Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his Class IV felony conviction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4011(1) based on his failure to comply with certain registration provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4004(9) of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Defendant claimed the district court erred when it rejected his constitutional challenges to SORA. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) Defendant had not shown that either section 29-4004(9) or section 29-4011 is an ex post facto punishment either on its face or as applied; (2) the district court did not err when it rejected Defendant's due process challenge; and (3) Defendant's additional constitutional challenges were without merit. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree sexual assault in 1995. The Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) had not been enacted at the time of Defendant's conviction, but because he was still on probation on January 1, 1997, he became subject to then newly enacted SORA. Defendant was released from probation in April 1997. In 2009, Defendant was notified that he would be subject to life-time registration under SORA. Defendant was later found guilty of violating SORA. Defendant appealed, asserting that SORA as amended violated the ex post facto and due process clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions on its face and as applied to him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it rejected the constitutional challenges that were raised by Defendant in his criminal proceeding. View "State v. Gaskill" on Justia Law

Following a trial by jury, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of eighty to ninety years' imprisonment. At trial, two witnesses testified that sometime before the murder of the victim, they had seen Defendant with a gun, and that he carried his gun in his backpack. Defendant argued (1) this testimony was evidence of a prior crime - possession of a firearm by a felon - and fell under Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-404(2); and (2) as such, the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the incident occurred pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-404(3). The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the testimony fell under section 27-404(2); (2) the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing outside the presence pursuant to section 27-404(3); but (3) viewed in context of the whole record, this error was harmless. View "State v. Freemont" on Justia Law

Defendant Francis Seberger was convicted of first degree murder. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising Sixth Amendment concerns regarding his trial and appellate court representation. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the decision of the district court to deny Defendant an evidentiary hearing on his allegation that he was not properly advised of his right to testify and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on this single allegation; and (2) affirmed the decision of the district court in all other respects. View "State v. Seberger" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual assault and felony child abuse. At issue on appeal was the admission of evidence of Defendant's prior sexual contacts with minors, which Defendant claimed violated Nebraska rules of evidence and the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-414 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions; and (2) the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence of prior acts. View "State v. Kibbee" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder, use of a weapon to commit a felony, criminal conspiracy, and tampering with a witness. On appeal, the Supreme Court first rejected Defendant's claim that the district court was divested of jurisdiction when Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari part way through the proceedings. The Court then reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding (1) the district court erred when it gave the jury a written instruction stating that the jury must consider Defendant's refusal to testify as an admission of guilt, and (2) the error was not harmless. View "State v. Abram" on Justia Law

Chad Sorensen was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), second offense, with a blood alcohol content over .15. Sorensen was sentenced to probation, and his license was revoked for one year. Sorenson appealed, contending that his confrontation rights were violated when the county court admitted into evidence the affidavit of the nurse who performed Sorensen's blood draw without also requiring that nurse to testify at trial. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed Sorensen's convictions, holding that Sorensen's right to confrontation was violated when the State was not required to call the nurse as a witness at trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether an alleged victim of child sexual abuse may claim a privilege against testifying in the criminal prosecution of the alleged perpetrator pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1210, which provides, "When the matter sought to be elicited would tend to render the witness criminally liable or to expose him or her to public ignominy, the witness is not compelled to answer...." The district court found the privilege against exposure to public ignominy did not apply to the victim because her testimony was highly material to the crimes charged. The victim appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds after noting that section 25-1210 does not include a materiality exception, holding that public ignominy privilege cannot be asserted by a witness in a criminal case, regardless of the materiality of the testimony. View "State v. Riensche" on Justia Law

Thunder Collins was tried and convicted for numerous crimes, including first degree murder. On Collins' first appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the cause for a hearing to determine whether Collins was prejudiced by the jury's weekend separation during its deliberation. At that hearing, Collins moved for the judge's recusal and to conduct discovery. Both motions were denied. Following the hearing, the district court determined that Collins suffered no prejudice from the jury's separation and overruled his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed Collins' convictions and sentences, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Collins' motions. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

David Kofoed, the supervisor of the Crime Scene Investigation Division for the sheriff's office was charged with tampering with evidence during the investigation of two suspects in two 2006 murders. After a Neb. R. Evid. 404 hearing, the trial court admitted evidence of an uncharged extrinsic crime during the 2003 investigation of a child's murder. The trial court subsequently found Kofoed guilty of evidence tampering during the 2006 murder investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) the trial court did not err in sustaining the State's motion to admit evidence of Kofoed's alleged act of evidence tampering in 2003 during the Rule 404 hearing; (2) the court did not err in overruling Kofoed's motion for a directed verdict and in finding him guilty of tampering with evidence; and (3) the trial judge did not err in failing to recuse himself from the proceeding and in overruling Kofoed's motion for a new trial. View "State v. Kofoed" on Justia Law