Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a dispute between developers of rent-restricted housing projects and the Lancaster County Board of Equalization. The Board sought permission from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission to use a different methodology than the statutorily provided income approach for assessing the value of the housing projects. The Board argued that the income approach did not result in actual value and sought to use a different, professionally accepted mass appraisal method. The developers appealed the Commission's decision to grant the Board's request.The Nebraska Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the Commission's decision was a "final decision" subject to appeal. The court concluded that the Commission's decision was not final because it did not approve a specific alternate methodology and did not determine the valuation of the properties. The court further reasoned that the decision could be rendered moot by future developments in the litigation, such as the Board's refusal to approve the County Assessor's proposed valuations. The court held that, because the developers' rights had not been substantially affected by the Commission's decision, it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "A & P II, LLC v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal." on Justia Law

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In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted the Nebraska Construction Lien Act (NCLA) and determined that construction liens can attach to the contracting owner's real estate, even if ownership of the property changed before the liens were recorded. The case arose from a dispute between S & H Holdings, L.L.C. (S&H), Realty Income Properties 19, LLC (RIP), and several contractors. S&H, the original owner of the property, entered into an agreement with Integrated Construction Management Services, Inc. to construct a Burger King on the property. The contractors were not fully paid for their services and materials, so they filed liens on the property. Meanwhile, S&H sold the property to RIP.S&H and RIP argued that the liens did not attach to the property because S&H no longer owned it at the time the liens were recorded. The contractors argued that their liens attached because the transfer of ownership did not affect the liens' attachment. The court rejected S&H and RIP's argument, finding that the contractors' liens attached to the property regardless of the change in ownership. The court held that a construction lien is automatically created whenever a contractor furnishes services or materials and originates from the contracting owner's agreement to improve the real estate, even if the lien has not yet attached to the real estate and is not yet enforceable. The court concluded that the contractors' liens had attached to the property and had priority over RIP's fee interest. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. View "Nore Electric v. S & H Holdings" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Nebraska recently ruled on a dispute between the Nebraska Journalism Trust (NJT) and the Nebraska Department of Environment and Energy (NDEE) over the cost of providing public records. NJT had requested email records from NDEE relating to certain environmental topics, and was given an estimated cost of $44,103.11, mainly for the time spent by non-attorney staff to review the requested records. NJT filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the cost estimate included charges unauthorized by Nebraska law.The court ruled that a requester of public records who is provided with a fee estimate that contains unauthorized charges may indeed file for a writ of mandamus. The court also clarified that the party seeking a writ of mandamus has the burden of proving that the fee estimate includes unauthorized charges, after which the public body must show that the fees charged are authorized by law.However, the court found that the plain language of Nebraska law permits a public body to charge a fee for time spent by non-attorney employees, in excess of four cumulative hours, reviewing requested public records. The court thus concluded that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the law, vacated its writ of mandamus and its order awarding attorney fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nebraska Journalism Trust v. Dept. of Envt. & Energy" on Justia Law

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The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed a decision holding Allen Crow, a corporate officer, personally liable for unpaid use taxes of his former corporation, Direct Media Marketing, Inc. The court determined that Crow failed to rebut the presumption of correctness of the amount of use taxes assessed against Direct Media. The court further found that Crow was a responsible officer of Direct Media and willfully failed to pay Direct Media's use taxes, making him personally liable for the tax deficiency.Despite the Department of Revenue's significant delay in pursuing proceedings against Direct Media and Crow, the court did not find compelling circumstances or demonstrated prejudice that would warrant equitable relief. The court held that the doctrine of laches, which bars a party from relief due to delay, could not be applied against the government in its efforts to enforce a public right or protect a public interest. The court concluded that the delay did not absolve Direct Media and Crow of their liability. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order upholding the order of the Tax Commissioner that held Crow personally liable for Direct Media's unpaid taxes. View "Crow v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

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The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled in a dispute involving property tax assessment after a real estate property was damaged by fire due to arson. The issue at the core of the case was whether a fire caused by arson could be considered a "calamity" under state law, thus entitling the property owner, Inland Insurance Company, to a reduction in their property's assessed value.The Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) had upheld the decision of the Lancaster County Board of Equalization, maintaining the assessed value of the property without considering the damage caused by the fire as a calamity. The TERC interpreted the word "calamity" as referring only to natural events.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed with TERC's interpretation of the term "calamity." The court held that the term, as used in state law, encompasses any disastrous event, not just natural disasters. The language of the law, the court reasoned, did not limit calamities to natural events. The court therefore reversed TERC's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not consider the Board of Equalization's cross-appeal, which argued that certain tax statutes were unconstitutional, due to a procedural issue. View "Inland Ins. Co. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal." on Justia Law

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The State of Nebraska convicted DeShawn L. Gleaton, Jr. of first-degree murder, use of a firearm to commit a felony, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and witness tampering. Gleaton appealed, arguing that the lower court erred in admitting expert testimony about cell phone location data, in overruling defense objections to the prosecutor's statements during closing argument, and in declining to strike certain victim impact material from the presentence investigation report. Gleaton also accused the lower court of judicial misconduct during sentencing. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Gleaton's convictions and sentences, ruling that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, in overruling defense objections to the prosecutor's statements, or in declining to strike the victim impact material. The high court also found no judicial misconduct. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the lower court committed plain error in sentencing by applying 413 days' credit for time served to Gleaton's life sentence, instead of applying the credit to the nonlife sentences consecutive to the life sentence. The high court modified Gleaton's sentences to correct this error. View "State v. Gleaton" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in a case involving the right to a speedy trial. The defendant, Justin N. Rashad, was charged with first degree assault and use of a firearm to commit a felony in connection with the shooting of his father. Rashad argued that his right to a speedy trial, as provided by Nebraska law, was violated when the State failed to meet its evidentiary burden to show that there was good cause to continue his case past the 6-month speedy trial deadline. The trial was initially delayed because the judge had another trial scheduled. The trial was then set for a date in February, months past the speedy trial deadline.The Supreme Court held that the evidence in the record, which consisted solely of emails regarding the scheduling of the hearing on the continuance and a transcript of that hearing, was insufficient to show that there was good cause to continue Rashad’s trial past the speedy trial deadline. The Court noted that statements of unavailability, without more, are insufficient to show that docket congestion existed, such that there was good cause to continue the trial. Furthermore, the court highlighted that the information about the judge’s availability came from statements by the judge, and that comments by the trial judge are not evidence. As such, the court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was good cause to continue Rashad’s trial. The case was remanded to the lower court with instructions to grant Rashad's motion for absolute discharge. View "State v. Rashad" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case before the Nebraska Supreme Court involved an appeal by Nathaniel L. Gnewuch, who was convicted of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. Gnewuch had requested a deferred sentence under Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-2292, but the district court refused to consider his request, deeming the statute unconstitutional. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court examined the language of § 29-2292, which allows for a deferred judgement and probation for a guilty defendant, without the entry of a final judgement of conviction, under certain circumstances.The court rejected the district court's assertion that it lacked jurisdiction to impose a sentence of probation before the entry of a judgement of conviction, finding nothing in the Nebraska Constitution that prevented the Legislature from granting the district court such jurisdiction. The court also disagreed with the argument that § 29-2292 violates the separation of powers clause in the Nebraska Constitution by allowing the judiciary to invade the charging function, an inherent executive power. It concluded that the power to define criminal conduct and fix punishment is vested in the legislative branch, while the imposition of a sentence within these legislative limits is a judicial function.Therefore, the court held that § 29-2292 does not violate the separation of powers clause in the Nebraska Constitution and remanded the case back to the district court for consideration of Gnewuch's request for a deferred judgement. View "State v. Gnewuch" on Justia Law

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The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed a decision made by the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) that included corrections unit case managers within the protective service bargaining unit (PSBU), represented by the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #88 (FOP 88). The case arose from a petition filed by FOP 88 to the CIR to clarify or amend the PSBU to include corrections unit case managers. The State of Nebraska appealed the CIR's decision, arguing that corrections unit case managers were supervisors and, hence, should not be in the same bargaining unit as their subordinates. The court deemed the CIR had erred in giving preclusive effect to its 2018 order, which certified FOP 88 as the bargaining representative for the PSBU. The court held that the issue of whether corrections unit case managers were part of the PSBU was not precluded by the 2018 order. The court remanded the matter back to the CIR to again determine whether the PSBU includes corrections unit case managers based on the existing record, with instructions to provide an explanation forming the basis for its ruling. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #88 v. State" on Justia Law

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The defendant, Melvin Lear, was charged with a felony offense by the State of Nebraska. Lear requested a continuance in order to conduct additional discovery, which was granted by the court. However, the continuance extended the trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. Lear then filed a motion for absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds. The district court denied the motion, finding that Lear had waived his statutory right to a speedy trial by requesting a continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory limit. Lear appealed the decision, arguing that the waiver provision in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) only applies to a continuance granted at the sole request of the defendant, not a request joined in by the State. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected Lear's argument, interpreting the waiver provision to apply to a continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his or her counsel, regardless of whether the State joins the request, when the period of delay resulting from the continuance extends a trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision to deny Lear's motion for absolute discharge. View "State v. Lear" on Justia Law