Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not err in overruling Appellant's motions to suppress the eyewitness identifications of two witnesses and in subsequently allowing both witnesses to make in-court identifications of Appellant, as the identifications of both witnesses were reliable; and (2) the district court did not err when, in its articulation of its factual findings, it overruled Appellant's motions to suppress the eyewitness identifications. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony for the killing of his mother. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instructions, taken as a whole, correctly stated the elements of the crime, and therefore, Appellant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance for failing to object to the instructions; (2) Appellant failed to identify an expert who would have opined differently on Appellant's insanity, and therefore, Appellant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to obtain an additional expert opinion as to Appellant's sanity at the time of the killing; and (3) the arguments Appellant asserted were omitted by appellate counsel lacked merit. View "State v. Fox" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition alleging that Violet was a minor child who came within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) due to the faults and habits of her biological mother, Abigael. The State also filed a motion for a protective custody hearing. Abigael filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that although Violet was born in Nebraska, she had never actually lived in Nebraska. The juvenile court dismissed the petition, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Violet had lived in Iowa since her discharge from the hospital after she was born. The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal, holding that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case. View "In re Interest of Violet T." on Justia Law

Arlene Easter sold insurance for First Express Services Group, Inc. Arlene subsequently resigned from First Express and began to work for her son, Mark, who was a part owner of a competing agency. After resigning, Arlene took a customer list from First Express and transferred many of First Express' customers to Mark's agency. First Express sued Arlene for breach of contract and Arlene, Mark, and Mark's agency for misappropriation of trade secrets and unjust enrichment. After a jury trial, judgment was rendered for First Express on all claims. The Supreme Court (1) modified the judgment against Arlene, finding that Arlene was liable only for the portion of the judgment attributed by the district court to the breach of contract claim; and (2) reversed the judgment against Mark, holding that Mark was not liable for either misappropriation of trade secrets or unjust enrichment. View "First Express Servs. Group, Inc. v. Easter" on Justia Law

After a joint jury trial with his codefendant, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus ninety-six to 150 years. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding, inter alia, that the district court did not err in (1) refusing to sever Defendant's trial from his codefendant's; (2) allowing the State to introduce evidence of gang membership and prior bad acts without a hearing; (3) allowing the State to introduce hearsay evidence under the excited utterance exception to hearsay; (4) overruling Defendant's motions for mistrial; and (5) admitting post mortem photographs depicting the victim's face with a fatal wound, as the admission was not unfairly prejudicial to Defendant. The Court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's convictions and that Defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a joint jury trial with his codefendant, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus ninety-six to 150 years. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the district court did not err in (1) failing to sever Defendant's trial from his codefendant's, as Defendant was not prejudiced by the joint trial; and (2) allowing the jury to separate without obtaining a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of Defendant's right to sequester the jury, as the district court met the requirement that the defendant expressly agrees to waive sequestration. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant purchased the assets of an indoor football team owned by Omaha Beef, LLC. In 2008, Appellant applied for workers' compensation insurance under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Plan, arguing that it was entitled to a certain experience modifier (XMod), which is used when calculating the premium owed, because it was a new entity with no claims experience. The National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. determined that Appellant was a successor entity to Omaha Beef, and thus, the various XMods assigned to Omaha Beef for the relevant time periods must be transferred to Appellant. The director of the Department of Insurance affirmed. The district court affirmed, reasoning that Appellant was a successor to Omaha Beef and that the change in ownership resulted in the transfer of the workers' compensation rating for Omaha Beef to Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) Appellant had the burden of proof to show there was no "change in ownership"; and (2) a "change in ownership" existed such that the XMod of Omaha Beef should be transferred to Appellant. View "Gridiron Mgmt. Group, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Father initiated a paternity action seeking an order declaring him to be the biological father of Child and awarding him visitation with Child. In her answer, Mother alleged that Father's paternity claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Mother also filed a counterclaim asking for a termination of Father's parental rights based on abandonment. The district court determined Father's paternity claim was not time-barred and entered an order terminating Father's parental rights. The supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court properly found grounds for abandonment; but (2) Mother did not meet her burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights would be in the best interests of Child. Remanded. View "Kenneth C. v. Lacie H." on Justia Law

Freeholders filed successfully filed petitions to move their property from the Prague Public School District to the Wahoo Public School District. East Butler County School District objected to the petitions because East Butler and the Prague District had a petition pending before the State Committee for the Reorganization of School Districts involving a proposed merger plan that encompassed the Freeholders' property. The Supreme Court concluded that East Butler had standing to appeal the Board's decision and remanded. On remand, the district court determined that the Board had jurisdiction over the Freeholders' petitions, thus rejecting East Butler's argument that the Reorganization Committee had exclusive jurisdiction to act in the matter under the "prior jurisdiction rule." The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prior jurisdiction rule, if adopted, did not apply to this case, and thus the Board had jurisdiction over the freeholder petitions. View "Butler County Sch. Dist. v. Freeholder Petitioners" on Justia Law

Appellee was employed as a carman for Union Pacific Railroad Company when he was injured by a chair that collapsed, causing injury to his back. Appellee filed a Federal Employers' Liability Act action against Union Pacific and also filed suit against the manufacturer of the chair, Steelcase, Inc. Appellee settled his case against Steelcase. The claim against Union Pacific proceeded to trial. A jury verdict was entered for Appellee in the amount of $1,032,375. The district court allowed Union Pacific to set off the verdict in the amount of $425,000 because of the settlement reached with Steelcase. The court also enforced a medical lien in the amount of $139,845 against that settlement. Union Pacific appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in allowing a setoff of the portion of Appellee's medical bills that were written off by Appellee's medical providers as a result of negotiations between Union Pacific and the providers; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by not modifying the allocation of Appellee's settlement with Steelcase and setting off that reallocated amount from the verdict. View "Strasburg v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law