dismissed the dissolution proceeding. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second dissolution proceeding. On the advice of Defendants, certain attorneys and law firms, Plaintiff accepted a settlement proposal from her former husband based upon the postmarital agreements approved in the first dissolution action. The marriage was then dissolved. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants were negligent in advising her to accept the settlement proposal. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the actions of Defendants were not the proximate cause of any damage to Plaintiff, and even if Defendants breached the standard of care, Plaintiff could not have received a more favorable settlement in the second dissolution proceeding because the court was bound to enforce the order in the first dissolution proceeding under the doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judgment in the first proceeding had preclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata. View "Young v. Govier & Milone, LLP" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was born in Zaire and immigrated to the United States after being granted asylum, pled no contest to two misdemeanors in 2010. Because of credit for time served, Defendant was released from custody on the same day he was sentenced. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not properly advise Defendant of the immigration consequences of conviction at the time he entered the pleas. The district court denied Defendant's motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because Defendant had completed his sentences and had been released from custody. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to decide Defendant's common-law motion to withdraw his pleas because (1) the statutory remedy under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02 did not apply and the motion asserted a constitutional issue which was not addressed under the Nebraska Postconviction Act; and (2) the fact that Defendant served his sentences was not relevant to the jurisdictional analysis. Remanded. View "State v. Yuma" on Justia Law

Defendant obtained controlled substances pursuant to prescriptions written for chronic pain issues but did not inform her medical providers that she was being prescribed similar medications elsewhere. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of ten counts of acquiring a controlled substance by fraud. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that she should not be charged with multiple counts based on multiple prescriptions from the same doctor because the fraudulent act was the singular failure to disclose to the other medical providers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission of Defendant's pharmacy records did not violate her constitutional or statutory rights; (2) the trial court did not err in concluding that Defendant committed multiple violations of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-418 each time she obtained and filled a prescription by her treating family physician; and (3) probable cause supported the warrant for Defendant's medical records. View "State v. Wiedeman" on Justia Law