Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Nicole and Jeremy had three children, born in 2001, 2004, and 2005, and lived in Missouri. In 2007, Madysen, then 6 years old, reported that Jeremy had been sexually abusing her for more than a year. Jeremy was arrested. Nicole moved with the children to Nebraska and filed for divorce. The 2007 dissolution granted sole custody of the children to Nicole and stated that Jeremy “shall not have any parenting time.” The court ordered Jeremy to pay $50 per month in child support. IPursuant to a plea agreement, Jeremy was sentenced to 16 years’ confinement. Nicole married William in 2013; they sought adoption by a stepparent and to terminate Jeremy;s parental rights. Jeremy opposed the adoptions. The petitions asked the court to find that Jeremy had abandoned the children under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-104, such that Jeremy’s consent was not required. Jeremy’s mother had consistently paid the ordered child support; Jeremy had sent the children cards. The court ordered that Jeremy’s consent was not required. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the record did not support a finding upon clear and convincing evidence that Jeremy had abandoned his children. The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the Court of Appeals had also lacked jurisdiction. The order was not final, pending an order on the adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of Madysen S." on Justia Law

Lindner sued the City of La Vista, challenging ordinance No. 979, creating an off-street parking district adjoining a Cabela’s store, as unconstitutional. The district court found that the action was time barred and dismissed. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, stating that is was not apparent from the face of Lindner’s complaint when Lindner’s cause of action accrued. On remand, the court accepted evidence and determined that the four-year catchall limitations period, Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-212, applied and that Lindner’s action accrued more than four years before he filed suit. The court identified the dates when the city opted to pay for the cost of off-street parking through general revenues and sales tax revenues, enacted ordinance No. 983 authorizing the issuance of bonds, issued the bonds, and first paid on. Each of these events occurred greater than four years before Lindner filed his complaint. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. The district court correctly identified the three undisputed dates when the city chose the funding mechanism to be used and implemented that decision. Even if using the latest event, October 16, 2006, as the date upon which - Lindner’s claim accrued, Lindner’s December 16, 2011, complaint was filed more than four years after the action accrued. View "Lindner v. Kindig" on Justia Law

The Lindsays were minority shareholders of the 304 Corporation; its principal asset was Mid City Bank. In 2010, the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance and the FDIC began an examination of the bank. In 2011, the Department appointed the FDIC as the bank's receiver, stating that “‘large commercial real estate loan and poor management practices . . . led to a deterioration of the bank’s capital’” so that there was “‘no option but to declare the insolvent institution receivership.’” The bank reopened and regained good standing. In 2014, the FDIC filed suit, alleging that Fitl “was grossly negligent and breached his fiduciary duties,” 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(2)(A)(i). The Lindsays also filed suit, alleging breach of fiduciary duties. The court dismissed. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. The Lindsays’ claims are similar to all other shareholders’ claims and did not arise from a special duty, since the injury was not “separate and distinct.” The district court correctly concluded that the Lindsays’ claims were derivative in nature and that as a result of the FDIC lawsuit, the Lindsays had no standing to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation. View "Lindsay v. Fitl" on Justia Law

In May 2013, Deines filed a complaint seeking to recover earned commissions from his former employer under the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act. Essex filed an answer which, among other things, alleged Deines had been paid all commissions he was owed. After the case had been pending for approximately 15 months, the trial court issued a notice of intent to dismiss. The notice required the parties to take certain action within 30 days or the case would be dismissed for want of prosecution. No action was taken within the prescribed time and the court entered an order dismissing the case for want of prosecution. Deines subsequently filed a successful motion to reinstate the case. The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed an appeal. The order was neither a judgment nor a final order. View "Deintes v. Essex Corp." on Justia Law

The juvenile court granted the Department of Health and Human Services temporary custody of Jackson after finding that he had suffered head injuries at home. Jackson was placed with his maternal grandmother, Erin, and her husband, Paul, where he remained in foster care for the next two and a half years. The Department later removed Jackson from his placement with Erin and Paul and placed him with other foster parents. Erin and Paul filed a motion for placement requesting an order that the Department place Jackson back with them and also filed a motion to intervene. The court granted Erin and Paul’s motion to intervene but denied their motion for placement, finding that the State had met its burden of proof that its placement plan was in the best interests of Jackson. Erin and Paul filed a motion for new trial or to alter or amend the court’s order. The motion was denied. Erin and Paul appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Erin and Paul had no right to take an appeal under the circumstances, and therefore, they had no standing. View "In re Interest of Jackson E." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse that resulted in the death of an infant in her care. Defendant was sentenced to seventy years to life. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that evidence of the infant’s prior injuries while in her care should have been excluded as prior bad acts under Neb. R. Evid. 404. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial on the basis of allowing the admission of the prior injuries, as the prior injuries were inextricably intertwined with the charged crime; (2) there was no misconduct by the prosecutor during closing argument; (3) Defendant’s sentence was not an abuse of discretion; and (4) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. View "State v. Cullen" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted in Douglas County of first degree sexual assault. Appellant later filed a pro se complaint in Lancaster County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against prosecutors, public defenders, and attorneys purportedly involved in the underlying criminal action. Appellant moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court, acting sua sponte, objected that venue was not proper in Lancaster County and, on that basis, also objected to the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The court then denied Appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, opining that if Appellant wished to proceed with the action in forma pauperis, he should make his request in Douglas County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Iowa law does not permit denial of in forma pauperis based on a sua sponte objection to venue, the district court erred in denying Appellant in forma pauperis status on that basis. Remanded. View "Castonguay v. Retelsdorf" on Justia Law

Castellar Partners LLC was retained by appellees (collectively, the AMP parties) to review a “hedge fund portfolio” and the services being provided by another advisor. Castella and one of the AMP parties - AMP Capital Investors Limited (AMPCI), a subsidiary of AMP incorporated in Australia - executed an “Advisory Agreement” under which Castellar was required to provide its services regarding the fund in exchange for certain fees. The AMP parties terminated their relationship with Castellar the next year. Castellar filed suit, alleging that the AMP parties had “recklessly and willfully” misled it in order to obtain its services with regard to the fund. The district court dismissed one of Castellar’s claims, concluding that due to a forum selection clause, the claim for breach of contract was required to be litigated in New South Wales, Australia. The district court certified the dismissal of that claim as a final judgment, and Castella appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the certification was improper, as Castellar’s claims entailed “similar issues” and “related facts,” and all of the parties remain involved in the litigation before the district court. View "Castellar Partners, LLC v. AMP Ltd." on Justia Law

Devin Witt allegedly drove a pickup truck over Benjamin Carrel’s foot in a parking lot in Beatrice, Nebraska. The truck was registered to Serco, Inc. Carrel brought a personal injury action against Serco and Witt. When Serco did not respond to a service of summons, a show cause order, or notice of Carrel’s motion for a default judgment, the district court entered a default judgment against Serco. The district court denied Serco’s motion to vacate the default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Serco’s motion to vacate the default judgment, holding that, where Serco placed Carrel on notice of its meritorious defense that it did not employ Witt or own the vehicle he was driving at the time of the incident and where any negligence on the part of Serco in responding to the suit was excusable, permitting the default judgment to stand would unfairly deprive Serco of a substantial right and produce an unjust result. Remanded with directions to vacate the default judgment and to give Serco a reasonable time in which to file an appropriate responsive pleading. View "Carrel v. Serco Inc." on Justia Law

David and Pamela Fisher, as “Husband and Wife,” sued U.S. Bank National Association to terminate severed mineral interests, alleging that they had owned the land since 1986. In its answer, US Bank argued that the Fishers, as husband and wife, were not the real parties in interest because, in 2001, the Fishers conveyed the land to themselves as trustees for the David and Pamela Fisher Living Trust. The Fishers subsequently filed an amended complaint adding themselves as plaintiffs in their capacity as trustees. Before the complaint was amended, however, US Bank recorded a verified claim of mineral interest. The district court granted summary judgment for US Bank, concluding that the Fishers’ amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-301. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the amended complaint related back under the plain language of section 25-301 because it joined the real parties in interest. Remanded. View "Fisher v. Heirs & Devisees of Lovercheck" on Justia Law