Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted by a jury of attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, and use of a weapon to commit a felony. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the assault and weapon convictions and found that the trial court did not err in failing to give a self-defense instruction, but (2) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the attempted second degree murder conviction, finding the jury should have been instructed on both attempted second degree murder and attempted sudden quarrel manslaughter. Although its reasoning differed in some respects from that of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant did not request an instruction on attempted sudden quarrel manslaughter, and because he was charged with a nonhomicide charge, the district court had no duty to instruct on any lesser-included offenses in the absence of such a request, and the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise; but (2) Defendant was entitled to a new trial at which the jury could be instructed on the distinction between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to first degree sexual assault. The district court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five to thirty years' imprisonment with credit for 224 days served. The two issues presented for review in this appeal were whether Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective and whether Defendant received an excessive sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record was insufficient to to review on direct appeal Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and accordingly, the Court declined to address it; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to twenty-five to thirty years' imprisonment for first degree sexual assault. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial at which the jury was instructed on aiding and abetting, Defendant was convicted of robbery, attempted robbery, two counts of use of a weapon to commit a felony, and second degree assault. As postconviction relief, Defendant was granted a new direct appeal. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) the district court erred when it declared that a witness was unavailable and when it allowed Defendant's deposition testimony to be read into the record, but the error was harmless; and (2) the court of appeals did not err when it determined that the evidence supported the convictions. View "State v. Kitt" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of a class IV felony based on his failure to comply with certain registration provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court subsequently sustained Defendant's motion for rehearing and ordered the case submitted without further oral argument. The Court then withdrew its prior opinion, reversed and vacated Defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss, holding that Defendant did not commit the offense for which he was charged and convicted because he was not subject to SORA on the date of the alleged offense, and therefore, Defendant had no legal obligation to report his change of address to the sex offender registry. View "State v. Gaskill" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of theft by shoplifting, $200 or less. The district court relied on two prior county court convictions to enhance the crime for punishment as a Class IV felony. In the second of these two prior proceedings, the county court had refused to enhance the conviction and had treated it as a first offense. Defendant argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel required the district court to treat the instant conviction as only a second offense, and thus, as a Class I misdemeanor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for enhancement as a third or subsequent offense, the plain language of the relevant statute required only that Defendant have been previously convicted of two instances of theft by shoplifting, whether the earlier convictions were called first offense or second offense; and (2) Defendant's two prior convictions clearly satisfied this requirement. View "State v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and no drug tax stamp. The principle issue on appeal was whether a reasonable person would understand that a general consent to search a vehicle for illegal drugs authorized the opening of a gift-wrapped box in the vehicle's storage area. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the possession of a controlled substance conviction, holding that because (i) the object of the search was clearly disclosed, (ii) the container was not equivalent to a locked container and was not destroyed, and (iii) the consent was not withdrawn after the officer's interest in the container was communicated to its owner, the search did not exceed the scope of the consent; but (2) reversed the no drug tax stamp conviction, holding that the record contained no evidence of the absence of a drug tax stamp. View "State v. Howell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of one count of attempted first degree sexual assault and one count of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child. During the proceedings, the jurors were addressed by juror number instead of by name, with a few exceptions. Noting plain error, the court of appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial after determining that the district court abused its discretion in impaneling an "anonymous jury." The Supreme court reversed, holding that Defendant waived any objection to the jury that was impaneled, and plain error review was improper because the record did not plainly show that the district court impaneled an anonymous jury. Remanded. View "State v. Nadeem" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with numerous crimes, including first degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and two weapons charges. A jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Defendant appealed, asserting (1) the prosecutor improperly removed a prospective juror from the jury pool because the of the juror's race, (2) the police did not properly advise him of his Miranda rights, and (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his criminal conspiracy conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor's reasons for striking the prospective juror were race neutral and, overall, persuasive; (2) although the Miranda warnings did not expressly state that Defendant was entitled to appointed counsel before questioning, that information was obviously implied from the warnings that the police read to him; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the criminal conspiracy conviction. View "State v. Nave" on Justia Law

After successfully appealing his conviction for first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony, Appellant pled guilty upon remand to manslaughter and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Appellant asserted that the second judge was vindictive because of Appellant's successful appeal and, thus, imposed a harsher sentence for the weapons conviction in violation of Appellant's due process rights. At issue was whether the presumption of vindictiveness applies when a different judge gives a greater sentence after the defendant successfully appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a vindictiveness presumption does not apply when there is a different sentencing judge after a successful appeal; and (2) furthermore, the second district court judge did not act with actual vindictiveness. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated Ashley W. as a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(1) for possession of marijuana. Ashley appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion. The court of appeals declined to address issues previously raised by Ashley in a motion to suppress, concluding she had failed to preserve the alleged errors. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying Ashley's motion to suppress and in finding that she had waived her objection to the evidence at the adjudication hearing and that the court of appeals erred in affirming the order of adjudication. View "In re Ashley W." on Justia Law