Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brian Shaffer, who had severe autism and chemical sensitivities, resided with his mother, Delores Shaffer, who was paid to provide private duty nursing (PDN) care to Brian. In 2011, Brian’s Medicaid coverage was transferred to Coventry Health Care of Nebraska, Inc. When Coventry determined that the nursing services were not medically necessary, Shaffer requested a State fair hearing with the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. Coventry participated in the administrative proceedings, at which a hearing officer concluded that the PDN services were not medically necessary. Delores sought judicial review of the order, but the petition did not name Coventry as a respondent. The district court reversed the order of the Department, finding the PDN services that Delores provided to Brian were medically necessary. Coventry appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court, holding that Coventry was a “party of record” at the State fair hearing and therefore a necessary party in the subsequent appeal to the district court, and the failure to make Coventry a party to the appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction. View "Shaffer v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Jennifer Van Kleek was caring for Walter and Janet Chapman’s dog while the Chapmans were out of town when the dog bit her on her lower lip. Van Kleek sent a claim to the Chapmans’ homeowner’s insurer, Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers), for her injuries from the bite. Farmers denied the claim, concluding the Van Kleek was “legally responsible” for the dog and therefore, she was also an insured, and the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries to insureds. The policy defined “insured” to include “any person…legally responsible for covered animals." Van Kleek filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a determination that the policy covered her claim. The district court granted Farmers’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Van Kleek was “legally responsible” for the dog because she was the only person responsible for feeding, watering, and letting the dog into the backyard while the Chapmans were away. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Van Kleek was an insured under the policy because she was “legally responsible” for the Chapmans’ dog, and therefore, the unambiguous terms of the policy excluded coverage of her injury. View "Van Kleek v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

In 2011, Ameritox, Ltd. sued Millennium Laboratories, Inc. in federal district court in Florida. In 2012, Millennium filed second amended counterclaims in response to Ameritox’s third amended complaint. The Florida court subsequently denied Millennium’s leave to amend its second amended counterclaims. Thereafter, Millennium and two of its employees (collectively, Appellants) sued Brian Ward, one of Ameritox’s employees, in a Nebraska district court. Ward moved to dismiss Appellants’ complaint for failure to state a claim and for failure to join a necessary party, alleging that the claims were barred under the doctrines of res judicata. The district court sustained the motion to dismiss, concluding that the Florida court’s denial of Millennium’s motion to amend its counterclaims barred the claims against Ward. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the denial of leave to amend was not a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata and did not bar Millennium’s claims against Ward in the district court. View "Millennium Labs., Inc. v. Ward" on Justia Law

Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with committing criminal mischief for damaging the property of Cedars Teaching, Learning, & Connecting group home (Cedars Home) while she was a participant in its program. While the charges were pending final disposition, Appellant ran away from other placements several times. Although another group home accepted Appellant at its location, the juvenile court ordered intensive supervised probation at the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center (YRTC), pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-286(1)(b)(ii), finding that all levels of probation supervision and options for community-based services had been exhausted and that intensive supervised probation was appropriate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 43-286 requires that before a juvenile is placed in YRTC, the Office of Probation Administration must consider what would be a reliable alternative to commitment at YRTC and report its findings to the court; and (2) applying section 43-286 to the present case, Appellant’s placement at YRTC was premature. Remanded. View "In re Interest of Nedhal A." on Justia Law

Rhonda was the mother and sole surviving parent of Benjamin, a twenty-two-year-old incapacitated adult. Rhonda filed a petition for the appointment of a guardian for Benjamin and nominated herself as guardian. The county court appointed an unrelated individual as Benjamin’s guardian without making findings or providing an explanation for passing over Rhonda. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appointment was arbitrary and capricious, as the county court appointed the unrelated individual as Benjamin’s guardian without specific findings, any explanation for bypassing Rhonda’s statutory priority for appointment, or any reason readily apparent in the evidentiary record. View "In re Guardianship of Benjamin E." on Justia Law

Edward Stuchlik died testate and was survived by his wife, Margaret Stuchlik, and five children, including John Stuchlik and Kenneth Stuchlik. John sought removal of Margaret as the personal representative of the Edward Stuchlik estate and removal of Margaret and Kenneth as cotrustees of the Edward Stuchlik Family Trust. John asked the court to appoint him as personal representative and trustee in their place. The county court entered judgment in favor of Margaret and Kenneth. The Supreme Court affirmed in most respects and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) because Margaret was waiting to be discharged as personal representative pending the outcome of this action, any action for her removal as personal representative was without merit; (2) John’s arguments that Margaret and Kenneth should be removed as costrustees based on a theory of a contract for wills or an oral trust between Margaret and Edward were irrelevant to the petition to remove a costrustee; but (3) the court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider allegations pertaining to the extent Margaret’s and Kenneth’s activities as general partners of a partnership related to their fitness as costrustees. View "In re Estate of Stuchlik" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint in the district court against Bellevue Public Schools (BPS), alleging that he was fired as an employee of BPS in retaliation for reporting to his superiors the presence, demolition, and removal of asbestos-containing materials at the middle school where he worked. The district court granted summary judgment for BPS. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that BPS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Appellant failed to present evidence of a genuine issue of material fact that the permissible reason of poor job performance articulated by BPS for his termination was a pretext for an impermissible termination. View "O’Brien v. Bellevue Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

In 2009, Patricia Damme injured her low back in a workplace accident. In 2013, Damme underwent surgery on her back. The surgery was a success. The Workers’ Compensation Court awarded Damme temporary total disability benefits from 2009 to 2013 and future medical care. Damme’s employer, Pike Enterprises, Inc. appealed, arguing, among other things, that the 2009 incident was not an injury but a “temporary symptom aggravation” of Damme’s preexisting back problems. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Workers’ Compensation Court did not err in (1) finding a causal relationship between the work-related injury Damme sustained in 2009 and the 2013 surgery; (2) determining that Damme’s 2013 surgery was reasonably necessary to treat her physical condition and pain symptoms; (3) finding that after her injury, Damme could not work until the surgeon who performed the surgery released her to return to work; (4) determining that Damme’s incarceration was not an event that barred her receipt of temporary total disability disability benefits; and (5) awarding nonspecified future medical benefits. View "Damme v. Pike Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Mother, on behalf of her minor child, filed a petition for a domestic abuse protection order against Father. The district court issued an ex parte domestic abuse protection order. The evidence against Father included text messages with vulgar language and name calling. Upon a show cause hearing on the ex parte order, the district court upheld its domestic abuse protection order. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court incorrectly granted a domestic abuse protection order, as Father’s conduct did not fit within the statutory definition of “abuse”; and (2) because the case was tried on the domestic abuse theory, Mother could not change to a harassment theory on appeal. View "Linda N. v. William N." on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2011, Appellant filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court overruled Appellant’s motion in an order issued in 2012. Appellant then filed an amended pro se motion for postconviction relief, again alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court overruled the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider any assignments of error related to the claims that were denied in the 2012 order; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s amended motion without an evidentiary hearing. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law