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In this product liability action, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the claimant’s expert’s testimony regarding causation. Plaintiff brought this product liability action against Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. and Roche Laboratories, Inc. (collectively, Roche) alleging that she developed health issues as a result of ingesting Accutane, a pharmaceutical drug manufactured and distributed by Roche. After conducting a Daubert/Schafersman hearing, the district court entered an order precluding Plaintiff’s expert witness from rendering opinions on the general and specific causation of Plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease. Thereafter, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of Roche. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony after finding that the expert’s methodology was unreliable and conclusion-driven; and (2) with the exclusion of this testimony, there remained no issue of material fact, and therefore, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Roche. View "Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this product liability action, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the claimant’s expert’s testimony regarding causation. Plaintiff brought this product liability action against Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. and Roche Laboratories, Inc. (collectively, Roche) alleging that she developed health issues as a result of ingesting Accutane, a pharmaceutical drug manufactured and distributed by Roche. After conducting a Daubert/Schafersman hearing, the district court entered an order precluding Plaintiff’s expert witness from rendering opinions on the general and specific causation of Plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease. Thereafter, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of Roche. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony after finding that the expert’s methodology was unreliable and conclusion-driven; and (2) with the exclusion of this testimony, there remained no issue of material fact, and therefore, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Roche. View "Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc." on Justia Law

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The stop of Defendant’s vehicle for the purpose of gathering information about the presence of stolen firearms and other criminal activity at the residence Defendant drove from, for which a search warrant was being sought, did not violate Defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Nebraska Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court convicting Defendant of felony possession of a controlled substance, holding (1) the application of the balancing test set forth in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), which recognizes that warrantless seizures without reasonable suspicion may be reasonable under certain circumstances, was appropriate under the facts of this case; and (2) the stop was reasonable under Brown. View "State v. Sievers" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of dissolution entered by the district, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in either the amount or duration of the alimony award. The district court entered a decree of dissolution that ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony of $2,500 per month for ten years. Husband appealed, challenging the alimony award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had ample evidence from which to conclude that Husband’s income and earning potential were sufficient to support a monthly alimony award of $2,500; and (2) given the length of the parties’ marriage, the ages of their minor children, and Wife’s chronic medical conditions and high medication costs, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering alimony for a period of ten years. View "Wiedel v. Wiedel" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal from an order dismissing his amended complaint alleging that the conditions at the Nebraska State Penitentiary (NSP) violate his rights under Nebraska law and that his claims are representative of all inmates housed in the segregation units at the NSP, holding that this matter was moot. Appellant sued the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS), its director, and other officials and employees of the DCS, asserting that prison officials violate his rights when they place another prisoner in his “medically designed one-man segregation single-cell,” which disturbs his circadian rhythm. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for failing to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal, holding that because Appellant no longer resided at the NSP, this matter was moot. View "Nesbitt v. Frakes" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to transfer his case to juvenile court. Defendant was seventeen years old when he was charged with multiple felonies. The district court sustained Defendant’s motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the matter to juvenile court because (1) the State failed to meet its burden to show that a sound basis existed for retaining the matter in district court; (2) district the court sufficiently made the required findings pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-276; and (3) any error in the court’s deciding of the motion to transfer without first reading and considering police reports related to the investigation of the crimes charged was harmless. View "State v. Tyler P." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court dismissing Appellants’ claim seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraudulent misrepresentation after discovering hail damage to the roof of a real property they were under contract to purchase from Appellees. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend, concluding that the damage was reasonably ascertainable by Appellants. In reversing, the Supreme court held that the district court erred when it granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because Appellants alleged sufficient facts to state claims that were plausible on their face. View "Burklund v. Fuehrer" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirming the valuations of certain grassland properties owned by the Betty L. Green Living Trust and the Richard R. Green Living Trust (the Trusts) that had been established by the county assessor and approved by the county board of equalization (the Board). In its decision, TERC concluded that the Trusts did not present competent evidence to rebut the presumption that the Board faithfully performed its duties and had sufficient competent evidence to make its determinations. The Supreme Court affirmed TERC’s order, holding that TERC’s decision conformed to the law, was supported by competent evidence, and was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. View "Betty L. Green Living Trust v. Morrill County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for first degree murder, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, thus rejecting Defendant’s assignments of error. Specifically, the Court held that the district court did not err in (1) admitting the video of Defendant’s interview with law enforcement officials because, where there was no police coercion and Defendant did not unequivocally invoke the right to remain silent, Defendant’s confession was voluntary; (2) not redacting various statements made in an interview pursuant to Neb. R. Evid. 401 to 403; and (3) overruling Defendant’s motion for mistrial based on statements made by the prosecution in closing arguments because, while the prosecuting attorney made several inappropriate statements, Defendant’s right to a fair trial was not prejudiced. View "State v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

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A determination that a defendant is subject to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) must be reviewed on direct appeal from the underlying conviction and sentence, and such a determination is not subject to an impermissible collateral attack in subsequent proceedings. Defendant was convicted of violating SORA’s registration requirement. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State failed to prove he was subject to SORA’s requirements because it failed to present evidence that, during the proceedings for a previous conviction and sentence, the county court had made a factual finding pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction, determining that the determination in the previous proceedings that Defendant was subject to SORA was valid because it was based on an implied factual finding pursuant to section 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in analyzing whether the determination in the previous proceedings was valid; but (2) this Court’s ultimate conclusion on the judgment was the same as that of the court of appeals. View "State v. Ratumaimuri" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law