Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A city code enforcement officer entered Appellant’s urban property, which was unfenced and uninhabited, without a warrant to investigate numerous motor vehicles and motorcycles without license plates or vehicles that were inoperable. Appellant was subsequently convicted of multiple violations of a municipal ordinance relating to unregistered motor vehicles. On appeal, the district court reversed Appellant’s convictions on two of the twelve counts and otherwise affirmed. Appellant appealed, arguing that the officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his property without a warrant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a warrantless search of Appellant’s real property occurred but that the search was reasonable under the probable cause exception to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) probable cause does not justify a warrantless search of real property; but (2) under the open fields doctrine, there was no search in this case for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. View "City of Beatrice v. Meints" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individually and as guardians and next friends on behalf of their seven minor children, sued the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), several DHHS employees in their official and individual capacities, and the children’s guardian ad litem, alleging that over the course of the juvenile proceedings involving their oldest three children, Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights had been violated. The district court sustained Defendants’ motions do dismiss, concluding (1) Defendants were entitled to sovereign, qualified, absolute, and statutory immunities; and (2) Plaintiffs’ claims against the DHHS employees in their individual capacities were barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing the claims against the DHHS, the DHHS employees in their official capacities, and the guardian ad litem on the basis that they were immune from Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims; and (2) did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims against the DHHS employees in their individual capacities on the grounds that the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. View "Anthony K. v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

After Plaintiffs’ oldest three children were removed from Plaintiffs' care and eventually reunified with them, Plaintiffs, individually and as guardians and next friends on behalf of their seven minor children, sued the State, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and several DHHS employees. The case was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. In the complaint, Plaintiffs sought general and special damages for violations of their constitutionally protected rights to familial integrity, due process, and equal protection. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint, concluding (1) only the State had been properly served; (2) the State was entitled to sovereign immunity as to Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims that requested monetary damages; and (3) the State was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly dismissed DHHS and the DHHS employees for lack of proper service of process; (2) correctly determined that sovereign immunity barred Plaintiffs’ claims against the State for monetary damages under section 1983; and (3) erred in not granting the State’s motion to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action but achieved the same result by dismissing all remaining causes of action against the State on summary judgment. View "Anthony K. v. State" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled no contest to first degree sexual assault of a child. Defendant did not file a direct appeal. Defendant later filed a second amended motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective for, among other things, advising him to plead no contest. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Defendant’s claims were procedurally barred due to his failure to file a direct appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s claims were not procedurally barred because Defendant’s trial counsel was still serving as counsel during the period in which the direct appeal could have been filed. Remanded. View "State v. Payne" on Justia Law

Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4106(2) provides for retroactive application of its requirement that inmates convicted of a felony sex offense or other specified offense submit a DNA sample before being discharged from confinement. The statute further provides that an inmate will forfeit his past and future good time credit if the inmate refuses to submit a DNA sample. George Shepard was an inmate who was sentenced before the passage of section 29-4106(2) and refused to submit a DNA sample. Facing the impending forfeiture of his good time credit, Shepard filed a complaint for declaratory judgment challenging the application of section 29-4106 as violative of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The district court declared section 29-4106(2) unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions as applied to Shepard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the retroactive application of section 29-4106(2) violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. View "Shepard v. Houston" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence, second offense. Defendant appealed, challenging the county court’s determinations that the Nebraska rules of evidence did not apply to the hearing on her motion to suppress and arguing that the county court erred in failing to sustain her suppression motion because the Nebraska State Patrol checkpoint at which was stopped was unconstitutional. The district court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in a criminal case, the rules of evidence do not apply to suppression hearings; and (2) the county court did not err in determining that the checkpoint was constitutional. View "State v. Piper" on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Appellant’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In 2012, Appellant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds. The trial court dismissed the claims without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant appealed the dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, given the great weight of the evidence against him, there was no ineffective assistance of counsel because even finding the allegations true would not have been prejudicial to Appellant’s case. View "State v. Fernando-Granados" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree sexual assault and sentenced to three to five years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court did not err in (1) failing to allow Defendant to inquire on redirect examination into the nature of his witness’ felony conviction after he was impeached by the State; (2) not granting the parties’ joint motion for mistrial; and (3) admitting certain hearsay statements under the excited utterances exception. The Court further held that because the record was incomplete, the Court could not reach Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. View "State v. Castillo-Zamora" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of discharging a firearm at a dwelling while in or near a motor vehicle, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1212.04, and using a firearm to commit a felony. Defendant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) counsel could not have been deficient for failing to raise a novel constitutional challenge to section 28-1212.04, and therefore, the district court did not err when it denied this claim; and (2) the record refuted the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence obtained from the stop and search of Defendant’s vehicle, and therefore, the district court did not err when it denied this claim. View "State v. Sanders" on Justia Law

In 1999, Appellant pled no contest to first degree murder. Appellant was eighteen years old at the time of the offense. Appellant was sentenced to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and Appellant’s first postconviction motion was denied. Appellant filed a second motion for postconviction relief, claiming that she was a “minor” as defined under certain Nebraska law at the time of her offense, and therefore, her life sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama. The district court denied the motion, concluding that because Appellant was not under the age of eighteen at the time of her offense, Miller did not apply to her case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the relief afforded in Miller and resulting resentencing under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-105.02 apply to persons who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes and therefore did not apply to Defendant. View "State v. Wetherell" on Justia Law