Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court entered an award against Mauro Rubio and Cono Contracting, LLC in favor of Catarino Lopez, Rubio alleged the award was procured by fraud, irregularity, and was inequitable. Rubio’s attorney withdrew unexpectedly at trial, leaving Rubio unrepresented. Rubio claimed Lopez exaggerated his injuries and sought to vacate the award, citing Nebraska statutory and equitable grounds. The award had been filed in the District Court for Douglas County.Lopez moved to dismiss Rubio’s independent action in the district court, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the Workers’ Compensation Court’s award, asserting the district court’s authority was limited to enforcement. The district court agreed, finding it had no authority to vacate or modify the compensation court award and that Rubio’s complaint failed to state a claim for relief under § 25-2001. Rubio appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals. Prior to briefing, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the district court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the award and, consequently, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Rubio’s motion for rehearing was denied.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court had equitable jurisdiction to vacate the compensation court’s award once it had been filed as a judgment in the district court, pursuant to § 48-188. The Court held that the district court’s jurisdiction was not limited to enforcement and that it could entertain an independent action to vacate such an award. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ dismissal and retained the case for further proceedings, allowing briefing on whether Rubio had stated a claim for relief. View "1 Cono Contracting v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The case concerned a request from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for Nebraska’s statewide voter registration list, including sensitive personal information. Before the Secretary of State released the list, a membership organization and a registered voter filed suit, seeking to block or limit the disclosure, alleging that such release would violate Nebraska statutes restricting the dissemination and use of voter information. They argued that the DOJ was not entitled to all the requested data under federal law and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.In the District Court for Lancaster County, the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and had failed to join the DOJ as an indispensable party. The court agreed that the plaintiffs did not have standing, finding that they had not alleged a concrete injury and that concerns over possible future public disclosure or misuse were speculative. The court also found that Common Cause had not adequately pleaded associational standing. However, the court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the DOJ (or the U.S. Attorney General) was an indispensable party. The case was dismissed without prejudice on standing grounds, and the plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary injunction and summary judgment were denied.On appeal, while the matter was pending before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the Secretary released the voter list to the DOJ. The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the case was moot because the list had already been disclosed, eliminating any live controversy or possibility of meaningful relief. The court declined to apply the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal. The main holding is that, due to the completed disclosure, the action no longer presented a justiciable issue. View "Common Cause v. Evnen" on Justia Law

The case involved a medical negligence and wrongful death claim arising from care provided to a resident at a county-owned skilled nursing facility in Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the decedent’s personal representative and surviving spouse, alleged that substandard care by the facility’s staff caused fatal injuries. The suit was initiated against several entities purportedly associated with the facility, but only two remained as defendants after some were dismissed for procedural reasons.After the complaint was filed in the District Court for Merrick County, the primary remaining defendant, identified as Litzenberg Memorial Long Term Care, moved to dismiss the case. The defendant argued that the complaint failed to demonstrate compliance with the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act’s presuit notice requirement, claiming that notice was not properly served on the appropriate official. Before the court ruled on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to clarify factual allegations regarding compliance with presuit notice and to correct the defendant’s name. The proposed amendment included details suggesting that the Merrick County clerk was an appropriate recipient for notice, and asserted that the defendant should be estopped from contesting notice due to representations made by the clerk.The district court denied the motion for leave to amend and granted the motion to dismiss, finding the amendment would be futile because the notice had not been properly served. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that under the applicable procedural rule, the plaintiffs were entitled to amend their complaint once as a matter of course prior to any responsive pleading. The court held that filing a motion for leave to amend did not waive this right. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing that the plaintiffs be allowed to amend their complaint. View "Cyboron v. Merrick County" on Justia Law

The case began when a limited liability company filed a breach of contract action against an individual, who responded by asserting a counterclaim for tortious interference with current and prospective business relationships, seeking damages, interest, and attorney fees. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual on that claim and denied the company’s motion. Subsequently, the company moved for summary judgment on the counterclaim, but the individual moved to dismiss his counterclaim without prejudice, which the district court granted. The company then filed a notice of appeal.On appeal, the Nebraska Court of Appeals considered whether it had jurisdiction, given that the case involved multiple claims and the district court had not certified a final judgment under the relevant Nebraska statute. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, although a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not usually create appellate jurisdiction, in this instance, the individual’s acknowledgment that any attempt to refile his counterclaim would be barred by the statute of limitations, and that he did not intend to refile, provided the finality needed for appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals then reversed the district court’s summary judgment order.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case to address appellate jurisdiction. It held that, because there was neither a judgment rendered nor a final order disposing of all claims as required by statute, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its bright-line rule that appellate jurisdiction cannot be created merely by voluntarily dismissing unresolved claims without prejudice, even if the claims are unlikely to be refiled. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the matter with directions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "WRK v. Wiegert" on Justia Law

The parties in this case are neighbors whose homes are situated with their backyards facing one another, separated by a narrow commons area. Prior to the events at issue, there was significant animosity between them. In December 2024, one party filed petitions for harassment protection orders against the other parties, alleging ongoing disputes including the use of police resources to gather information, failure to restrain their dogs after warnings, installation of a bright work light shining into her home, and incidents that made her feel she was being watched or followed. The district court issued ex parte harassment protection orders the same day, effective for one year.After the orders were issued, the subjects of the orders requested a show cause hearing before the District Court for Lancaster County. At this hearing, they presented evidence and explained their actions, asserting lawful purposes for their conduct, including security and documenting a potential ordinance violation. The district court found their explanations unpersuasive, concluded that their actions were intended to intimidate, and affirmed the harassment protection orders to remain in effect for one year. The parties subject to the orders appealed, and the appeals were consolidated and moved to the Nebraska Supreme Court’s docket.While the appeal was pending before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the harassment protection orders expired, rendering the appeals moot. However, the court determined that the issue of interpreting the phrase “which serves no legitimate purpose” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(2)(a) presented a matter of public interest warranting review despite mootness. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that, under this statute, determining whether conduct serves a legitimate purpose requires (1) a genuine, justifiable purpose and (2) a logical connection between the conduct and that purpose under the circumstances. The court dismissed the appeals as moot. View "Flinn v. Strode" on Justia Law

A juvenile born in 2007 was adjudicated at age 14 for habitual truancy and placed on indefinite probation. Over the next several years, he was adjudicated in four separate delinquency cases—primarily theft and assault-related—and placed on indefinite probation in each case. While still on probation in all five cases, the State filed a felony criminal complaint against him for attempted robbery. In response, the State moved in all juvenile cases for a finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitative services under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, requesting that the court terminate jurisdiction “unsuccessfully.”The Separate Juvenile Court of Sarpy County held a consolidated hearing, receiving evidence regarding the juvenile’s history, participation in probation and services, and recent criminal charges. The court found him nonamenable to rehabilitative services and ordered termination of both probation and the court’s jurisdiction, specifying that the record would not be sealed. The juvenile appealed these orders. The Nebraska Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals, and the Nebraska Supreme Court moved them to its docket to address statutory interpretation and procedural issues regarding Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.03.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that a finding of nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03 must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, with the State bearing the burden when it moves for such a finding. The Court affirmed the juvenile court’s determination of nonamenability, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it held there is no statutory authority for a juvenile court to terminate probation or jurisdiction based solely on a finding of nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03. The Supreme Court affirmed the nonamenability finding, but vacated the orders terminating probation and jurisdiction, remanding the cases for further proceedings. View "In re Interest of Johnny H." on Justia Law

A privately held Nebraska S corporation had two classes of stock: Class A voting shares and Class B nonvoting shares. In 2023, the corporation sold substantially all its assets to a third party in a transaction structured as a disposition of assets, with proceeds distributed to all shareholders. The board unanimously approved the transaction, and the majority of both classes of shares voted in favor, except for some Class A and Class B shareholders, who opposed or abstained. Following closing, Class B shareholders received their cash proceeds but subsequently notified the corporation of their intent to assert appraisal rights, seeking a higher payment per share.The District Court for Sarpy County was presented with cross-motions for partial summary judgment regarding whether Class B nonvoting shareholders were entitled to appraisal rights under Nebraska’s Model Business Corporation Act (NMBCA) following the asset sale. The district court found that the relevant statute (§ 21-2,172(a)(3)) limited appraisal rights for a disposition of assets to shareholders “entitled to vote on the disposition,” and therefore determined that Class B shareholders lacked such rights. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the corporation and related parties, dismissed certain third-party defendants, and certified the judgment for immediate appeal pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1).On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and its certification for abuse of discretion. The court held that only Class A voting shareholders were entitled to appraisal rights in connection with the disposition of assets, as the statute unambiguously limited such rights to voting shareholders. The court also found no express grant of appraisal rights to Class B shareholders in the articles of incorporation. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Streck, Inc. v. Ryan" on Justia Law

A New Mexico insurance company initiated a lawsuit in Nebraska against two insurance companies, asserting claims for contribution and indemnity. One defendant, a New York insurance company, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, while the other defendant, a surplus insurance company, challenged a default judgment and sought to file a responsive pleading. The district court in Douglas County issued separate orders: it dismissed the New York insurer with prejudice and set aside the default judgment against the other defendant, allowing additional proceedings.After the dismissal order concerning the New York insurer, the plaintiff appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The case returned to the district court, where the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claims against the remaining defendant without prejudice. This second dismissal order did not reference the prior dismissal of the New York insurer. The plaintiff then filed another appeal, again challenging the earlier dismissal order. The Court of Appeals dismissed this second appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, citing the absence of a single judgment resolving all claims against all parties as required by Nebraska statutes and referencing the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in Elbert v. Keating, O’Gara. The plaintiff petitioned for further review.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, because the district court had not entered a single written judgment adjudicating all claims and all parties, nor certified any order as final under the applicable statute, there was no final, appealable order. Therefore, the Supreme Court determined it lacked appellate jurisdiction and affirmed the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals. The court emphasized that jurisdiction cannot be created by voluntary dismissal without prejudice of unresolved claims or parties in the absence of a final judgment. View "Continental Indem. Co. v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co." on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, a university in Nebraska instituted a policy requiring all students to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by a specified deadline, with the only exemptions allowed for medical reasons or until a vaccine received full FDA approval. Religious exemptions were not permitted. Students who failed to comply were unenrolled and barred from campus, and some had holds placed on their accounts, preventing access to transcripts. One student complied with the mandate but suffered adverse effects and was medically exempted from further doses. Another student withdrew voluntarily before the deadline.After the university enforced the mandate, several students sought injunctive relief in the District Court for Douglas County to prevent their unenrollment, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The court denied relief, finding that any contract included the Emergency Use Authorization waiver agreements and that the students breached the contract by not being vaccinated after FDA approval. An initial appeal was dismissed by the Nebraska Supreme Court for lack of a final, appealable order. The students then consolidated their actions and filed an operative complaint alleging breach of implied contract, denial of due process, conversion, negligence, and violations of the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act (NCPA). The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and denied leave to amend.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and found that the students plausibly alleged claims for breach of an implied contract and conversion, based on the university’s unilateral modification of conditions mid-semester and the withholding of transcripts. The court affirmed the dismissal of the negligence and NCPA claims, finding them preempted by the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, and held that the due process claim was abandoned on appeal. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the breach of contract and conversion claims. View "Ramaekers v. Creighton University" on Justia Law

The case involves a woman, M.S., who was the subject of a petition filed by the State in May 2024, alleging she was mentally ill and dangerous under Nebraska law. The petition was supported by statements from M.S.’ daughter, who described recent concerning behavior, including M.S. bringing a gun to her daughter’s home, appearing paranoid, and exhibiting signs of being out of touch with reality. M.S. was admitted to a psychiatric facility pending commitment proceedings, and a hearing was held before the Mental Health Board of the Fourth Judicial District. During the proceedings, M.S. was represented by counsel and objected to certain testimony on confrontation and hearsay grounds.The Mental Health Board overruled M.S.’ motion for a continuance and proceeded with the commitment hearing, where it heard testimony from a psychiatrist, M.S.’ daughter, and M.S. herself. The Board found, by clear and convincing evidence, that M.S. suffered from bipolar I disorder, manic with psychosis, and was dangerous to herself and others. The Board ordered inpatient treatment and authorized forced medication. M.S. appealed to the District Court for Douglas County, arguing that her rights to confrontation were violated, that inadmissible hearsay was admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to support her commitment. The district court affirmed the Board’s decision, ruling that any errors in admitting certain evidence were harmless because the facts were otherwise established in the record.On further appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that confrontation rights under both the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, as extended by statute to mental health commitment proceedings, are trial rights that do not apply to pretrial hearings. The court further found that the challenged statements by family members were admissible under the medical purpose exception to the hearsay rule. The court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported the findings that M.S. was mentally ill and dangerous, and that the treatment ordered was the least restrictive alternative. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "In re Interest of M.S." on Justia Law