Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this Nebraska case, the appellant, Christian G., filed a motion to vacate a domestic abuse protection order issued against him, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and that the court erred in excluding his affidavit, which sought to prove he did not receive timely notice of the hearing. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that by filing a request for a hearing on the protection order, Christian made a general appearance in court, thereby conferring the court personal jurisdiction over him. The court also held that while an affidavit may be used in motion practice, including for preliminary, collateral, and interlocutory matters, it is not exempt from the rules of evidence. The court determined that the portion of Christian's affidavit that contained hearsay was correctly excluded by the district court because Christian did not properly limit his offer to the admissible parts of the affidavit. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which upheld the district court's ruling that denied Christian's motion to vacate the protection order. View "K. v. G." on Justia Law

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Janet Palmtag, a real estate agent and general candidate for the Nebraska Legislature, against The Republican Party of Nebraska. The case stems from political mailers, sent by the Party, which stated that Palmtag had been disciplined by the Iowa Real Estate Commission for illegal activities and had lost her Iowa real estate license. Palmtag claims these statements are false and defamatory. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Party, finding a genuine issue that the statements were false but no genuine issue that the Party acted with actual malice. Palmtag appealed this decision, and the Party cross-appealed the district court’s conclusion that Palmtag did not have to plead and prove special damages.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that when the facts presented by Palmtag are viewed in the light most favorable to her, those facts are sufficient for a jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that the Party acted with actual malice. The court also rejected the Party's argument that in all public libel cases the plaintiff must prove special damages, finding that Palmtag's action involves defamation per se, for which no proof of actual harm is necessary. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Palmtag v. Republican Party of Nebraska" on Justia Law

In the case involving Sandra Lopez and Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Omaha, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case, holding that the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries. Lopez, an employee of Catholic Charities, sued her employer alleging assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress following a realistic active shooter drill conducted at her workplace. She claimed physical and mental injuries as a result of the drill. The district court dismissed the suit, asserting that her exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation. On appeal, Lopez argued that she should be able to pursue tort theories of recovery against her employer for injuries suffered if the employer acted with a specific intent to injure the employee. However, the court found that even if an employer acts with a specific intent to injure an employee, the resulting injury is accidental if it is unexpected or unforeseen to the person suffering the injury, and thus compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court also rejected Lopez's constitutional challenge due to non-compliance with procedural requirements and her public policy argument because it was not grounded on any specific statute or recognized legal authority. View "Lopez v. Catholic Charities" on Justia Law

In this case from the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court considered an appeal from a successful will contest. The decedent, Rita A. Walker, died at the age of 84 and her son, Mark E. Walker, filed a petition for formal probate of a will purportedly executed by Rita shortly before her death. This will named Mark as the sole beneficiary and personal representative of Rita's estate, omitting her three other sons. One of these other sons, Michael J. Walker, contested the will, alleging that Rita lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the will's execution and that the will was the product of undue influence.The county court held a bench trial and concluded that while the will was validly executed, it would not admit it to probate because Mark had failed to prove Rita's testamentary capacity at the time of execution and that the will was the product of undue influence. The court ordered the case to proceed intestate and appointed Michael as personal representative.Mark appealed, arguing that the county court erred in excluding from evidence a document purported to be a prior will signed by Rita, which he contended was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant to the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the document was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant. The court found that the document had a tendency to show that Rita had a constant and abiding scheme for the distribution of her property, rebutting charges of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity. Therefore, the court reversed the county court's order refusing to admit the proposed will to probate and remanded the case for the county court to reconsider the existing record, including the contested document, in determining whether Mark met his burden of proving testamentary capacity and whether Michael met his burden of proving undue influence. View "In re Estate of Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed sixteen-year-old Sayrah P.'s appeal from an order for electronic monitoring and an order for staff secure detention, holding that this appeal lacked a final, appealable order.A juvenile probation officer found that Sayrah qualified for an alternative to detention and sent her home with an order for electronic monitoring. Two days after the initial screening the juvenile court held a hearing and ordered that Sayrah's electronic monitoring continue. Because Sayrah was noncompliant with her electronic monitoring she was ordered a month later to "staff secure" detention. Sayrah appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order, holding that the orders appealed from did not affect a substantial right, and therefore, the orders were not appealable. View "In re Interest of Sayrah P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the director of the Department of Natural Resources that each purported objector to an application seeking an interbasin transfer to divert surface water from an over-appropriated Platte River reach to the Republican River Basin, holding that the purported objectors lacked standing.Several objector entities filed objectives to the operative application, but the director dismissed all of those entities for lack of standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to have standing in this surface water appropriation case Appellants were required to meet the common-law standard; and (2) because Appellants' allegations did not demonstrate that they had or will suffer an injury in fact each failed to establish standing. View "In re Application A-19594" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's action for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, holding that Plaintiff's first amended complaint validly commenced a proceeding within the applicable limitations period.Plaintiff filed a complaint against the David Mach, the special administrator for the Estate of Leo Mach, alleging negligence. Because, after filing the complaint, Plaintiff learned that the estate had closed and that David had been discharged as special administrator, Plaintiff moved to reopen the estate and reappoint David as special administrator. The county court granted the motion, and Plaintiff served David with the summons and the original complaint. Plaintiff later moved to amend the complaint, which the court sustained. Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint. The district court granted summary judgment for David, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding that the original filing was a nullity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff's first amended complaint validly commenced. Proceeding within the applicable limitations period. View "Sparks v. Mach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from a second opinion of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court affirming the county court's monetary judgment in favor of Richard Muller in this fence dispute action between Muller and John Weeder, holding that, as a result of Weeder's death, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue its opinion and mandate in the first appeal.After the district court affirmed, as modified, the judgment in favor of Muller, Weeder appealed. Weeder died while the case was pending in the court of appeals. Unaware of Weeder's death, the court of appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, the county court again entered a monetary judgment in favor of Muller. The district court dismissed the second appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on Weeder's death. The Supreme Court remanded this matter to the court in which it was pending at the time of Weeder's death, holding that the court of appeals' opinion and mandate in the first appeal must be vacated as null and void and that this Court lacked jurisdiction over the second appeal. View "Muller v. Weeder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing certain defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that the defendants' contacts were too attenuated for them to have purposefully established minimum contacts within Nebraska.The out-of-state defendants at issue on appeal facilitated the sale of allegedly defective software installed by a local mechanic in four of Plaintiff's trucks. Plaintiff asserted against them claims for strict liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranties. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the quality and nature of the defendants' activities related to this action did not support personal jurisdiction. View "Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel ECM, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this complaint brought by Plaintiffs, Central States Development, LLC and Saint James Apartment Partners, against Defendants, Elizabeth Friedgut and the law firm of DLA Piper, LLP, holding that dismissal was proper.Friedgut, as DLA's employee, represented Plaintiffs in a dispute with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. Plaintiffs later brought a negligence case against Defendants in connection with that representation. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Defendants did not have the requisite minimum contacts with Nebraska to establish personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Central States Development v. Friedgut" on Justia Law