Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Raven Addy-Cruz was killed in an automobile accident caused by Lyle Carman. Carman was employed by Lopez Trucking. Lopez Trucking had been hired by Werner Construction (Werner) to haul debris from a construction site. Addy-Cruz’s estate filed a wrongful death suit against Carman, the owner of Lopez Trucking (Lopez), and Werner. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Werner. The estate, Carman, and Lopez then entered a joint stipulation to dismiss without prejudice. Thereafter, the estate filed a notice of appeal from the order sustaining summary judgment in favor of Werner. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the estate’s voluntary dismissal of the cause of action without prejudice did not create a final order from which an appeal could be brought. View "Addy v. Lopez" on Justia Law

This action began in 1998, when the State filed a complaint on the relation of the State Department of Insurance, which was appointed as receiver of an insolvent insurance company. The case reached the Supreme Court at least three times - in 1999, 2005, and 2008. In 2015, the district court entered an order sanctioning William Gast, who represented some defendants, for filing a frivolous motion to recuse. On appeal, Gast challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to enter the order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to sanction Gast for filing a frivolous motion. View "State ex rel. Dep’t of Ins. v. Countrywide Truck Ins. Agency" on Justia Law

In two separate garnishment proceedings, Appellants, judgment creditors, served garnishment interrogatories on the judgment debtors’ attorney (Attorney). Appellants did not challenge Attorney’s answers in the first garnishment proceeding but filed an application to determine Attorney’s garnishment liability in response to Attorney’s answers in the second garnishment proceeding. The district court overruled Appellants’ motion to determine garnishment liability, concluding that because Appellants did not move to determine Attorney’s liability after he responded to the first garnishment interrogatories, he was released and discharged as to the property sought and that the property could not be sought again by Appellants in the second garnishment proceeding based on claim preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it overruled Appellants’ motion to determine Attorney’s garnishment liability in the second garnishment proceeding. View "Huntington v. Pedersen" on Justia Law

Jesse, the legal father of Jaelyn under Ohio statutes, challenged the adoption of Jaelyn in Nebraska. In this appeal, Jesse specifically challenged the constitutionality of several Nebraska statutes, including statutes that permitted Jaelyn to be adopted without his consent. Jesse also argued that Nebraska must give full faith and credit to Ohio’s paternity determination. Under Ohio law, Jesse had the right to withhold consent to the adoption of Jaelyn. After the county court issued an adoption decree, the district court declined to grant habeas relief, determining that Jesse lost standing to challenge the adoption after the county court found that Jesse was not Jaelyn’s biological father. The Supreme Court reversed without addressing Jesse’s constitutional challenges, holding that the district court erred in failing to determine that Nebraska must give full faith and credit to Ohio’s determination of Jesse’s paternity. Remanded. View "Jesse B. v. Tylee H." on Justia Law

A 2004 dissolution decree awarded Kerry custody of the parties’ children, provided Michael with parenting time, and ordered Michael to pay child support. The parties settled a 2011 petition for an increase in support and counter-petition, but neither petition was dismissed. In 2013, the court granted Michael’s motion to compel compliance with the settlement. The Court of Appeals remanded with direction to prepare the applicable worksheets. Following remand, both appealed. In 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed in part. In 2013, while the first modification was ongoing, Michael sought changes of custody and child support. A summons issued, but a deputy was unable to serve Kerry. An appointed special process server later certified that personal service had been “effectuated,” but did not actually serve Kerry with a summons. Kerry objected to jurisdiction. The court found that Kerry received actual notice and had not been prejudiced by the manner of service. Kerry filed an answer. In 2014, the district court granted Michael’s application to modify the order. The Court of Appeals vacated, holding that Michael’s failure to serve the summons on Kerry within six months deprived the court of jurisdiction. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed. Kerry waived service of process by making a general appearance in the second proceeding and the court retained jurisdiction to modify custody while an appeal on other issues was pending. View "Burns v. Burns" on Justia Law

Nicole and Jeremy had three children, born in 2001, 2004, and 2005, and lived in Missouri. In 2007, Madysen, then 6 years old, reported that Jeremy had been sexually abusing her for more than a year. Jeremy was arrested. Nicole moved with the children to Nebraska and filed for divorce. The 2007 dissolution granted sole custody of the children to Nicole and stated that Jeremy “shall not have any parenting time.” The court ordered Jeremy to pay $50 per month in child support. IPursuant to a plea agreement, Jeremy was sentenced to 16 years’ confinement. Nicole married William in 2013; they sought adoption by a stepparent and to terminate Jeremy;s parental rights. Jeremy opposed the adoptions. The petitions asked the court to find that Jeremy had abandoned the children under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-104, such that Jeremy’s consent was not required. Jeremy’s mother had consistently paid the ordered child support; Jeremy had sent the children cards. The court ordered that Jeremy’s consent was not required. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the record did not support a finding upon clear and convincing evidence that Jeremy had abandoned his children. The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the Court of Appeals had also lacked jurisdiction. The order was not final, pending an order on the adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of Madysen S." on Justia Law

Lindner sued the City of La Vista, challenging ordinance No. 979, creating an off-street parking district adjoining a Cabela’s store, as unconstitutional. The district court found that the action was time barred and dismissed. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, stating that is was not apparent from the face of Lindner’s complaint when Lindner’s cause of action accrued. On remand, the court accepted evidence and determined that the four-year catchall limitations period, Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-212, applied and that Lindner’s action accrued more than four years before he filed suit. The court identified the dates when the city opted to pay for the cost of off-street parking through general revenues and sales tax revenues, enacted ordinance No. 983 authorizing the issuance of bonds, issued the bonds, and first paid on. Each of these events occurred greater than four years before Lindner filed his complaint. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. The district court correctly identified the three undisputed dates when the city chose the funding mechanism to be used and implemented that decision. Even if using the latest event, October 16, 2006, as the date upon which - Lindner’s claim accrued, Lindner’s December 16, 2011, complaint was filed more than four years after the action accrued. View "Lindner v. Kindig" on Justia Law

The Lindsays were minority shareholders of the 304 Corporation; its principal asset was Mid City Bank. In 2010, the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance and the FDIC began an examination of the bank. In 2011, the Department appointed the FDIC as the bank's receiver, stating that “‘large commercial real estate loan and poor management practices . . . led to a deterioration of the bank’s capital’” so that there was “‘no option but to declare the insolvent institution receivership.’” The bank reopened and regained good standing. In 2014, the FDIC filed suit, alleging that Fitl “was grossly negligent and breached his fiduciary duties,” 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(2)(A)(i). The Lindsays also filed suit, alleging breach of fiduciary duties. The court dismissed. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. The Lindsays’ claims are similar to all other shareholders’ claims and did not arise from a special duty, since the injury was not “separate and distinct.” The district court correctly concluded that the Lindsays’ claims were derivative in nature and that as a result of the FDIC lawsuit, the Lindsays had no standing to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation. View "Lindsay v. Fitl" on Justia Law

In May 2013, Deines filed a complaint seeking to recover earned commissions from his former employer under the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act. Essex filed an answer which, among other things, alleged Deines had been paid all commissions he was owed. After the case had been pending for approximately 15 months, the trial court issued a notice of intent to dismiss. The notice required the parties to take certain action within 30 days or the case would be dismissed for want of prosecution. No action was taken within the prescribed time and the court entered an order dismissing the case for want of prosecution. Deines subsequently filed a successful motion to reinstate the case. The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed an appeal. The order was neither a judgment nor a final order. View "Deintes v. Essex Corp." on Justia Law

The juvenile court granted the Department of Health and Human Services temporary custody of Jackson after finding that he had suffered head injuries at home. Jackson was placed with his maternal grandmother, Erin, and her husband, Paul, where he remained in foster care for the next two and a half years. The Department later removed Jackson from his placement with Erin and Paul and placed him with other foster parents. Erin and Paul filed a motion for placement requesting an order that the Department place Jackson back with them and also filed a motion to intervene. The court granted Erin and Paul’s motion to intervene but denied their motion for placement, finding that the State had met its burden of proof that its placement plan was in the best interests of Jackson. Erin and Paul filed a motion for new trial or to alter or amend the court’s order. The motion was denied. Erin and Paul appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Erin and Paul had no right to take an appeal under the circumstances, and therefore, they had no standing. View "In re Interest of Jackson E." on Justia Law