Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder under a theory of aiding and abetting, criminal conspiracy to unlawfully possess and deliver a controlled substance, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced when the district court allowed his counsel to withdraw prior to counsel and by accepting Defendant's waiver of conflict of interest created by the former counsel's new employment with the county's attorney's office, which was prosecuting Defendant in this case; (2) the district court did not err in allowing evidence of prior bad acts; (3) Defendant's trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness for failing to request jury instructions regarding robbery and attempted robbery as lesser-included offenses of felony murder did not prejudice Defendant; (4) a jury instruction error did not require reversal of Defendant's second degree murder conviction; (5) the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence; and (6) the district court did not impose excessive sentences. View "State v. McGuire" on Justia Law

Child was born out of wedlock to Mother in 2005. Six years later, Sherman filed an amended complaint seeking to establish paternity both as an individual and behalf of Child as "next friend." Alternatively, Sherman asserted that Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1411 denied him due process and equal protection. The district court dismissed the amended complaint filed by Sherman as an individual as untimely and dismissed the amended complaint as to Sherman's filing as the next friend of Child, determining that suit may be brought on behalf of a child as next friend only when the child lacks a guardian. The court made no findings as to Sherman's constitutional claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's dismissal of Sherman's constitutional claims, holding that Sherman's complaint stated plausible due process and equal protection claims, and the factual allegations suggested the existence of the elements required to show both a due process and an equal protection violation; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Sherman T. v. Karen N." on Justia Law

After Decedent died in 2010, her son, Robert, was appointed the personal representative of her estate. After Robert filed an inventory of estate property and a proposed schedule of distribution, Christy, the daughter of Decedent's other son, filed a motion for supervised administration, arguing that pursuant to Decedent's will, she was left an interest in Decedent's land but that Robert did not include this interest in the schedule of distribution. At issue before the probate court was what portion of Christy's interest in the estate was purchased by Mark, Robert's son, at a bankruptcy auction in 1998. The probate court concluded that Christy's interest in Decedent's share of the land was not transferred to Mark following the bankruptcy sale and approved Christy's motion for supervised administration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the probate court did not err in finding Christy's motion for supervised administration tolled Christy's thirty-day deadline to object to the distribution of assets; (2) the probate court had jurisdiction to resolve the question of what was sold at Christy's bankruptcy auction as it related to Decedent's estate; and (3) the probate court made the correct determination regarding what Christy was entitled to through Decedent's estate. View "In re Estate of Odenreider" on Justia Law

Employee was injured during the scope and course of his employment with Employer, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company. Because he was a railroad employee, Employee filed a claim for personal injury damages pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The district court entered judgment in favor of Employee for $145,000. Employer paid the judgment but withheld $6,202 as Employee's share of Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA) payroll taxes on the entire general verdict award. The district court (1) overruled BNSF's motion for satisfaction and discharge of judgment and directed BNSF to pay $6,202 directly to Employee, and (2) directed the parties to agree in writing that no amount of the award would be considered lost wages so as to avoid any obligations under the RRTA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the general verdict award in favor of Employee was an award of compensation from which Employer was required to withhold a portion of in order to pay RRTA payroll taxes. Remanded with directions that the district court enter a satisfaction and discharge of the judgment upon proof of payment of $6,202 by BNSF to the IRS on account of the lost wages paid to Employee. View "Heckman v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co." on Justia Law

In 1996, Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with an underinsured driver. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff had an automobile insurance policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers). In 2001, Plaintiff settled with the underinsured driver. In 2011, Plaintiff filed this action based on contract, alleging that her damages from the accident exceeded the coverage she received from the tortfeasor's insurer and that Farmers had failed to pay "sums available" for her benefit pursuant to her underinsured motorist coverage. Farmers responded by alleging that Plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations or by laches. The district court entered summary judgment for Farmers, concluding that the limitations period commenced when Plaintiff settled with the tortfeasor in 2001 and that her claim was barred by the five-year contract statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it determined that Plaintiff's action accrued upon her settlement with the tortfeasor; and (2) instead, the Court should have applied the Supreme Court's holder in Snyder v. EMCASCO that the action accrues upon the insurer's breach. Remanded. View "Shada v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Employee, an African-American, was employed by the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services for several years. Employee filed suit against the State and individual defendants in their official capacities, alleging she was denied the opportunity to enroll with the health insurance carrier that had insured her prior to 2007 due to a ZIP code exclusion plan. Specifically, Employee alleged she was discriminated against on the basis of her race because most African-American employees resided in three excluded ZIP codes and were offered substandard health insurance based on the ZIP codes associated with their residential addresses. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all causes of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Employee's claim of disparate impact arising under Title VII, as the evidence presented by Defendants established that the plans offered in the excluded ZIP codes were equivalent to the plans offered statewide. View "Cartwright v. State" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant pled no contest to attempted first degree arson pursuant to a plea agreement. Defendant was discharged from prison in 2003 and was thereafter removed from the United States. In 2012, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea of no contest and vacate his conviction, alleging that his plea and conviction were obtained in violation of his due process rights and that his counsel was ineffective because he did not advise Defendant of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The district court denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that neither the postconviction statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02, nor the common-law "manifest injustice" procedure, all of which Defendant attempted to collaterally attack his plea under, provided a basis for relief in this case. View "State v. Osorio" on Justia Law

While serving as county attorney, Defendant established a pretrial diversion program wherein participants paid an enrollment fee and court costs. The fees and costs were deposited into a separate bank account with Defendant as the only authorized signer on the account. After the state auditor's office conducted an audit, Defendant was charged with three counts of theft by unlawful taking, among other charges. The third theft charge was based on a check Defendant wrote on the account of the diversion program to a local trapshooting team. The jury acquitted Defendant of the first two theft counts but convicted him of the third. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court plainly erred in instructing the jury on Defendant's affirmative defense of entrapment of estoppel. Remanded for retrial. View "State v. Edwards" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of life to life for the second degree murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in giving jury instructions on "sudden quarrel"; (2) did not err in giving a step instruction; (3) did not abuse its discretion in admitting autopsy photographs into evidence, as their potential prejudice did not substantially outweigh their probative value; and (3) did not err in imposing a sentence of life to life for second degree murder. View "State v. Abdulkadir" on Justia Law

Effective in 2010, the Legislature changed the manner in which wind energy generation facilities are taxed. The change (1) exempted personal property used by wind energy generation facilities from the personal property tax and imposed a new tax based upon the facility's nameplate capacity, and (2) allowed taxpayers who had paid personal property tax prior to 2010 to claim a credit against nameplate capacity taxes assessed for the year 2010 and onward. Plaintiffs, Nebraska taxpayers, challenged the constitutionality of the credit. The district court determined that the credit provision of the new statute constituted an improper commutation of taxes and was therefore unconstitutional and void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the nameplate capacity tax credit did not violate the constitutional prohibition against commutation of taxes because the prohibition does not apply to an excise tax, and the tax in this case was an excise tax; and (2) the statute authorizing the credit was not special legislation prohibited by the state constitution. Remanded with directions to dismiss. View "Banks v. Heineman" on Justia Law