Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The appellant shot and killed a woman in a hotel room after paying her for sex. He claimed that he acted in self-defense because he believed the woman was reaching for a gun in her backpack, referencing a previous occasion when he saw a gun there. Evidence presented at trial showed that the appellant rented the hotel room, but the woman reimbursed him and occupied the room for most of the time. The appellant was present in the room for about two hours, had no personal belongings there, and described himself as having rented the room for the woman rather than for himself. The altercation resulted in the appellant shooting the woman, after which he fled the scene and was later apprehended in another state.The District Court for Douglas County instructed the jury on self-defense, including a provision that the appellant had a duty to retreat before using deadly force. The jury convicted the appellant of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The appellant argued on appeal that the inclusion of the duty to retreat instruction was in error because the hotel room was his dwelling, which under state law would relieve him of a duty to retreat. He also assigned as error the court’s exclusion of certain character evidence and raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial evidence did not clearly establish the hotel room as the appellant’s place of lodging such that he would be entitled to the privilege of nonretreat. The court held that when evidence is conflicting as to whether a location is the defendant’s dwelling, it is a factual issue for the jury. The court further found no reversible error in the exclusion of character evidence or in the claims of ineffective assistance. The appellant’s convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Nickels" on Justia Law

Two individuals, who had been romantically involved and shared two minor children, ended their relationship in 2016. The mother was awarded legal and physical custody, with the father receiving parenting time under a court-ordered plan. Over subsequent years, the father’s parenting time was suspended due to his refusal or failure to provide negative drug tests, as required by court orders. He also accrued child support arrears and was imprisoned for criminal offenses between August 2023 and August 2024. In May 2024, while the father was incarcerated, the mother filed a complaint to terminate his parental rights, citing abandonment and neglect. The father alleged he was prevented from contacting the children due to changes in contact information and sought a contempt citation against the mother for not facilitating communication.The District Court for Seward County, Nebraska, presided over the termination action and the contempt request. The court found clear and convincing evidence that the father had abandoned the children for at least six months prior to the complaint and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The court also found the father had not exercised or attempted parenting time, nor paid child support during the relevant period, and that his abandonment both preceded and continued after his incarceration. The contempt request was denied, as the court found the mother was not in willful contempt.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court was the appropriate forum to hear the termination proceeding, that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of parental rights, and that the contempt issue was moot following termination. The order terminating parental rights was affirmed. View "Roth v. Marcoe" on Justia Law

A family purchased two parcels of land by warranty deed from a trust, through its successor trustee. After the purchase, the buyers adjusted fence lines to match the legal descriptions in the deed. A third party then sued the buyers, seeking to quiet title to portions of the land based on adverse possession. The buyers notified the trust and trustee and requested a defense against the claim, asserting a duty under the warranty deed, but the trust and trustee refused.The third-party action was heard in the District Court for Douglas County. The buyers moved for partial summary judgment, and the court quieted title in their favor. Their counterclaims for slander and attorney fees were denied. The court found the third party had a colorable claim but lacked legal expertise. The buyers subsequently sued the trust and trustee, seeking reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in defending the title, alleging anticipatory repudiation and breach of the warranty deed. After a stipulated bench trial, the district court ruled that Nebraska law does not allow recovery of attorney fees from a grantor when the grantee successfully defends title; a breach of the covenant of warranty only occurs upon an unsuccessful defense resulting in eviction or surrender. The buyers appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the matter de novo as a question of law. The court held that the covenant of warranty in Nebraska does not impose a separate duty to defend against third-party claims, and attorney fees are compensable only if the grantee suffers eviction or surrender under a paramount title. Because the buyers successfully defended their title and were not evicted, there was no breach, and neither the trust nor its trustee was liable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Morris v. Dall" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought medical treatment for vision issues and was referred to a board-certified ophthalmologist, who performed cataract surgery on both eyes in March and April 2018. After follow-up appointments and an additional procedure on one eye, the plaintiff’s vision improved compared to before surgery. However, nearly a year later, he experienced retinal detachments in both eyes, which required surgical repairs by another physician. Following these procedures, the plaintiff suffered diminished vision in both eyes.The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint in the District Court for Douglas County, asserting that the physician failed to obtain informed consent prior to the cataract surgeries, particularly by not discussing specific risks associated with prior radial keratotomy (RK) procedures. The physician answered that he met the applicable standard of care and denied any negligence or causation. The district court initially granted summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, but the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the limitations defense had not been properly raised. On remand, after the plaintiff failed to designate any expert witnesses by the deadline, the physician again moved for summary judgment, offering his own affidavit and evidence that the plaintiff had no expert to testify at trial. The plaintiff responded with depositions and affidavits asserting he was not informed of relevant risks and would have declined surgery if properly informed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and held that, although there was a factual dispute regarding whether the physician breached the standard of care in obtaining informed consent, the plaintiff failed to present competent evidence on proximate causation, an essential element of his claim. The Court found expert testimony was required to establish causation and rejected arguments based on the common knowledge exception and “self-evident damages.” The judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the physician was affirmed. View "Schuemann v. Timperley" on Justia Law

The State originally charged the defendant with two counts of first-degree murder in 2004 in the district court for Douglas County. The defendant filed a discovery motion shortly after the charges were brought. The case was dismissed in 2005 at the State’s request, and then, in 2025, the State refiled the same charges, commencing proceedings in county court before moving to the district court. The defendant filed several pretrial motions, including motions for discovery and depositions, and ultimately moved for discharge on the grounds that his statutory speedy trial rights had been violated.Following the refiling, the district court for Douglas County reviewed the timeline for both the original 2004 information and the 2025 information. The court applied the tacking-and-tolling approach, counting nonexcludable days from the 2004 case and excludable periods arising from the defendant’s pretrial motions in the 2025 case. The district court found that only three nonexcludable days had accrued before the discovery motion in 2004, and determined that the 2025 information generated 108 excludable days due to various motions. The court concluded that the defendant’s speedy trial deadline had not expired at the time he filed his motion for discharge.The Nebraska Supreme Court independently reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and conducted a de novo review of the legal questions. The Court held that the district court did not err in finding the 2004 discovery motion was never formally disposed of, and that the defendant’s speedy trial rights had not been violated when he moved for discharge. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for discharge and held that the defendant permanently waived his statutory speedy trial rights by filing an unsuccessful motion for discharge that resulted in a continuance beyond the statutory period. View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law

A Nebraska auction company and its former independent sales representative (ISR) entered into a written agreement containing restrictive covenants, including a noncompete clause, and an arbitration provision governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. The ISR terminated the relationship and began working for a competitor, allegedly violating the noncompete clause. The auction company sued for breach of contract, injunctive relief, and tortious interference, seeking a temporary injunction to prevent the ISR’s competitive activities.The District Court for Hall County compelled arbitration for the breach of contract and tortious interference claims but retained jurisdiction to decide the request for injunctive relief, ultimately granting a temporary injunction against the ISR. While the arbitration was pending, the ISR sought to dissolve the injunction and later moved for damages, costs, and attorney fees under Nebraska’s injunction undertaking statute after the arbitrator ruled the restrictive covenants unenforceable and awarded certain damages to the ISR. The arbitrator also found that additional damages based on the invalidation of the restrictive covenants were speculative and not recoverable. The District Court confirmed the arbitral award and denied the ISR’s subsequent motion for additional damages, reasoning that the arbitral award was preclusive as to all damages except attorney fees and expenses.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, due to the scope of the arbitration and the confirmation of the arbitrator’s award, the ISR could not recover further damages for the wrongful injunction that overlapped with claims already addressed in arbitration. However, the Court held that attorney fees and expenses related to resisting the issuance and seeking dissolution of the wrongful injunction were not foreclosed by the arbitration and should be awarded. The Supreme Court modified the lower court’s judgment to include $11,000 in such fees and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Big Iron Auction Co. v. Harder Capital" on Justia Law

After being convicted in 1999 of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, an individual was sentenced to life imprisonment and an additional term for the weapon offense. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In subsequent years, the individual filed multiple motions for postconviction relief, including a third motion in 2020 alleging that a key trial witness had recanted. That motion was dismissed as untimely, a decision summarily affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme Court. In June 2025, the individual filed a fourth motion for postconviction relief, challenging the constitutionality of the time limit for such motions under the Nebraska Postconviction Act, arguing that because his convictions predated the enactment of the time bar, it should not apply to him. He also sought an evidentiary hearing and later claimed the district court issued fictitious orders regarding his prior motions.The District Court for Douglas County dismissed the fourth postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding it time barred under the statutory amendments, and noted that the relief sought was not authorized by the Nebraska Postconviction Act. The court also found that any new claims, such as challenges to alleged fictitious orders, had not been properly raised in the latest motion.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the relief sought was not available under the Nebraska Postconviction Act, and that claims about fictitious orders were not properly before the court because they were not included in the verified postconviction motion. The Court also reiterated that new issues not raised in the verified motion cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, and that the procedural bars in the Act applied to this case. View "State v. McLemore" on Justia Law

A husband and wife disputed the division of assets as part of their divorce proceedings. Before their marriage, the husband purchased two lots of land, Lot 14 and Lot 15, with separate funds and took out loans to build improvements on each. The house and shed on Lot 14, and a barn on Lot 15, were completed before the marriage. After marriage, marital funds were used to pay down the loans, and the husband later paid off remaining balances with his separate, inherited funds. The couple jointly owned and operated the barn on Lot 15 through an LLC.The District Court for Washington County initially classified the land and improvements as the husband’s separate property but credited the marital estate with the payments made from marital funds. The court found the increase in value during the marriage was passive appreciation and thus separate property. The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed this treatment for the land but concluded the barn was marital property. Upon further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the “source of funds” rule, remanded for consideration of this rule, and affirmed the barn’s marital classification.On remand, a different district judge, relying on the existing record, applied the source of funds rule to the land and improvements and again divided the marital estate equally. The husband appealed, arguing for an evidentiary hearing and contesting the application of the source of funds rule.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing, as its mandate did not specify one. The Court clarified that the land remained the husband’s separate property, as it was acquired before marriage and marital funds were not used for its acquisition. The Court applied the source of funds rule to the improvements, recalculated the marital interest, and modified the equalization payment accordingly. The decree of dissolution was affirmed as modified. View "Stava v. Stava" on Justia Law

A man was accused of killing his girlfriend in Omaha, Nebraska, in November 2023. Evidence at trial indicated they had been dating for approximately a year, and he moved into her apartment several months before the incident. The victim was last seen after a supervised visit with her child, and her body was later found wrapped in bedding and plastic bags in a field outside Lincoln. Forensic evidence, GPS data from the victim’s vehicle, and testimony about blood stains and cleaning in the apartment connected the accused to the crime. The autopsy showed extensive blunt force injuries, and expert testimony suggested a claw-type hammer was likely used, although the specific weapon was never recovered.The District Court for Douglas County presided over the jury trial. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon (not a firearm) to commit a felony, and sentenced to life imprisonment plus 40 to 50 years, consecutively. Post-trial, the defendant argued that the court erred by denying a mistrial after a police officer’s statement about his truthfulness was inadvertently played for the jury, that the evidence was insufficient to support the deadly weapon conviction, that improper bad acts evidence was admitted, and that counsel was ineffective in investigating and cross-examining the victim’s ex-husband.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial, finding the limiting instructions were sufficient to mitigate any prejudice from the officer’s statement. The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the deadly weapon conviction, even without the weapon’s recovery. It ruled that most relationship evidence was inextricably intertwined with the murder and not inadmissible as “other acts,” and any error regarding evidence about the defendant’s behavior toward a third party was harmless. The record also showed no ineffective assistance of counsel. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "State v. Evans" on Justia Law

A nonprofit boating club owned property in Cass County, Nebraska, with access provided by a road known as Dock Road. This road extended from Main Street, past a public boat ramp owned by the city, and terminated at the club’s gate. In 2019, flooding washed out a portion of Dock Road, severing road access to the club’s property, though river access remained available. The city repaired Dock Road to restore access to its public boat ramp but did not repair the road up to the club’s property. The club sought to compel the city to restore road access, arguing the city had a mandatory duty to repair Dock Road under Nebraska law.Following the city’s refusal, the club filed for a writ of mandamus in the District Court for Cass County. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, concluding that the city’s duty under Nebraska statutes was discretionary rather than ministerial, and that the club had not shown Dock Road (particularly the portion past the public boat ramp) was a public street. The court dismissed the club’s complaint and denied its motion for summary judgment.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Court held that the club failed to demonstrate the portion of Dock Road it sought to have repaired was a public street, either by formal dedication or by prescription. Evidence showed that only members and invitees of the club used the disputed section, not the general public. Therefore, the statutory duty cited by the club did not apply, and the city was not obligated to repair the road as requested. The judgment for summary dismissal was affirmed. View "Plattsmouth Boat Club v. City of Plattsmouth" on Justia Law