Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The lead investigator for a law enforcement agency applied for and received a search warrant to search three computers Defendant owned for child pornography. Defendant admitted to the investigator to downloading and viewing child pornography and subsequently deleting the child pornography computer files. However, a forensic examination revealed remnants on Defendant’s hard drive. After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of knowingly possessing child pornography. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the earlier search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the investigator’s failure to explain in his affidavit that dynamic Internet Protocol (IP) addresses can change did not affect the probable cause determination; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. View "State v. Schuller" on Justia Law

In 1975, Appellant was convicted of sodomy, forcible rape, and robbery. In 2004, Appellant moved for testing under the DNA Testing Act (“Act”) of the biological evidence pertinent to his conviction. The district court granted the motion. The next year, DNA testing revealed that at least one stain of biological material was from a male who was not Appellant. The district court denied Appellant’s subsequent motion to vacate his convictions or grant a new trial, holding that the DNA test results were neither exonerating nor exculpatory because, among other things, the testing could not distinguish between semen and epithelial cells in older materials. In 2011, Appellant filed a second motion for DNA testing of the biological materials on the victims’ shirts, alleging that new more accurate testing techniques could lead to exonerating or exculpatory evidence, particularly because restesting could distinguish between semen and epithelial cells on the materials. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for resting under the Act, as, “[i]ndisputably, the requested retesting ‘may’ lead to exculpatory evidence.” View "State v. Pratt" on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant pled guilty to second degree murder. The district court sentenced Appellant to a term of imprisonment of fifty years to life. In 2012, Appellant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his sentence was excessive and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in connection with his sentencing. The district court dismissed the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief did not allege facts which constituted a denial of his constitutional rights, and that as to certain matters, the record refuted Appellant’s claims. View "State v. Dragon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree sexual assault and second degree false imprisonment. Appellant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief. The district court dismissed all but one of Appellant’s claims without an evidentiary hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s remaining claim regarding trial counsel’s failure to disclose an alleged plea offer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate to the defendant all formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the defendant; and (2) the district court did not clearly err in finding that the State made a formal offer, and therefore, trial counsel could not have been deficient in failing to disclose it to Appellant. View "State v. Alfredson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Red Willow Dairy, LLC, and Jim and Ann Huffman. The day before the order granting the default judgment was signed and file stamped, Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy. Plaintiff settled her claim in return for an assignment of rights to any causes of action Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans might have against Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company with respect to the underlying lawsuit. Plaintiff then sued Fireman’s for breach of its duty to defend Red Willow Dairy and Huffmans. The district court found that the filing of the default judgment violated the automatic stay of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Fireman’s. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the filing of the bankruptcy stayed any further proceedings in the underlying action, preventing the rendition and entry of the default judgment. View "Doe v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant suffered an injury while working for Employer in Nebraska. After a trial, Appellant was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. Three years later, Employer petitioned to discontinue the TTD benefits. Meanwhile, Appellant moved to Mexico. The compensation court terminated Employer’s obligation to pay TTD benefits but declined Appellant’s claim for permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity, finding that Appellant had failed to prove loss of earning capacity in his new community in Mexico. The Supreme Court remanded the case to permit Appellant to establish loss of earning capacity using the Nebraska community where the injury occurred. On remand, the compensation court found that Appellant suffered a forty-five-percent loss of earning capacity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred in failing to weigh all the evidence in making its factual findings, specifically in regard to the court’s findings that the opinions of a vocational rehabilitation counselor regarding Appellant’s loss of earning capacity were not rebutted. Remanded. View "Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions" on Justia Law

The owners (Owners) of certain property in the Village of Memphis filed with the county judge an inverse condemnation petition against the Village and sought compensation for an unlawful taking, alleging that the Village deprived them of their property by maintaining a well, a buried powerline, and water pipes on their property without an easement. An appraiser awarded damages to the Owners. The Village appealed. Thereafter, the parties entered into a settlement agreement as to compensation to be paid to the Owners. The Owners subsequently moved for attorney fees and expenses under Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-720, which mandates that a property owner be allowed attorney fees if a public entity initiates condemnation proceedings without negotiating in good faith with the owner. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the Village did not fail to engage in good faith negotiations with the Owners. The Supreme Court affirmed because the record demonstrated that the Village engaged in good faith negotiations to settle with the Owners after the Village appealed to the district court. View "Village of Memphis v. Frahm" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the offenses. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his sentence of life imprisonment was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, which was decided while Defendant’s appeal was pending. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated Defendant’s sentence for first degree murder, holding that the sentence of life imprisonment was unconstitutional under Miller. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Employee was injured during the course and scope of his employment with Employer. In 2010, the compensation court awarded Employee temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. In 2012, Employee filed two motions, one to compel payment of TTD benefits in compliance with the 2010 award, and the other to modify the 2010 compensation award for loss of earning capacity and entitlement to vocational rehabilitation benefits. In two orders entered on the same date, the compensation court found Employee was entitled to (1) receive TTD benefits after reaching maximum medical improvement for his physical injuries; (2) a waiting-time penalty, (3) an award of attorney fees, and (4) a loss of earning capacity and vocational rehabilitation evaluation carried out by a vocational rehabilitation counselor. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Employer’s appeal with respect to the order directing the vocational rehabilitation counselor to perform an evaluation because the order was not final; and (2) affirmed in all respects the order of the compensation court enforcing the 2010 award. View "Deleon v. Reinke Mfg. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nurse formerly employed by the Department of Health and Human Services, filed an action against Defendant, a supervisor who terminated her employment, alleging violations of her due process, free speech, and equal protection rights, among other claims. Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that, as a state employee, she was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff did not allege a viable violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, and Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on that claim; and (2) because Plaintiff’s alleged First Amendment claim necessitated resolving a fact-related dispute, Defendant’s appeal on this issue was not immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, and the appeal must be dismissed at to this issue. View "Carney v. Miller" on Justia Law