Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case arose from a vehicle collision on Interstate 80 in which the plaintiff, Bazan, was struck by a commercial semi-truck owned by Elite Fleet Hauling, LLC. Bazan sued the driver and the company, claiming the accident caused him to suffer a mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI), or concussion, necessitating ongoing treatment and resulting in significant damages. Elite Fleet admitted fault for the accident but disputed the causation, nature, and extent of Bazan’s injuries. A central issue was the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the cause and extent of Bazan’s alleged brain injury.During the litigation in the District Court for Cass County, Bazan sought to present expert testimony from his treating physician, Dr. Aguila, on causation, permanency, and future medical costs. However, the district court determined that Bazan failed to comply with the expert disclosure requirements specified in its progression order, particularly the requirement for a complete statement of the expert’s opinion and its basis by a set deadline. As a result, the court limited Dr. Aguila’s testimony to treatment provided and excluded his opinions on causation, permanency, and future costs. Meanwhile, Elite Fleet was permitted to present expert testimony from Dr. Ernst, a licensed neuropsychologist, who opined that Bazan did not sustain an mTBI in the collision, over Bazan’s objection that Dr. Ernst was not qualified to render such a diagnosis. The jury ultimately awarded Bazan $100,000, substantially less than he sought. Bazan’s motion for a new trial, challenging the expert witness rulings, was denied.Upon review, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing its progression order by excluding Dr. Aguila’s expert opinions due to inadequate and untimely disclosures. The Court also held that Dr. Ernst was qualified under Nebraska law to provide expert testimony on neuropsychological issues, including whether Bazan suffered an mTBI. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Bazan v. Gonser" on Justia Law

The case involved allegations that the defendant sexually abused his stepson, J.M., on multiple occasions between 2019 and 2022. The prosecution charged the defendant with two counts of first degree sexual assault of a child and one count of third degree sexual assault of a child. A key issue arose regarding the age of the victim at the time of one incident. Initially, the charge alleged the victim was between 12 and 15 years old, but testimony at trial indicated the victim was younger than 12. The prosecution successfully moved to amend the information during trial to reflect the victim’s correct age at the time of the offense.Prior to the appeal, the District Court for Douglas County allowed the State to amend the information to align with the evidence presented. The jury found the defendant guilty on all three counts, and the court convicted and sentenced him, also concluding that he committed an aggravated offense requiring lifetime sex offender registration. The defendant, now represented by different counsel, appealed, raising several assignments of error including challenges to the amendment of the information, exclusion of certain evidence, his absence during trial proceedings, and claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the statute defining first degree sexual assault of a child creates a single offense that can be committed in two distinct ways, based on the age of the victim and the age of the defendant. The Court found no abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the information, determined that the defendant’s absence during certain trial proceedings did not violate due process, and found no plain error regarding evidentiary exclusions. The Court also concluded that the ineffective assistance claims were either insufficiently specific or lacked merit. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "State v. Ansell" on Justia Law

The appellant shot and killed a woman in a hotel room after paying her for sex. He claimed that he acted in self-defense because he believed the woman was reaching for a gun in her backpack, referencing a previous occasion when he saw a gun there. Evidence presented at trial showed that the appellant rented the hotel room, but the woman reimbursed him and occupied the room for most of the time. The appellant was present in the room for about two hours, had no personal belongings there, and described himself as having rented the room for the woman rather than for himself. The altercation resulted in the appellant shooting the woman, after which he fled the scene and was later apprehended in another state.The District Court for Douglas County instructed the jury on self-defense, including a provision that the appellant had a duty to retreat before using deadly force. The jury convicted the appellant of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The appellant argued on appeal that the inclusion of the duty to retreat instruction was in error because the hotel room was his dwelling, which under state law would relieve him of a duty to retreat. He also assigned as error the court’s exclusion of certain character evidence and raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial evidence did not clearly establish the hotel room as the appellant’s place of lodging such that he would be entitled to the privilege of nonretreat. The court held that when evidence is conflicting as to whether a location is the defendant’s dwelling, it is a factual issue for the jury. The court further found no reversible error in the exclusion of character evidence or in the claims of ineffective assistance. The appellant’s convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Nickels" on Justia Law

Two individuals, who had been romantically involved and shared two minor children, ended their relationship in 2016. The mother was awarded legal and physical custody, with the father receiving parenting time under a court-ordered plan. Over subsequent years, the father’s parenting time was suspended due to his refusal or failure to provide negative drug tests, as required by court orders. He also accrued child support arrears and was imprisoned for criminal offenses between August 2023 and August 2024. In May 2024, while the father was incarcerated, the mother filed a complaint to terminate his parental rights, citing abandonment and neglect. The father alleged he was prevented from contacting the children due to changes in contact information and sought a contempt citation against the mother for not facilitating communication.The District Court for Seward County, Nebraska, presided over the termination action and the contempt request. The court found clear and convincing evidence that the father had abandoned the children for at least six months prior to the complaint and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The court also found the father had not exercised or attempted parenting time, nor paid child support during the relevant period, and that his abandonment both preceded and continued after his incarceration. The contempt request was denied, as the court found the mother was not in willful contempt.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court was the appropriate forum to hear the termination proceeding, that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of parental rights, and that the contempt issue was moot following termination. The order terminating parental rights was affirmed. View "Roth v. Marcoe" on Justia Law

A family purchased two parcels of land by warranty deed from a trust, through its successor trustee. After the purchase, the buyers adjusted fence lines to match the legal descriptions in the deed. A third party then sued the buyers, seeking to quiet title to portions of the land based on adverse possession. The buyers notified the trust and trustee and requested a defense against the claim, asserting a duty under the warranty deed, but the trust and trustee refused.The third-party action was heard in the District Court for Douglas County. The buyers moved for partial summary judgment, and the court quieted title in their favor. Their counterclaims for slander and attorney fees were denied. The court found the third party had a colorable claim but lacked legal expertise. The buyers subsequently sued the trust and trustee, seeking reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in defending the title, alleging anticipatory repudiation and breach of the warranty deed. After a stipulated bench trial, the district court ruled that Nebraska law does not allow recovery of attorney fees from a grantor when the grantee successfully defends title; a breach of the covenant of warranty only occurs upon an unsuccessful defense resulting in eviction or surrender. The buyers appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the matter de novo as a question of law. The court held that the covenant of warranty in Nebraska does not impose a separate duty to defend against third-party claims, and attorney fees are compensable only if the grantee suffers eviction or surrender under a paramount title. Because the buyers successfully defended their title and were not evicted, there was no breach, and neither the trust nor its trustee was liable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Morris v. Dall" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought medical treatment for vision issues and was referred to a board-certified ophthalmologist, who performed cataract surgery on both eyes in March and April 2018. After follow-up appointments and an additional procedure on one eye, the plaintiff’s vision improved compared to before surgery. However, nearly a year later, he experienced retinal detachments in both eyes, which required surgical repairs by another physician. Following these procedures, the plaintiff suffered diminished vision in both eyes.The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint in the District Court for Douglas County, asserting that the physician failed to obtain informed consent prior to the cataract surgeries, particularly by not discussing specific risks associated with prior radial keratotomy (RK) procedures. The physician answered that he met the applicable standard of care and denied any negligence or causation. The district court initially granted summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, but the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the limitations defense had not been properly raised. On remand, after the plaintiff failed to designate any expert witnesses by the deadline, the physician again moved for summary judgment, offering his own affidavit and evidence that the plaintiff had no expert to testify at trial. The plaintiff responded with depositions and affidavits asserting he was not informed of relevant risks and would have declined surgery if properly informed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and held that, although there was a factual dispute regarding whether the physician breached the standard of care in obtaining informed consent, the plaintiff failed to present competent evidence on proximate causation, an essential element of his claim. The Court found expert testimony was required to establish causation and rejected arguments based on the common knowledge exception and “self-evident damages.” The judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the physician was affirmed. View "Schuemann v. Timperley" on Justia Law

The State originally charged the defendant with two counts of first-degree murder in 2004 in the district court for Douglas County. The defendant filed a discovery motion shortly after the charges were brought. The case was dismissed in 2005 at the State’s request, and then, in 2025, the State refiled the same charges, commencing proceedings in county court before moving to the district court. The defendant filed several pretrial motions, including motions for discovery and depositions, and ultimately moved for discharge on the grounds that his statutory speedy trial rights had been violated.Following the refiling, the district court for Douglas County reviewed the timeline for both the original 2004 information and the 2025 information. The court applied the tacking-and-tolling approach, counting nonexcludable days from the 2004 case and excludable periods arising from the defendant’s pretrial motions in the 2025 case. The district court found that only three nonexcludable days had accrued before the discovery motion in 2004, and determined that the 2025 information generated 108 excludable days due to various motions. The court concluded that the defendant’s speedy trial deadline had not expired at the time he filed his motion for discharge.The Nebraska Supreme Court independently reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and conducted a de novo review of the legal questions. The Court held that the district court did not err in finding the 2004 discovery motion was never formally disposed of, and that the defendant’s speedy trial rights had not been violated when he moved for discharge. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for discharge and held that the defendant permanently waived his statutory speedy trial rights by filing an unsuccessful motion for discharge that resulted in a continuance beyond the statutory period. View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law

A Nebraska auction company and its former independent sales representative (ISR) entered into a written agreement containing restrictive covenants, including a noncompete clause, and an arbitration provision governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. The ISR terminated the relationship and began working for a competitor, allegedly violating the noncompete clause. The auction company sued for breach of contract, injunctive relief, and tortious interference, seeking a temporary injunction to prevent the ISR’s competitive activities.The District Court for Hall County compelled arbitration for the breach of contract and tortious interference claims but retained jurisdiction to decide the request for injunctive relief, ultimately granting a temporary injunction against the ISR. While the arbitration was pending, the ISR sought to dissolve the injunction and later moved for damages, costs, and attorney fees under Nebraska’s injunction undertaking statute after the arbitrator ruled the restrictive covenants unenforceable and awarded certain damages to the ISR. The arbitrator also found that additional damages based on the invalidation of the restrictive covenants were speculative and not recoverable. The District Court confirmed the arbitral award and denied the ISR’s subsequent motion for additional damages, reasoning that the arbitral award was preclusive as to all damages except attorney fees and expenses.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, due to the scope of the arbitration and the confirmation of the arbitrator’s award, the ISR could not recover further damages for the wrongful injunction that overlapped with claims already addressed in arbitration. However, the Court held that attorney fees and expenses related to resisting the issuance and seeking dissolution of the wrongful injunction were not foreclosed by the arbitration and should be awarded. The Supreme Court modified the lower court’s judgment to include $11,000 in such fees and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Big Iron Auction Co. v. Harder Capital" on Justia Law

After being convicted in 1999 of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, an individual was sentenced to life imprisonment and an additional term for the weapon offense. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In subsequent years, the individual filed multiple motions for postconviction relief, including a third motion in 2020 alleging that a key trial witness had recanted. That motion was dismissed as untimely, a decision summarily affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme Court. In June 2025, the individual filed a fourth motion for postconviction relief, challenging the constitutionality of the time limit for such motions under the Nebraska Postconviction Act, arguing that because his convictions predated the enactment of the time bar, it should not apply to him. He also sought an evidentiary hearing and later claimed the district court issued fictitious orders regarding his prior motions.The District Court for Douglas County dismissed the fourth postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding it time barred under the statutory amendments, and noted that the relief sought was not authorized by the Nebraska Postconviction Act. The court also found that any new claims, such as challenges to alleged fictitious orders, had not been properly raised in the latest motion.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the relief sought was not available under the Nebraska Postconviction Act, and that claims about fictitious orders were not properly before the court because they were not included in the verified postconviction motion. The Court also reiterated that new issues not raised in the verified motion cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, and that the procedural bars in the Act applied to this case. View "State v. McLemore" on Justia Law

A husband and wife disputed the division of assets as part of their divorce proceedings. Before their marriage, the husband purchased two lots of land, Lot 14 and Lot 15, with separate funds and took out loans to build improvements on each. The house and shed on Lot 14, and a barn on Lot 15, were completed before the marriage. After marriage, marital funds were used to pay down the loans, and the husband later paid off remaining balances with his separate, inherited funds. The couple jointly owned and operated the barn on Lot 15 through an LLC.The District Court for Washington County initially classified the land and improvements as the husband’s separate property but credited the marital estate with the payments made from marital funds. The court found the increase in value during the marriage was passive appreciation and thus separate property. The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed this treatment for the land but concluded the barn was marital property. Upon further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the “source of funds” rule, remanded for consideration of this rule, and affirmed the barn’s marital classification.On remand, a different district judge, relying on the existing record, applied the source of funds rule to the land and improvements and again divided the marital estate equally. The husband appealed, arguing for an evidentiary hearing and contesting the application of the source of funds rule.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing, as its mandate did not specify one. The Court clarified that the land remained the husband’s separate property, as it was acquired before marriage and marital funds were not used for its acquisition. The Court applied the source of funds rule to the improvements, recalculated the marital interest, and modified the equalization payment accordingly. The decree of dissolution was affirmed as modified. View "Stava v. Stava" on Justia Law