Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Grandmother and Grandfather filed a petition for adoption seeking to adopt Child. Grandfather had dementia, so Father, who was Child's father and Grandparents' son, sought to participate in the adoption proceedings on Grandfather's behalf and object to his mental capacity to pursue the adoption. After a hearing, the county court entered an order finding that Father did not have standing in the adoption case. At issue on appeal was whether Father could stand as Grandfather's "next friend" and participate in the proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction because Father's appeal was not taken from a final, appealable order; (2) Father could not appeal on his own behalf because he had asserted no personal stake in the controversy; and (3) Father could not appeal on Grandfather's behalf because the court's dismissal of Father did not affect any of Grandfather's substantial rights. View "In re Adoption of Amea R." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Ronald Smith was convicted of murder in the second degree and related offenses. Smith appealed his conviction for second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed after (1) reaffirming the holdings of State v. Pettit and Bosche v. State that an intentional killing committed without malice upon a sudden quarrel constitutes the offense of manslaughter, and overruling the holding of State v. Jones that the distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel is the presence or absence of an intention to kill; (2) holding that the step instruction given in this case was not a correct statement of the law because it (i) required the jury to convict on second degree murder if it found that Smith killed the victim intentionally but (ii) did not permit the jury to consider the alternative possibility that the killing was intentional but provoked by a sudden quarrel and, therefore, constituted manslaughter; and (3) concluding that because there was no evidence in the record upon which the jury could have concluded that Smith committed sudden quarrel manslaughter instead of second degree murder, the improper jury instruction did not prejudice Smith or affect his substantial rights. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Terry Graff was convicted of violating a protection order and was sentenced to twelve months' probation. Graff appealed to the district court, which affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a defendant can be convicted of knowingly violating a protection order of which he has actual notice if he was not personally served with that order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) personal service was specifically required by Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-311.09 and hence was an element of the crime; and (2) because personal service was required, but did not occur, there was insufficient evidence to convict Graff. Remanded with instructions to dismiss the charge. View "State v. Graff" on Justia Law

Under a plea bargain, Donald Lee pleaded nolo contendere to one count of second degree murder. The district court sentenced Lee to a term of seventy years to life in prison. Lee subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, claiming violations of his right to a speedy trial, his right to due process, and his right to effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion without granting an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the record did not affirmatively show that Lee's ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his speedy trial rights was without merit. Remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

Jeffrey McCave was in his car, parked in the driveway of his father's house, when his father told him to leave. After McCave refused, his father called the police, who arrested McCave. McCave was subsequently convicted of DUI, refusing to submit to a chemical test, trespass, and possessing an open container. The district court affirmed the judgment of the county court. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of conviction for DUI, refusing to submit, and possessing an open container and remanded with directions to vacate those convictions and sentences, holding (1) McCave's arrest for DUI was unlawful because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest McCave, and therefore, the county court erred in failing to suppress evidence derived from the arrest, and the error was not harmless; (2) the unlawful arrest also rendered McCave's conviction for refusing to submit unlawful; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain McCave's conviction for possessing alcohol in an open container; and (4) the county court erred in excluding evidence relevant to the trespass charge and the statutory defense to that charge, and because the error was not harmless, the Court reversed this conviction and remanded for a new trial only on that charge. View "State v. McCave" on Justia Law

Appellant Arthur Perina was charged with, among other things, motor vehicle homicide under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-306. Perina filed a motion to quash the motor vehicle homicide charge, asserting that section 28-306 was unconstitutional on the ground that it criminalized negligent acts. The county court overruled Perina's motion. Perina pled guilty to both charges, after which he renewed his constitutional challenge. It was again overruled. The district court affirmed Perina's convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in rejecting Perina's constitutional arguments or affirming the county court's decision to convict him of motor vehicle homicide without proof of mens rea because motor vehicle homicide is a public welfare offense that does not require proof of mens rea. View "State v. Perina" on Justia Law

Joshua Alfredson was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual assault and second degree false imprisonment. The trial court subsequently determined that an aggravated offense had been established and, as a result, subjected Alfredson to lifetime community supervision as part of his sentence. The court of appeals affirmed Alfredson's convictions and sentences, concluding (1) the trial court erred by failing to submit to the jury the aggravated offense determination regarding whether the offense included the use of force or the threat of serious violence pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 83-174.03, but (2) the error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court's error was not harmless because the Court could not say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have found that Alfredson used force or the threat of serious violence in compelling the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. Remanded. View "State v. Alfredson" on Justia Law

Jerad Parks was charged with first degree sexual assault on a child. Although Parks was twenty-four years old at the time he was charged, he filed a motion to transfer to the juvenile court because he was a juvenile at the time of the offenses. The district court denied the motion. Parks then pled no contest to attempted second degree sexual assault and felony child abuse. The district court ordered Parks to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Parks' motion to transfer because under the plain language of the juvenile code, the juvenile court's jurisdiction ends when the juvenile reaches the age of majority; and (2) because Parks pled no contest to a registrable offense under SORA, the plain language of the statute required Parks to register as a sex offender. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Glazebrook was convicted for first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Glazebrook contended (1) that the State's delay in charging him with the offense violated his constitutional rights, and (2) that the trial court erred in receiving certain evidence over his objections. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding (1) the district court's determination that Glazebrook failed to establish a denial of due process resulting from preindictment delay was not clearly erroneous, but (2) the district court abused its discretion in receiving evidence of Glazebrook's criminal history, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Glazebrook" on Justia Law

Jonathan Becker pleaded guilty to motor vehicle homicide and was sentenced to five years of probation, which included a requirement that Becker participate in a work ethic camp. The court also revoked Becker's driver's license for five years as a condition of probation. Becker later violated his probation, and the court revoked it. The court then sentenced Becker to five years in prison and again revoked Becker's license, this time for fifteen years. The court did not give Becker credit for the time he served in the work ethic camp or for his previous driver's license revocation. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding (1) Becker should receive credit for the time served at the work ethic camp, but (2) Becker should not receive credit for the time his license was revoked while he was on probation. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Becker" on Justia Law