Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his pretrial motions to suppress evidence obtained in the execution of four search warrants. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court’s implicit rejection of Defendant’s testimony claiming that his cell phone was taken from his person and not pursuant to a search warrant was not clearly wrong; (2) Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his cell phone; and (3) the warrants were either sufficiently particular, or if they violated the particularity requirement, exclusion was not required because the good faith exception applied. View "State v. Tyler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a disability discrimination action under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act, alleging that his Employer was aware of his disabilities and discriminated against him under the Act and that his Employer terminated his employment for violating standards or conditions of employment that did not apply to employees without disabilities. The jury returned a verdict for the Employer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in excluding testimony by a vocational rehabilitation counselor that was relevant to show the Employer’s knowledge and previous accommodation of Plaintiff’s mental impairments after a work-related accident, and the error was prejudicial. Remanded for a new trial. View "Arens v. NEBCO Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to fifty years to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court’s decision to deny Defendant an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of certain exhibits; and (2) affirmed the decision of the district court in all other respects. Remanded. View "State v. Huston" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense. Defendant appealed, arguing that the county court erred when it overruled his motion to suppress because the warrantless drawing of his blood did not satisfy any exception to the requirement of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. The district court affirmed the conviction, concluding that Defendant gave informed consent to the blood draw, and therefore, a search warrant was not necessary. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a blood draw of an arrestee in a DUI case is a search subject to Fourth Amendment principles, and when the State claims the blood draw was proper pursuant to the consent exception to the warrant requirement, actual voluntary consent is to be determined by reference to the totality of the circumstances, one of which is the existence of an implied consent statute; and (2) the county court did not err when it determined that Defendant consented to the search and, therefore, did not err in overruling Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Modlin" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant, who is Chinese and only speaks “some English,” was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a chemical breath test, arguing he was not properly advised of his right to obtain an evaluation by an independent physician and additional laboratory testing because, despite an obvious language barrier, the arresting officer failed to ensure that he understood his rights in a language he could understand. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that there was neither a statutory nor constitutional requirement for the officer to advise Defendant of his right to independent evaluation and testing under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,199, and therefore, the officer’s failure to give an advisement in a language Defendant understood was not a violation of his due process or equal protection rights. View "State v. Wang" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree assault, two counts of second degree assault, and two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) Defendant’s convictions and sentences for both first degree assault and second degree assault with respect to each victim did not violate his rights against double jeopardy; (2) the district court’s evidentiary rulings were not erroneous and did not violate Defendant’s right of confrontation or his right to present a complete defense; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Ballew" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, a company providing optometric care, as a clinical technician. Defendant terminated Plaintiff on the grounds that Plaintiff consistently failed to meet performance expectations over her five years of employment. Plaintiff filed suit, claiming unlawful discrimination based upon a perceived disability. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was not proper where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment based upon Defendant’s perception that Defendant had a disability. Remanded. View "Marshall v. EyeCare Specialities, P.C." on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted in Douglas County of first degree sexual assault. Appellant later filed a pro se complaint in Lancaster County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against prosecutors, public defenders, and attorneys purportedly involved in the underlying criminal action. Appellant moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court, acting sua sponte, objected that venue was not proper in Lancaster County and, on that basis, also objected to the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The court then denied Appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, opining that if Appellant wished to proceed with the action in forma pauperis, he should make his request in Douglas County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Iowa law does not permit denial of in forma pauperis based on a sua sponte objection to venue, the district court erred in denying Appellant in forma pauperis status on that basis. Remanded. View "Castonguay v. Retelsdorf" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to one count of aiding and abetting second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to no less than life imprisonment or more than life imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his sentence was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the Court does not reach some of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims because the record on direct appeal was insufficient for the Court to do so; (2) Defendant’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit; and (3) the sentence imposed was not an abuse of discretion. View "State v. Casares" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with the sexual assault of two girls. During trial, it was revealed that defense witnesses had viewed forensic interviews of the victims. The State moved to strike the entire testimony of one defense witness and to exclude any testimony from two other defense witnesses, asserting that defense counsel had violated the court discovery order and Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1926, the statute pertaining to victim interviews. Defense counsel responded that he did not have any objection to the State’s motion. The court granted the State’s motion. The jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of all charges. Thereafter, Defendant brought a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating and advising Defendant to stipulate to allow the witness testimony to be stricken. The postconviction court vacated Defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial, concluding that Defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by defense counsel’s deficient conduct of agreeing with the State to strike and exclude defense witnesses. View "State v. Armstrong" on Justia Law