Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Four children were removed from their mother’s home in January 2023 due to allegations of physical abuse. The State filed petitions to adjudicate the children as juveniles under Nebraska law, identifying both parents as parties. The juvenile court adjudicated the children and, following a disposition hearing for the father, ordered him to comply with a case plan. This plan required him to address anger issues, participate in therapy and parenting classes, and maintain appropriate care for the children. During the case, the father suffered a medical episode, faced a pending criminal case, and was found temporarily incompetent, but later restored to competency. He had not seen his children since February 2022.After the children spent over 15 months in out-of-home placement, the State filed supplemental petitions to terminate the father’s parental rights. At the termination hearing, a caseworker testified to the father’s minimal and late progress toward the case plan goals, lack of cooperation, and absence of meaningful relationship with the children. The father testified regarding his medical issues and recent efforts but admitted to violating a no-contact order and being incarcerated.The County Court for York County found statutory grounds for termination based on neglect, failure to correct conditions, and the children’s lengthy out-of-home placement. The court also found termination to be in the children’s best interests, emphasizing the father’s lack of contact and insufficient rehabilitation efforts. The father appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s order. The court held that the juvenile court’s adoption of the case plan did not violate due process, that the statutory bases for termination were satisfied, and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The court’s order was affirmed. View "In re Interest of Joel T." on Justia Law

A married couple purchased a residential property in Omaha, Nebraska, in 1988. Their lot bordered land owned by a company and its predecessor entities. After moving in, the couple began using and improving a portion of the neighboring company’s land—referred to as the Disputed Property. They cleared debris, treated weeds, planted grass, installed a fence (beyond their lot line), built a treehouse, and used the area for family activities. Over the years, they continued to maintain and landscape the Disputed Property, planting trees and a garden, and mowing it regularly. The couple had no permission from the legal owners for this use and believed the area was neglected and unmaintained by anyone else.In 2022, the couple and their family trust filed a lawsuit in the District Court for Douglas County to quiet title to the Disputed Property, claiming ownership by adverse possession. The defendant companies argued that the couple’s use had been permissive since 1997, citing letters sent to adjacent property owners offering permission for limited use until development began. The couple denied receiving any such letters. The district court found in favor of the couple and their trust, concluding that they had proven adverse possession for the statutory period of at least ten years.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the facts and legal findings de novo. It determined that the couple’s use of the land was actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse under a claim of ownership for the required period. The court found the couple’s testimony more credible regarding non-receipt of any permission letters. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order, quieting title to the Disputed Property in the couple’s trust. The main holding is that the couple acquired title to the Disputed Property by adverse possession. View "Goldie v. McNeil & Co. Builders" on Justia Law

This case involves a series of crimes committed over several days in Omaha, Nebraska, in June 2021, by three teenagers. The defendant was charged with 11 counts, including first degree murder, assault, discharging a firearm, theft, robbery, and weapons offenses. The crimes began with the armed theft of a white Volkswagen Jetta, which was later used in two drive-by shootings in rival gang neighborhoods, resulting in one death and several injuries. Shortly after, the group stole a Toyota Scion, and all three suspects were apprehended when law enforcement tracked the stolen vehicle. Key evidence included surveillance footage, forensic analysis of shell casings, cell phone data, and testimony from one co-defendant.The District Court for Douglas County consolidated the defendant’s trial with that of a co-defendant, over objections seeking separate trials and severance of theft-related charges. The court denied these motions, finding the crimes were part of a common scheme or plan, and that any prejudice could be addressed with jury instructions. During trial, the defense objected to the admission of evidence found in the Jetta after a break in police custody, and to police officers’ identifications of the defendant in surveillance footage, arguing improper foundation and opinion testimony. The court overruled these objections. The defendant’s request for a jury instruction clarifying that mere presence is insufficient for aiding and abetting liability was also denied.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court held that joinder of charges and defendants was proper, as the offenses were sufficiently connected and no compelling actual prejudice was demonstrated. It found the chain of custody for the evidence adequate and the admission of lay opinion testimony by police officers permissible. The court also determined that the jury instructions given were appropriate and not misleading. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

An individual submitted a candidate filing form to appear on the ballot for Douglas County sheriff in the May 2026 primary election. Alongside his filing, he provided a letter from the director of the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center certifying that he possessed an “inactive” Nebraska law enforcement officer certificate. His certificate had been active from 1984 to 2009 but was inactive at the time of filing. The Douglas County Republican Party objected to his candidacy, arguing that Nebraska law required a candidate to hold an “active” certificate. The objection was supported by a memorandum and legislative materials suggesting legislative intent to require active certification.The Douglas County election commissioner reviewed the objection and determined that the candidate did not meet the requirements to run for sheriff, based on the inactive status of his law enforcement certificate. The candidate then filed an emergency application for special proceedings with the Nebraska Supreme Court, seeking to overturn the commissioner’s decision and compel his placement on the ballot. The Republican Party intervened, asserting that legislative history and statutory context supported the requirement of an active certificate.The Supreme Court of Nebraska heard the case as a special, summary proceeding under state election law. The court held that the relevant statute required only that a candidate “possess a law enforcement officer certificate,” and made no distinction between active and inactive status. The court found the statutory text to be unambiguous and declined to consider legislative history or administrative regulations. Accordingly, the court concluded that possession of an inactive certificate satisfied the statutory qualifications for candidacy. The judgment ordered that the candidate’s name appear on the ballot for the sheriff’s office. View "Martinez v. Jensen" on Justia Law

In this case, a divorced couple disputed the calculation of child support payments. The father was originally ordered to pay child support based on his salary and bonuses, with restricted stock units (RSUs) he received from his employer excluded as income but divided as marital property. After their divorce, the father began selling his RSUs, which he had not done during the marriage. The mother then sought to modify the child support order, arguing that the RSU sales represented a material change in circumstances and that future RSU income should be considered for child support purposes.After the Nebraska Court of Appeals dismissed earlier appeals for lack of jurisdiction, the mother filed a complaint to modify child support in the District Court for Douglas County. A child support referee found that the father’s post-divorce sales of RSUs constituted a material change in circumstances, justifying a recalculation of child support. The referee included the RSU income, along with salary and bonuses, in determining the father’s income, and recommended increasing the child support payments. The referee also recommended that the modification be applied retroactively to a date later than the mother requested and that both parties pay their own attorney fees. The district court adopted these recommendations in full.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the father’s sale of RSUs after the divorce was a material change in circumstances not contemplated in the original decree, making claim and issue preclusion doctrines inapplicable. The Supreme Court also found no abuse of discretion in including RSU income, averaging bonus payments, accounting for taxes, or in the district court’s decisions regarding retroactivity and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Kingston v. Kingston" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was stopped by law enforcement officers in Seward County, Nebraska, after officers observed his vehicle turn without signaling and swerve as it drove. The officers approached the vehicle and observed signs of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol and the defendant’s slurred speech. The defendant admitted to drinking and was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and transported to the county detention center, where he submitted to a breath test. His blood alcohol content was measured at .131 grams per 210 liters of breath. After the breath test, an officer informed the defendant, incorrectly, that he could seek an independent chemical test only after being released, when in fact he had the statutory right to do so while still in custody.The County Court for Seward County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the breath test results, finding that the officers had probable cause to stop the vehicle based on a traffic violation and did not hamper or prevent the defendant from obtaining an independent test. A bench trial resulted in a conviction for DUI and an open container violation. Upon appeal, the District Court for Seward County affirmed, concluding that the officer’s incorrect statement did not amount to a refusal or denial of the defendant’s statutory right to an independent test.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the officer’s mistaken or incomplete advisement regarding the timing of the independent test did not constitute a refusal to permit such a test under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,199. The court found the officers had probable cause for the initial stop, and the defendant’s statutory and constitutional rights were not violated. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "State v. Weber" on Justia Law

The case concerns a fatal stabbing involving a 14-year-old, Damore, who was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon. The incident began with an altercation between two groups of teenagers at a convenience store in Lincoln, Nebraska, which escalated when the victim’s vehicle was damaged. The victim’s mother went to Damore’s residence to address the damage, leading to a confrontation. The victim arrived, a physical altercation ensued, and Damore stabbed the victim twice, resulting in the victim’s death. Damore was subsequently charged and sought to have his case transferred from district court to juvenile court.After Damore was bound over to the District Court for Lancaster County, he filed a motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. The district court conducted a multi-day evidentiary hearing, considering testimony from various witnesses and extensive documentary evidence. The district court made specific findings and evaluated each statutory factor required by Nebraska law, ultimately finding that most factors supported retaining the case in district court and denying the motion to transfer. Damore timely appealed.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed, concluding that the lower court’s findings and ultimate decision were not clearly untenable. Damore then sought further review, arguing that the Court of Appeals misstated and misapplied the abuse of discretion standard, and incorrectly reviewed the case.The Supreme Court of Nebraska addressed Damore’s arguments, clarified the abuse of discretion standard, and explained that the Court of Appeals had properly applied the standard. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not misstate or misapply the abuse of discretion standard and affirmed its decision, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Damore’s motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. View "State v. Damore" on Justia Law

A dispute arose after a member of a Nebraska nonprofit corporation, which operates a residential building, was elected to the board of directors by lifetime leaseholders and subsequently removed by a vote of the other board members pursuant to a provision in the corporation’s bylaws. The removed director filed a declaratory judgment action, naming as defendants the “Board of Directors,” the individual directors who voted for her removal, and her replacement, but did not name the corporation itself. She argued her removal violated state nonprofit law because, in her view, leaseholders were “members” under the statute, and directors elected by members could not be removed in this manner.The District Court for Douglas County considered cross-motions for summary judgment. It concluded that the corporation had no members as defined by the Nebraska Nonprofit Corporation Act, based on the corporation’s articles, and found the removal provision in the bylaws valid. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The removed director then appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that it could not address the substantive legal questions because the nonprofit corporation was an indispensable party to the declaratory judgment action. The court explained that a declaratory judgment determining the rightful composition of a corporation’s board necessarily affects the corporation’s interests, and such relief cannot be granted without the corporation’s participation. The court further held that naming the board of directors was not a substitute for naming the corporation itself, as the board is not a legal entity capable of being sued. Consequently, the Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss it without prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to join an indispensable party. View "Powers v. Board of Directors of Elmwood Tower" on Justia Law

Two ethanol producers, one based in Nebraska and the other in Illinois, became involved in a dispute centering on the calculation of a benchmark price for ethanol sales contracts. The Nebraska-based company alleged that its Illinois counterpart intentionally manipulated the Chicago Benchmark Price for ethanol by strategically timing large deliveries and engaging in below-market sales at a key terminal. This alleged conduct, according to the Nebraska company, reduced the value of its own sales contracts, which were referenced to the benchmark, and allowed the Illinois company to profit through derivative contracts that increased in value as the benchmark price declined.The lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois, with the Nebraska company asserting a claim under Nebraska law for tortious interference with contract, specifically relying on § 766A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The federal district court granted the Illinois company’s motion to dismiss, holding that Nebraska courts had not recognized § 766A as a viable theory of liability. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated that dismissal, directing the district court to predict whether the Nebraska Supreme Court would recognize such a cause of action or to certify the question to the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court accepted the certified question and, after reviewing its own precedent and the common-law origins of § 766A, concluded that this theory of liability was not recognized in English common law nor compelled by the Nebraska Constitution. The court further determined that the policy arguments for adopting § 766A were not so compelling as to warrant judicial innovation in this area and that such decisions are best left to the Legislature. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that it would not recognize § 766A as a valid basis for tort liability in Nebraska. View "Green Plains Trade Group v. Archer Daniels Midland Co." on Justia Law

After the death of Theresa A. Meyers, questions arose regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees charged to her estate and a revocable trust she had established. The personal representative of Meyers’ estate and cotrustees of her trust initially agreed with the law firm representing them to a percentage-based fee, first at 2% and later reduced to 1% of the gross assets. Following the discovery of additional assets and the likelihood of litigation, the law firm and the remaining fiduciaries entered a written agreement switching to hourly billing. One cotrustee, however, did not sign this modification. After the law firm completed its services, some beneficiaries and devisees challenged the attorney fees as excessive, prompting a review under Nebraska law.The County Court for Douglas County held a consolidated hearing and found that the attorney fees charged by the law firm were fair, reasonable, necessary, and not excessive, taking into account the complexity of the estate, the services performed, and expert testimony. The county court also found no conflict of interest in the firm’s representation of both the personal representative and the cotrustees. The court did not address whether the written fee modification was effective. Dissatisfied, the challengers appealed.The Nebraska Court of Appeals determined that the written hourly fee agreement was ineffective because not all cotrustees had consented, as required by the trust. The appellate court thus applied the original 1% fee structure and found that this amount was reasonable. The law firm sought further review.The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by addressing the effectiveness of the written fee agreement, as the challengers had not properly raised the issue on appeal. The Supreme Court found no error on the record regarding the reasonableness of the fees as determined by the county court. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded with directions to affirm the county court’s order. View "In re Estate of Meyers" on Justia Law