Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alma Gonzalez was convicted of fraudulently obtaining public assistance benefits based upon a no contest plea that she entered pursuant to a plea agreement. Over two years after her sentencing, Gonzalez filed a motion to withdraw her plea, alleging that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney had not explained that her plea would result in automatic deportation. The district court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) procedurally, Gonzalez was permitted to move for withdrawal of her plea; but (2) Gonzalez failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that withdrawal of her plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Robert Dunkin pled no contest to the charge of murder in the second degree. The district court accepted Dunkin's plea, entered a judgment of guilty, and sentenced Dunkin to forty years to life imprisonment. Dunkin filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) Dunkin was not pressured or coerced to enter his plea; (2) Dunkin failed to establish that counsel's preparation for the case was unreasonable or inadequate; (3) Dunkin's counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue of competency; (4) Dunkin's allegation that a specific sentence was promised or that the plea agreement was conditioned on such a sentence was without merit; and (5) Dunkin's counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal where Dunkin and counsel had no contact following the sentencing proceedings. View "State v. Dunkin" on Justia Law

Chad Norman pled no contest to third degree assault and was sentenced to probation for two years and jail for thirty days. After a hearing, the district court also ordered Norman to register under Nebraska's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Norman appealed the portion of his sentence requiring him to register, claiming he was denied due process. The Supreme Court reversed the registration order, holding (1) before a court orders a defendant to be subject to SORA pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4003(1)(b)(i), the court must make a finding whether the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact as part of the incident that gave rise to the defendant's conviction for one of the offenses not sexual in nature listed in section 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B); (2) the court must provide procedural due process when it makes this finding, including proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and (3) although the court in this case provided Norman with notice and a hearing, the court erred when it based its finding solely on statements in the State's factual basis for Norman's plea and explicitly ignored the evidence at the hearing. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Norman" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Hessler was incarcerated and sentenced to death relating to the rape and murder of a fifteen-year-old. Hessler subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief. The district court granted an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to demand a competency hearing before the trial court allowed Hessler to waive counsel and represent himself at sentencing. The court then denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hessler failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the sentencing hearing, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying postconviction relief. View "State v. Hessler" on Justia Law

Lucky Iromuanya was convicted of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and two related counts of use of a weapon. The Supreme Court modified his sentence. Iromuanya subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel directed at his trial and appellate counsel. The district court overruled the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Iromuanya's motion without a hearing where, for all of his claims, Iromuanya either failed to allege facts that showed his counsel's deficient performance or failed to allege facts that showed he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficiencies. View "State v. Iromuanya" on Justia Law

Timmy Timmens was convicted of second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Timmens subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in several particulars and that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. The district court dismissed all but one of the claims without a hearing and denied the remaining claim following an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Timmens' appeal of the order denying all but one of his postconviction claims without a hearing was untimely; (2) trial counsel's performance with respect to Timmens' remaining claim was not deficient under the Strickland v. Washington standard, and therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective in not raising the issue of trial counsel's performance on direct appeal; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Timmens' motion to alter or amend the judgment. View "State v. Timmens" on Justia Law

A rental vehicle driven by James Nelson was stopped for speeding. A subsequent search disclosed a package of cocaine. After a jury trial, Nelson was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver or distribute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although Nelson was not the driver authorized on the rental agreement, he had permission from the authorized driver to drive the vehicle, and therefore, Nelson had standing to challenge his detention and the search of the vehicle; (2) the district court's denial of Nelson's first motion to suppress was not in error where an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer would have had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Nelson; and (3) the district court did not err when it denied Nelson's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence because the evidence at issue was not newly discovered evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2101(5), the evidence was not exculpatory, and its loss or destruction did not deprive Nelson of due process or a fair trial. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Grandmother and Grandfather filed a petition for adoption seeking to adopt Child. Grandfather had dementia, so Father, who was Child's father and Grandparents' son, sought to participate in the adoption proceedings on Grandfather's behalf and object to his mental capacity to pursue the adoption. After a hearing, the county court entered an order finding that Father did not have standing in the adoption case. At issue on appeal was whether Father could stand as Grandfather's "next friend" and participate in the proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction because Father's appeal was not taken from a final, appealable order; (2) Father could not appeal on his own behalf because he had asserted no personal stake in the controversy; and (3) Father could not appeal on Grandfather's behalf because the court's dismissal of Father did not affect any of Grandfather's substantial rights. View "In re Adoption of Amea R." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Ronald Smith was convicted of murder in the second degree and related offenses. Smith appealed his conviction for second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed after (1) reaffirming the holdings of State v. Pettit and Bosche v. State that an intentional killing committed without malice upon a sudden quarrel constitutes the offense of manslaughter, and overruling the holding of State v. Jones that the distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel is the presence or absence of an intention to kill; (2) holding that the step instruction given in this case was not a correct statement of the law because it (i) required the jury to convict on second degree murder if it found that Smith killed the victim intentionally but (ii) did not permit the jury to consider the alternative possibility that the killing was intentional but provoked by a sudden quarrel and, therefore, constituted manslaughter; and (3) concluding that because there was no evidence in the record upon which the jury could have concluded that Smith committed sudden quarrel manslaughter instead of second degree murder, the improper jury instruction did not prejudice Smith or affect his substantial rights. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Terry Graff was convicted of violating a protection order and was sentenced to twelve months' probation. Graff appealed to the district court, which affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a defendant can be convicted of knowingly violating a protection order of which he has actual notice if he was not personally served with that order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) personal service was specifically required by Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-311.09 and hence was an element of the crime; and (2) because personal service was required, but did not occur, there was insufficient evidence to convict Graff. Remanded with instructions to dismiss the charge. View "State v. Graff" on Justia Law