Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding, among other things, that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) admitting into evidence journal entries written by Defendant while incarcerated for another crime; (3) not excluding the testimony of certain witnesses on the grounds that Defendant was presented with a “Hobson’s choice” of either conducting effective cross-examination that would bring to light other bad acts or not conducting an effective cross-examination; and (4) giving Defendant a life sentence. View "State v. Oldson" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Constitution confers on the Legislature the authority to define crimes and fix their punishment and on the Parole Board “power to grant paroles after conviction and judgment, under such conditions as may be prescribed by law, for any offenses committed against the criminal laws of this state except treason and cases of impeachment.” A statute provides: Every committed offender shall be eligible for parole when the offender has served one-half the minimum term. Because it is impossible to determine when an offender has served one-half of a life sentence, the section has been interpreted to mean that an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole until the Board of Pardons commutes the sentence to a term of years. Adams, an inmate serving two sentences of life imprisonment, challenged the statute as an unconstitutional usurpation of the Board's authority. The district court dismissed and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the commutation requirement was a “condition” prescribed by the Legislature within the meaning of the constitution’s “conditions clause,” which “reserves to the Legislature the ability to add to or subtract from the [Board’s] power to grant paroles in all cases except in cases of treason or impeachment.” View "Adams v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The State filed a motion to deny an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion, and the district court granted the State’s request. Thereafter, the district court denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by denying an evidentiary hearing where Defendant’s motion did not allege any prejudice due to his trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance; and (2) the district court did not err by denying postconviction relief. View "State v. Abdulkadir" on Justia Law

Madeline Schmitz and Steven Sickler were divorced in 2001. The property division awarded a percentage of Steven’s individual retirement account to Madeline. Madeline’s percentage had not been transferred to her in the fourteen years since the decree. The district court found Steven in contempt and ordered him to serve a sentence of ninety days’ incarceration. The sentence could be purged by payment of $37,234 to Madeline within a period of seventeen days. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) imprisonment for contempt for failing to comply with the order of property division in a dissolution decree does not violate Neb. Const. art. I, 20; (2) the district court did not err in finding Steven’s conduct to be willful; and (3) the order is modified so as to permit Steven to purge the contempt at any time during his period of incarceration. View "Sickler v. Sickler" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of first degree murder, three counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s out-of-court statements to several witnesses in the weeks following the murders under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements of one witness, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Britt" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty in county court of driving under the influence and was sentenced to six months’ probation. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the police did not act reasonably in stopping Defendant, and therefore, the stop was unconstitutional under Brown v. Texas. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for further review. The Court then reversed, holding that the stop was reasonable under Brown, and the court of appeals erred in its balancing of the Brown factors. View "State v. Woldt" on Justia Law

After EyeCare Specialties, P.C. of Lincoln terminated the employment of Cindy Marshall, Marshall sued, alleging that EyeCare discriminated against her because of her skin condition, tremors, and perceived disability related to her past prescription drug abuse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of EyeCare. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether EyeCare discriminated against Marshall because of her skin condition and tremors, both of which EyeCare perceived to substantially limit Marshall’s ability to work; and (2) Marshall failed to present evidence that EyeCare discriminated against her for having a perceived drug addiction that substantially limited one or more major life activities. View "Marshall v. EyeCare Specialties, P.C." on Justia Law

Shortly after his release from prison, Nikko Jenkins shot Shamecka Holloway. Holloway sued the State, Correct Care Solutions (CCS), and certain State employees, claiming that the State and CCS, which contracted with the State to provide medical services for inmates, were negligent in failing to provide Jenkins with adequate mental health treatment and failing to seek mental health commitment prior to Jenkins’ release. The district court dismissed Holloway’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State and its employees were entitled to immunity from suit because whether to seek commitment falls under the discretionary function exception to the State Tort Claims Act; and (2) Holloway failed to plead sufficient facts to show that CCS was liable. View "Holloway v. State" on Justia Law

Marilyn Waldron, a seventy-eight-year-old woman, sustained injuries when Deputy Sheriff James Roark and his partner entered Waldron’s home to serve an arrest warrant on Waldron’s grandson. Waldron brought this action against Roark pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the entry was in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that Roark used excessive force against her. The district court granted summary judgment to Roark, concluding that the circumstances justified the deputies’ entry into the home and that Roark’s use of force was objectively reasonable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a question of fact existed as to whether Roark’s entry into Waldron’s home violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) a question of fact existed as to whether the force Roark used was excessive. Remanded. View "Waldron v. Roark" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to terms of life-to-life imprisonment for each murder conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing, primarily, that because sudden quarrel provocation negates the malice element of murder, the step instruction for first degree murder violated his due process rights because the jury was not instructed that the State had to prove that the killings were not the result of a sudden quarrel brought about by a sufficient provocation. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) when the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with premeditated and deliberate malice, the jury necessarily simultaneously found no sudden quarrel provocation beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Defendant’s remaining arguments lacked merit. View "State v. Hinrichsen" on Justia Law