Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Douglas County attorney filed a petition with the Mental Health Board alleging that S.J. was a dangerous sex offender within the meaning of Nebraska's Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA). The Board concluded that S.J. was a dangerous sex offender. The Board then held a hearing in which it concluded that inpatient treatment at Norfolk Regional Center was the least restrictive alternative presently available and ordered inpatient commitment. S.J. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) clear and convincing evidence supported the district court's findings that S.J. was substantially unable to control his behavior; (2) clear and convincing evidence supported the court's finding that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative; and (3) SOCA's provision regarding the composition of the Board was consistent with due process requirements. View "In re S.J." on Justia Law

Big John's Billiards filed this action against the State and others seeking a declaration that the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was special legislation, violated Nebraska's equal protection clause, and constituted a regulatory taking. The district court sustained in part and in part overruled Big John's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of special legislation but did not direct entry of a final judgment or dismiss Big John's other constitutional claims. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the district court did not enter a final order, the Court did not have appellate jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Big John's Billards v. State" on Justia Law

This case concerned a city's preexisting lien on land eventually condemned. At issue was whether the city could file a motion in either county or district court for setoff of the lien amount from the condemnation award. The landowner argued (1) the city must condemn the lien, as well as the subject property, in order to claim the land in condemnation proceedings; and (2) it was error for the county court in this case to grant such a setoff because county courts lack jurisdiction to make judicial determinations in condemnation proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated in part and reversed in part, holding (1) it is appropriate for a district court to consider the question of a setoff upon a timely motion by the condemnor when the condemnor has a lien interest in the land acquired; and (2) the district court in this case erred in remanding the matter of the setoff to the county court, as the issue was properly presented to the district court through a timely motion by the city, and the district court had jurisdiction to determine the city's lien and whether and to what amount it should be deducted from the condemnation award. View "City of Waverly v. Hedrick" on Justia Law

The dispute in this case revolved around a limited partnership (Kellom Heights) formed to provide financing for the redevelopment of property. Appellees were Kellom Heights, a corporation, and limited partners in Kellom Heights. Appellants were the redevelopment corporation, the general partner, and a corporation that was a limited parter of the redevelopment corporation. Appellees became dissatisfied with the operation of Kellom Heights and filed this complaint asserting various causes of action. The district court found for Appellees on certain causes of action and entered a judgment in their favor in the amount of $918,228 plus costs and interest. The court also awarded attorney fees and denied Appellees' request for prejudgment interest. The Supreme in part reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred when it rejected Appellants' statute of limitations defenses as to certain claims; and (2) the court erred in ruling that additional supervisory fees were not permitted. The Court affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment. View "Fitzgerald v. Cmty. Redevelopment Corp." on Justia Law

Because of Defendant Oscar Hernandez's third conviction for driving under the influence, the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles revoked his license. Defendant received an ignition interlock permit from the Department. Before the revocation expired, Defendant was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle that did not have an ignition interlock device. The State charged Defendant with driving during revocation under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.06. The district court concluded that section 60-6,197.06 did not apply to Defendant's conduct and that Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,211.05(5) did. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) section 60-6,197.06 does not provide the penalty for a driver who has a valid ignition interlock permit but operates a vehicle not equipped with such a device; and (2) rather, that conduct is a Class II misdemeanor under section 60-6,211.05(5). View "State v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Servio Diaz, a Honduran disaster refugee with authorization to reside in the U.S., pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to misdemeanor charges of attempted possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, and driving while intoxicated. Diaz subsequently filed a motion for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief on the basis that his counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to advise Diaz of potential deportation consequences he would face when he entered his guilty plea. The district court determined that Diaz had not established entitlement to relief and denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, concluding that the error asserted by Diaz was not an appropriate basis for relief by a writ of error coram nobis. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Appellees, three Nebraska non-profit organizations and a resident taxpayer, brought an action against the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission and its director, seeking a declaration that the Commissioner's regulations were illegal and void because the Commission had exceeded its authority under the Nebraska Liquor Control Act by classifying flavored malt beverages as beer rather than spirits, which were taxed at a much higher rate under the Act. The district court concluded (1) Appellees had standing to challenge the Commission's regulation, and (2) the flavored malt beverages were spirits under the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court correctly concluded that the taxpayer had taxpayer standing to assert this claim, and therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to consider whether the nonprofits also had standing; and (2) the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by classifying and taxing flavored malt beverages as beer, as the Act unambiguously required flavored malt beverages to be classified as spirits. View "Project Extra Mile v. Neb. Liquor Control Comm'n" on Justia Law