Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State of Nebraska convicted DeShawn L. Gleaton, Jr. of first-degree murder, use of a firearm to commit a felony, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and witness tampering. Gleaton appealed, arguing that the lower court erred in admitting expert testimony about cell phone location data, in overruling defense objections to the prosecutor's statements during closing argument, and in declining to strike certain victim impact material from the presentence investigation report. Gleaton also accused the lower court of judicial misconduct during sentencing. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Gleaton's convictions and sentences, ruling that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, in overruling defense objections to the prosecutor's statements, or in declining to strike the victim impact material. The high court also found no judicial misconduct. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the lower court committed plain error in sentencing by applying 413 days' credit for time served to Gleaton's life sentence, instead of applying the credit to the nonlife sentences consecutive to the life sentence. The high court modified Gleaton's sentences to correct this error. View "State v. Gleaton" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in a case involving the right to a speedy trial. The defendant, Justin N. Rashad, was charged with first degree assault and use of a firearm to commit a felony in connection with the shooting of his father. Rashad argued that his right to a speedy trial, as provided by Nebraska law, was violated when the State failed to meet its evidentiary burden to show that there was good cause to continue his case past the 6-month speedy trial deadline. The trial was initially delayed because the judge had another trial scheduled. The trial was then set for a date in February, months past the speedy trial deadline.The Supreme Court held that the evidence in the record, which consisted solely of emails regarding the scheduling of the hearing on the continuance and a transcript of that hearing, was insufficient to show that there was good cause to continue Rashad’s trial past the speedy trial deadline. The Court noted that statements of unavailability, without more, are insufficient to show that docket congestion existed, such that there was good cause to continue the trial. Furthermore, the court highlighted that the information about the judge’s availability came from statements by the judge, and that comments by the trial judge are not evidence. As such, the court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was good cause to continue Rashad’s trial. The case was remanded to the lower court with instructions to grant Rashad's motion for absolute discharge. View "State v. Rashad" on Justia Law

The case before the Nebraska Supreme Court involved an appeal by Nathaniel L. Gnewuch, who was convicted of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. Gnewuch had requested a deferred sentence under Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-2292, but the district court refused to consider his request, deeming the statute unconstitutional. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court examined the language of § 29-2292, which allows for a deferred judgement and probation for a guilty defendant, without the entry of a final judgement of conviction, under certain circumstances.The court rejected the district court's assertion that it lacked jurisdiction to impose a sentence of probation before the entry of a judgement of conviction, finding nothing in the Nebraska Constitution that prevented the Legislature from granting the district court such jurisdiction. The court also disagreed with the argument that § 29-2292 violates the separation of powers clause in the Nebraska Constitution by allowing the judiciary to invade the charging function, an inherent executive power. It concluded that the power to define criminal conduct and fix punishment is vested in the legislative branch, while the imposition of a sentence within these legislative limits is a judicial function.Therefore, the court held that § 29-2292 does not violate the separation of powers clause in the Nebraska Constitution and remanded the case back to the district court for consideration of Gnewuch's request for a deferred judgement. View "State v. Gnewuch" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed a decision made by the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) that included corrections unit case managers within the protective service bargaining unit (PSBU), represented by the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #88 (FOP 88). The case arose from a petition filed by FOP 88 to the CIR to clarify or amend the PSBU to include corrections unit case managers. The State of Nebraska appealed the CIR's decision, arguing that corrections unit case managers were supervisors and, hence, should not be in the same bargaining unit as their subordinates. The court deemed the CIR had erred in giving preclusive effect to its 2018 order, which certified FOP 88 as the bargaining representative for the PSBU. The court held that the issue of whether corrections unit case managers were part of the PSBU was not precluded by the 2018 order. The court remanded the matter back to the CIR to again determine whether the PSBU includes corrections unit case managers based on the existing record, with instructions to provide an explanation forming the basis for its ruling. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #88 v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant, Melvin Lear, was charged with a felony offense by the State of Nebraska. Lear requested a continuance in order to conduct additional discovery, which was granted by the court. However, the continuance extended the trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. Lear then filed a motion for absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds. The district court denied the motion, finding that Lear had waived his statutory right to a speedy trial by requesting a continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory limit. Lear appealed the decision, arguing that the waiver provision in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) only applies to a continuance granted at the sole request of the defendant, not a request joined in by the State. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected Lear's argument, interpreting the waiver provision to apply to a continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his or her counsel, regardless of whether the State joins the request, when the period of delay resulting from the continuance extends a trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision to deny Lear's motion for absolute discharge. View "State v. Lear" on Justia Law

In Nebraska, a man named Hope T. Npimnee was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and sentenced to 35 to 40 years in prison. The victim, identified as S.M., claimed that she was intoxicated when Npimnee had non-consensual sexual contact with her. Npimnee appealed his conviction, arguing that the jury instructions were incorrect and contradictory, that there was insufficient evidence to support the theory that S.M. was so intoxicated as to be incapable of resisting, that the court failed to instruct the jury on the defense of consent, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s conviction and sentence, finding that the jury instructions were correct and that there was sufficient evidence to support the theory that S.M. was so intoxicated as to be incapable of resisting. The Court also found that there was no need for an additional instruction on the defense of consent, as the jury was already required to find that the sexual contact was without consent in order to convict Npimnee. Npimnee's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were dismissed due to insufficiently specific allegations. View "State v. Npimnee" on Justia Law

The appellant, Jordon J. Miller, was convicted and sentenced for second degree murder following a plea agreement. The charge stemmed from an incident when shots were fired at a passing vehicle, resulting in the death of Jade Lea. Miller appealed, claiming that the district court erred in overruling his motion to withdraw his plea, that his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated, that the court imposed an excessive sentence, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Nebraska Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the overruling of Miller's motion to withdraw his plea, noting that a defendant’s change of mind alone is not a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea. The court also found that the record on appeal was not sufficient to review Miller's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in Miller's sentencing. As such, the court affirmed Miller’s conviction and sentence. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

This case involves two consolidated appeals related to Sanitary and Improvement District No. 596 of Douglas County, Nebraska (SID 596) and THG Development, L.L.C. (THG), a real estate owner whose property adjoins but is outside of SID 596's boundaries. The first appeal is from a condemnation action in which SID 596 sought to condemn part of THG's property for public use and the second appeal is from a separate action in which SID 596 sought to levy a special assessment on THG's property, which is outside of SID 596's boundaries, alleging that the property received special benefits from improvements made by SID 596.On the first appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, finding no merit in THG's claims that the lower court erred in allowing the mention of "special benefits" and in permitting certain expert testimony. The Supreme Court also found no merit in the claim that the trial court erred in denying THG's motion for a new trial based on alleged improper conduct by SID 596's counsel during closing argument.In the second appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment granting THG's motion for summary judgment and dismissing SID 596's complaint. The court interpreted the relevant statute, § 31-752, as not authorizing an SID to levy a special assessment on property located outside of the SID's boundaries. As such, the court concluded that SID 596's complaint seeking to levy a special assessment on THG's property was without merit. The court also found no merit in THG's cross-appeal arguing that the lower court erred in denying its motion for attorney fees. View "SID No. 596 v. THG Development" on Justia Law

In the case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, Kathryn Wright was employed as a customer service agent for Southwest Airlines Co. (Southwest). In her volunteer role on a workplace social committee, she was found to have not kept adequate records of expenditures and to have spent committee funds for personal purposes. Consequently, Southwest terminated her employment. Wright then applied for unemployment insurance benefits, which were initially granted by the Nebraska Department of Labor (DOL) adjudicator. However, this decision was overturned by the DOL appeal tribunal, disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits for the week of the discharge and the 14 weeks thereafter. The district court affirmed this decision and Wright appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Wright had committed misconduct connected with her work under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-628.10 (Reissue 2021). The court found that Wright's failure to keep a ledger and maintain supporting documentation for all committee expenses was misconduct connected with her work, regardless of the fact that her work on the committee was volunteer and separate from her paid job duties. The court also disagreed with Wright's argument that the committee funds were not Southwest's but her coworkers'. The court reasoned that the funds were contributed to the committee organized, promoted, supported, and regulated by Southwest, which had an interest in ensuring that the funds were spent appropriately. Therefore, Wright's failure to follow the rules harmed Southwest and was misconduct connected with her work. View "Wright v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

In this case, John Edward Griffith II and Christina M. Griffith sued LG Chem America, Inc., and Shoemaker’s Truck Station, Inc., after lithium-ion rechargeable batteries purchased at a Shoemaker's Truck Station store in Nebraska exploded in Mr. Griffith's pocket in Pennsylvania, causing him serious burns and permanent injuries.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that Nebraska lacked personal jurisdiction over LG Chem America, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. The court found that LG Chem America had no substantial connection to Nebraska related to the case. The company's activities in Nebraska, which included renting warehouse space for the storage of petrochemical products and selling those products to two customers in the state, were unrelated to the sale and distribution of the lithium-ion batteries at issue in the case.The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to apply Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations to the Griffiths' negligence and loss of consortium claims, given that the injury occurred in Pennsylvania. The court found that Pennsylvania had a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties than Nebraska, where the batteries were purchased. As a result, the Griffiths' claims, filed more than two years after the injury, were time-barred under Pennsylvania law. View "Griffith v. LG Chem America" on Justia Law