by
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the separate juvenile court adjudicating Reality W. as being habitually truant from school, holding that the statutory defenses to adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-209(2)(b) and 43-276(2) did not apply based on the record in this case. On appeal, Reality asserted that her school failed in its obligation to address barriers to attendance under section 79-209(2)(b) and that there was insufficient evidence that the county attorney made reasonable efforts to refer her and her family to community-based resources prior to filing a petition, as required under section 43-276(2). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the juvenile court correctly concluded that Reality did not have a defense to adjudication under section 79-209; and (2) Reality did not have a defense to adjudication under section 43-276(2). View "In re Interest of Reality W." on Justia Law

Posted in: Juvenile Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the assessment decision of the Board of Equalization of the City of Omaha exercising a quasi-judicial function as a result of Appellant's failure to file an appeal bond with the city clerk within twenty days, holding that the statutory scheme requires that an appellant execute a bond with the city clerk within twenty days, which Appellant did not do in this case. Appellant personally appeared before the Board to protest a proposed special assessment to be levied on his property. The Board denied Appellant's protest. The City Council for the City of Omaha subsequently levied the special assessment on Appellant's property. Appellant appealed, The district court found that Appellant had failed to comply with Neb. Rev. Stat. 14-813 by not filing an appeal bond with the city clerk within twenty days, thus dismissing Appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Glasson v. Board of Equalization of City of Omaha" on Justia Law

by
In this declaratory judgment action in which ex-husband (Husband) sought a declaration that he was entitled to one-half of the proceeds of a home awarded to the ex-wife (Wife) in the divorce decree and sold two years later when Wife decided to remarry, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court declaring that Wife had timely refinanced the house and that, therefore, Husband was not entitled to one-half of the proceeds from its later sale, holding that the district court's judgment was correct. A provision in the dissolution decree stated that Wife would have the home refinanced into her own name within twelve months of entry of the decree and that, if she did not, the house should be sold and the parties should equally divide any proceeds. Wife was approved for refinancing within one year of the entry of the dissolution decree, but the bank did not schedule closing on the refinance until thirteen months after the entry of the dissolution decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Wife made a good faith effort to complete refinancing within twelve months and Husband did not incur any harm as a result of the delay in closing, the sale of the house and equal division of the proceeds was not required. View "Bayne v. Bayne" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision affirming the decision of the State Personnel Board dismissing Appellant's grievance challenging her termination as a teacher at the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the dismissal of Appellant's grievance. After the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) terminated Appellant's employment for cause Appellant completed a grievance form challenging her termination. Appellant initiated the grievance proceedings provided by the government collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The proceedings concluded with the Board dismissing Appellant's grievance appeals. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant waived the right to continue to pursue her grievance under the terms of the CBA, and therefore, the district court did not err in affirming the Board's dismissal of Appellant's grievance. View "Bower-Hansen v. Nebraska Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the district court's imposition of a sentence of five years' probate with 180 days of jail time as a condition of probation for Defendant's conviction of attempted sexual assault of a child on the grounds that the sentence was excessively lenient, holding that the sentence was not unreasonable or clearly against conscience or evidence. The presentence investigation report in this case indicated that Defendant believed the child to be eighteen years old. Further, Defendant had no criminal record. The State appealed the sentence, arguing that it was excessively lenient and involved inappropriate consideration of an irrelevant factor. The court of appeals agreed with the State. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the sentence imposed by the district court was lenient, the sentence was not unreasonable, untenable, or clearly against justice or conscience, evidence, and reason. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the probate court's dismissal of a golf course partnership's claim based upon an unfulfilled pledge agreement in a decedent's probate proceeding, holding that the partnership failed to state a claim based on contract but did state a claim based upon promissory estoppel. The decedent entered into a written pledge agreement with the golf course partnership under which the decedent would make a gift of $20 million so that the partnership could make improvements to the golf course it operated. The decedent died the next year, and the partnership filed a statement of claim against the estate for the $20 million pledge agreement. The estate denied the claim. The partnership then filed a petition for allowance of claim, claiming that the pledge agreement was an enforceable, binding obligation against the estate and, alternatively, that the petition should be granted under a promissory estoppel theory. The probate court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because the partnership was not a charitable, educational, or like institution, its attempt to enforce the pledge agreement as a contract failed; but (2) the partnership stated a claim under a promissory estoppel theory. View "In re Estate of Ryan" on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts

by
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of possession of a stolen firearm, holding that the "intent to restore" clause of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1212.03 is an essential element of the crime such that failure to instruct the jury of this material element is plain error, and the error to so instruct in this case was not harmless. In the proceedings below, the jury was not instructed that the absence of an intent to restore the property was a material element of the crime. The Supreme Court held that the court erred when it did not instruct the jury on the intent to restore element of the crime, and the instruction error was not harmless. Thus, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial. View "State v. Mann" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's denial of Father's motion to modify custody of a minor child after the child reported that her stepfather was sexually abusing her, holding that the court made an error law in finding that there was no competent evidence of sexual abuse by the stepfather. The district court ultimately concluded that Father had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the stepfather had sexually abused the minor child. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) applied the correct standard of proof; (2) did not abuse its discretion in its determination of the scope and meaning of Father's complaint; but (3) abused its discretion when it failed to grant Father's motion to modify the custody decree because the record clearly showed there was competent evidence adduced that, if believed, tended to establish that the child was sexually abused by her stepfather. View "Eric H. v. Ashley H." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC's (Prospect) motions to confirm arbitration awards and for summary judgment in this interpleader action, holding that when Prospect moved to confirm the arbitration awards under section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 through 16, the district court was required by the FAA to do so. After selling an interest in her personal injury claim to Prospect, Edrie Wheat settled her claim. When a dispute arose over the amount due Prospect, Prospect initiated arbitration proceedings against Wheat and Ronald J. Palagi, P.C., LLC (Palagi), the law firm representing Wheat. Awards were eventually entered against Wheat and Palagi in favor of Prospect. Wheat and Palagi then brought this interpleader action but did not seek to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration awards. The district court granted Prospect's motion to confirm the arbitration awards and also granted Prospect's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) summary judgment was not premature; and (2) the district court did not err in failing to find the agreement was invalid and unenforceable. View "Ronald J. Palagi, P.C. v. Prospect Funding Holdings" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order dismissing Tenants' first cause of action against Landlord under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) but reversed as to Tenants' second, third, and fourth causes of action, holding that the complaint stated plausible claims for relief under Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1419, 76-1430, and 76-1439 of the URLTA for retaliatory conduct, ouster, and failure to maintain fit and habitable premises but not under sections 76-1418 and 76-1429 for failure to deliver possession. In their complaint, Tenants alleged that numerous code violations materially affecting their health and safety were present at the time they commenced physical possession of the property at issue but were not discovered until later. The City of Omaha Planning Department's housing division eventually declared the property unsafe and unfit for human occupancy, Tenants vacated the premises and did not receive a return of their security deposit or rent and utilities paid for the months they were unable to occupy the premises. Tenants then brought this action. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the alleged facts did not state a claim for relief under the URLTA. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing several causes of action. View "Vasquez v. CHI Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Landlord - Tenant