Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony stemming from Defendant’s involvement in a fatal shooting that occurred during a home invasion robbery. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it restricted his cross-examination of three key prosecution witnesses and otherwise violated his constitutional rights of confrontation and due process by impeding his efforts to impeach the witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross examination of the witnesses; (2) Defendant’s argument that the State violated his rights by failing to disclose tacit plea agreements between the State and the witnesses was without merit; and (3) evidence of prior home invasion robberies committed by two of the witnesses was not admissible in this case because it was not relevant for any legitimate purpose, including impeachment.View "State v. Patton" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony for the death of her husband. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain statements Defendant made while in police custody as volunteered statements. Specifically, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the statements because Defendant had invoked her constitutional right to end the interrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) statements Defendant made from 3:43 to 4 a.m. should have been suppressed because Defendant had invoked her right to remain silent, but the district court’s error was harmless; and (2) statements Defendant made after 4:18 a.m. were not required to be suppressed as involuntary due to Defendant’s earlier invocation of her right to end questioning, as the statements Defendant made after 4:18 a.m. were initiated by Defendant and were not the product of interrogation.View "State v. DeJong" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree assault. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, (2) the sentence was excessive, and (3) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, (2) the sentence was not excessive, and (3) Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit because Defendant made insufficient allegations of fact that would support findings of prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the evidence supported Defendant’s conviction and sentence; and (2) Defendant failed to make sufficiently specific allegations of deficient conduct regarding one of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, but the merits of Defendant’s remaining two ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims could not be reviewed upon the trial record, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in determining that these claims were alleged with insufficient specificity and thus lacked merit. View "State v. Abdullah" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant moved to suppress the statements he made to police during the murder investigation. The district court overruled Defendant’s motion, and, at a bench trial, the State received evidence of the statements challenged in Defendant’s motion to suppress. The district court found Defendant guilty of both charges and sentenced him to life imprisonment for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in admitting evidence of Defendant’s confession during a pre-Miranda interrogation, but this evidence was cumulative to other admissible evidence, and its admission was harmless error; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Juranek" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of knowing or intentional child abuse resulting in death and was sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging errors on the part of the trial court and errors relating to the ineffectiveness of trial counsel and appellate counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Defendant’s petition for postconviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree sexual assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in several respects and that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding, as to three of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, they were without merit because Defendant failed to allege how he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the court of appeals applied the wrong reasoning in finding that three of Defendant’s ineffective assistance claims lacked merit for failure to allege prejudice, as resolution of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims requires specific allegations of the deficient conduct, but allegations of prejudice are not necessary on direct appeal; and (2) in these three instances, the record was not sufficient to review Defendant’s claim.View "State v. Filholm" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant, who was not a citizen of the United States, pled guilty to attempted sexual assault in the first degree. After Appellant was released from incarceration he filed a motion to withdraw his plea and vacate the judgment, alleging that not allowing him to withdraw his plea would result in “manifest injustice” because his trial counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The district court dismissed the motion, determining that Appellant could have brought his Padilla v. Kentucky claim in an earlier postconviction action. Appellant appealed, arguing that postconviction relief was never available to him because he could not have reasonably discovered the factual predicate of his claim while incarcerated, as he did not receive notice of the government’s decision to deport him until after his release. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the exercise of due diligence, Appellant should have discovered and brought his Padilla claim while incarcerated through a postconviction action; and (2) therefore, the district court properly dismissed Appellant’s claim for manifest injustice relief. View "State v. Mamer" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether federal law preempts Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2602.01(f)(4), which generally prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Here, Allied Professionals Insurance Company (APIC), which is registered with the Nebraska Department of Insurance as a foreign risk retention group, issued a professional liability insurance policy to Dr. Brett Speece that included a provision requiring binding arbitration. After Speece filed an action seeking a declaration that APIC was obligated to provide coverage for his defense in a Medicaid proceeding, APIC filed a motion to compel arbitration. The district court overruled the motion, concluding that the arbitration clause in the policy was not valid and enforceable pursuant to section 25-2602.01, and that neither the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) nor the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 (LRRA) preempted the state statute. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order overruling APIC’s motion to compel arbitration, holding (1) the FAA does not preempt section 25-2602.01(f)(4), but the LRRA does preempt application of the Nebraska statute to foreign risk retention groups; and (2) therefore, the district court erred when it determined that section 25-2602.01(f)(4) prohibited enforcement of the arbitration clause in the parties’ insurance contract in this case. View "Speece v. Allied Prof’ls Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant was a temporary employee at the University of Nebraska. After the University considering terminating Appellant’s employment, human resources completed a “threat assessment” in relation to the termination, which noted Appellant’s criminal record and history of becoming upset over discussion of work performance. When the University decided to terminate Appellant, an e-mail was circulated warning coworkers to alert campus police and lock their doors if they saw Appellant. Appellant filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the University Board of Regents and two of its managers, making a “stigma plus” claim that he was deprived of a liberty interest in his good name without due process of law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact that Appellant had not sufficiently suffered a constitutional violation; (2) the Board of Regents was shielded by sovereign immunity; and (3) the individual defendants were protected by qualified sovereign immunity because the alleged violation was not clearly established. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment.View "Potter v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb." on Justia Law

The Nebraska Constitution generally prohibits the Legislature from authorizing games of chance but contains an exception for live horseracing under certain conditions. At issue in this case was L.R. 41CA, a resolution to amend Neb. Const. art. III, 24 by permitting wagering on “replayed” horseraces in addition to wagering on live horseraces and specifying how the Legislature must appropriate the proceeds from a tax placed on wagering for live and replayed horseraces. The Secretary of State granted the writ of mandamus sought by the relator in this case, holding (1) the separate-vote provision of Neb. Const. art. XVI, 1 requires the Legislature to present constitutional amendments to voters in a manner that allows them to vote separately on distinct and independent subjects; and (2) L.R. 41CA violates the separate-vote provision, and therefore, article XVI, section 1 bars its placement on the November 2014 general election ballot. View "State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale" on Justia Law