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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court for Seward County denying the request sought by Jami Hollomon, the mother of a minor child, seeking to register an order by the State of Texas adjudicating parentage and establishing a parenting plan for the child, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying Hollomon's request to register the Texas order in Nebraska. In its order, the State of Texas adjudicated parentage and established a parenting plan as between Hollomon and Alex Taylor, the unmarried parents of the child. The district court denied Hollomon's request to confirm and register the order in Nebraska, concluding that it should decline jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1226 to 43-1266. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Texas order may be registered in Nebraska; and (2) concerns about whether the district court for Seward County may exercise jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding were not yet implicated. View "Hollomon v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of attempted possession fo a controlled substance, a Class I misdemeanor, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in finding that Defendant made a free, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea; (2) the district court did not err in accepting the plea because it did not violate double jeopardy where Defendant waived his rights in the plea agreement; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to a term of incarceration; and (4) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel. View "State v. Manjikian" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decree dissolving Appellant's marriage to Appellee, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the valuation dates for the marital assets and in classifying, valuing, and dividing the marital estate. On appeal, Appellant challenged the division of property, asserting that all assets must be valued using a single date and that a coverture formula was required to establish the premarital value of a business. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) using a single date to value all assets would imagine upon the discretion necessary to equitably divide a marital estate, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in valuing marital assets on dates that rationally related to the property being divided; and (2) the coverture formula depends upon speculation and assumptions generally inconsistent with such valuations, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to apply that method. View "Rohde v. Rohde" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, holding that there was no plain error with regard to the prosecutor's opening statement or a witness's invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege in the jury's presence and that Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were without merit. Specifically, the Court held (1) no prosecutorial misconduct occurred during opening statements; (2) the bill of exceptions did not show that the prosecutor knew a witness would assert a testimonial privilege in the jury's presence; (3) expert testimony regarding blood spatter evidence was neither irrelevant nor unfairly prejudicial; and (4) therefore, trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, failing to demand compliance with Neb. Evid. R. 513(2) and failing to challenge the blood spatter evidence. View "State v. Munoz" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court affirming the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission's order cancelling Appellant's liquor license, holding that the Commission and the district court disregarded the plain language of the Commission's "disturbance rule," 237 Neb. Admin. Code ch. 6, 019.01F. The Commission found that Appellant violated the disturbance rule when it "allowed or permitted a disturbance" at an event it hosted. The district court concluded that the record supported the Commission's findings. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erred in agreeing with the Commission that the disturbance occurred when Appellant hosted the event because the regulation applies only where a licensee allows any unreasonable disturbance "to continue without taking the steps" as set forth in the rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission and the district court ignored the words "to continue," and therefore, the decisions below did not conform to the law. View "McManus Enterprises v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's order dismissing a sexual assault protection order and entering a harassment protection order in that case, holding that the entry of the harassment protection order violated A.G.'s right to procedural due process. D.W. sought an obtained an ex parte sexual assault protection order against A.G. A.G. requested a show cause hearing on whether the sexual assault protection order should remain in effect. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the sexual assault protection order would not remain in effect but that it would enter a harassment protection order. After sua sponte filing D.W.'s original petition and affidavit under a new case number, the trial court dismissed the sexual assault protection order and entered a harassment protection order in that case. The Supreme Court held (1) there is no basis to reverse the dismissal of the sexual assault protection order; but (2) the entry of the harassment protection order did not comply with procedural due process. View "D.W. v. A.G." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order affirming the denial of LeVeta Winslow's 2016 application for Medicaid benefits, holding that Nebraska's Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Division of Medicaid and Long-Term Care properly determined that Winslow was ineligible for Medicaid due to excess resources. DHHS determined that Winslow was ineligible for Medicaid because her resources, which included a house, were above $4,000. The district court affirmed the denial of benefits, finding that the house did not qualify for Winslow's home and thus was not exempt from consideration as an available resource as Winslow's home. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the house was not subject to the home exemption for Winslow's Medicaid application; (2) the district court erred in determining that the property was not eligible for the other real property exception because Winslow lacked authority to liquidate while it was held by a revocable trust; and (3) Winslow failed to provide sufficient documentation that she was under the available resource limit if she could exclude the house, and therefore, the district court did not err in failing to find that DHHS was required to provide Winslow an IM-1 form for the house while it was held by the trust. View "Winslow v. State ex rel. Peterson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order granting a mortgage company's motion for summary judgment, holding that a subordination clause in a land contract for the purchase of a residence effectively subordinated the rights of the purchasers to the rights held by later assignees of the note and deed of trust. The purchasers of the property entered into the land contract with a seller-trust. After the purchasers took possession, the seller-trust signed a promissory note and a deed of trust to a bank for a certain amount of money in order to pay a previously existing mortgage on the property. The note and deed of trust were eventually assigned to the mortgage company. When the seller-trust defaulted on its loan, the purchasers filed suit to enjoin a trustee sale of the property, asserting that his claim to the property was superior to that of the mortgage company. The district court granted summary judgment for the mortgage company. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the subordination clause meant that the rights of any existing lenders of the seller-trust would take precedence over the purchasers' rights or interest in the property until the purchasers have paid the contract price in full. View "Wintroub v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court affirming the decision of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) terminating Appellant's status as a Medicaid service provider, holding that the district court's affirmance of the sanction imposed by DHHS was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Based on Appellant's failures to adhere to the standards for participation in Medicaid, DHHS terminated Appellant's provider agreements for good cause and then informed Appellant of her permanent exclusion from the Medicaid program. The DHHS director of the Division of Medicaid and Long-Term Care ruled that DHHS' decision to terminate Appellant as a Medicaid service provider was proper. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court's finding that Appellant billed for overlapping services was based on competent evidence; and (2) DHHS' sanction to permanently exclude Appellant from the Medicaid program was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Tran v. State" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the ground that Plaintiff's cause of action was time barred by the statute of limitations for professional negligence under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-222, holding that the district court erred in concluding that a massage therapist is a professional under section 25-222 and in granting summary judgment on that ground. Plaintiff, a customer of Defendant, a massage therapy establishment, alleged that Defendant's employee, a licensed massage therapist, improperly compressed a nerve on Plaintiff's neck, causing her to become unconscious, fall out of the massage chair, and sustain injuries. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, alleging that her injuries were caused by Defendant's negligence as the massage therapist's employer. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff's claim was time barred by the application of section 25-222. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by finding that massage therapy is a "profession" within the meaning of section 25-222. The Supreme Court remanded the cause to the district court. View "Wehrer v. Dynamic Life Therapy & Wellness, P.C." on Justia Law