Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Herchel Huff was driving a motor vehicle when he struck and killed a pedestrian. Huff was convicted of several charges in connection with the accident, including manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide. The primary issue on appeal was whether Huff's convictions for manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions because, as Huff argued, manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of motor vehicle homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part vacated, holding that, under Blockburger v. United States, unlawful act manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of motor vehicle homicide, and therefore, Huff was subjected to multiple punishments in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court then vacated Huff's conviction and sentence for manslaughter and remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Huff" on Justia Law

Susan Schwerdtfeger became pregnant by in vitro fertilization, and after giving birth, she and Teri Latham lived with the child for five years. The parties then separated and Latham moved out of the home. After Latham's visitation with the child stopped, Latham brought an action seeking custody and visitation, alleging that she had standing based on the doctrine of in loco parentis. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Schwerdtfeger and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it concluded that the doctrine of in loco parentis did not apply to the facts of this case, and therefore, Latham had standing to seek custody and visitation of the child; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact whether Latham should be granted custody and/or visitation of the child. View "Latham v. Schwerdtfeger" on Justia Law

An irrigation district (FCID) petitioned the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to reevaluate a portion of the Republican River Basin according to the criteria in Neb. Rev. Stat. 46-713 and to determine whether the basin met the criteria to be considered "overappropriated" rather than "fully appropriated." If the status of the basin was changed to "overappropriated," the DNR could assert more authority over the basin. The DNR denied FCID's petition, finding the statute allowed the DNR to declare a river basin overappropriated only if it was subject to an interstate cooperative agreement. Because the basin was subject to an interstate compact, the DNR declared it did not have the authority to change the status as an interstate compact was not the equivalent of an interstate cooperative agreement. The FCID appealed. The DNR cross-appealed, alleging that FCID failed to demonstrate an injury in fact for standing purposes. The Supreme Court found the FCID failed to plead an injury in fact and therefore did not have standing. The Court dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction and did not reach the merits of the litigation. View "Frenchman-Cambridge Irr. Dist. v. Dep't of Nat. Res." on Justia Law

A jury found Stephen Pullens guilty of killing his mother by throwing her over a balcony. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing hearsay evidence of a prior attempt by Pullens to throw his mother off a balcony; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence emails written by Pullens after finding that the State had made a showing that the emails were what the State purported them to be; (3) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on voluntary flight because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer flight; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Pullens' request for a continuance on the day of the sentencing hearing or in refusing to appoint a public defender for the sentencing hearing; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not affording Pullens an opportunity to review his presentence investigation report and by considering a letter written by someone not involved in the case; and (6) Pullens' arguments concerning ineffective assistance of counsel were not appropriate for review on direct appeal. View "State v. Pullens" on Justia Law

David Kass was found guilty of enticement by an electronic communication device under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-833, which proscribes a person age nineteen or older from knowingly and intentionally using an electronic communication device to contact a child under age sixteen or a peace officer whom the person believe to be a child under age sixteen, and using language that conjures up repugnant sexual images. The district court sentenced Kass to one year in prison and ordered him to register as a sex offender. Kass appealed, arguing that section 28-833 was facially overbroad, that the court erred in its jury instructions, and that his sentence was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad; (2) there was no plain error in the court's instruction on the elements of the crime or in the court's denial of Kass's request for a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment; and (3) given Kass's age, his education, the offense, and the fact that he was a police officer, the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Kass to one year in prison. View "State v. Kass" on Justia Law

Terence Nero was charged with burglary, a class three felony. Nero waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial followed. The district court declined to make a specific finding regarding which felony it determined Nero had intended to commit to support the charge of burglary. The court found Nero guilty of burglary, and Nero appealed the conviction. At issue was whether the state is required to specify the underlying felony it seeks to prove to support a charge of burglary. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) because the state did not specify the underlying felony it sought to prove, Nero was deprived of an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution; (2) because Nero's right to notice was prejudiced, the district court's denial of Nero's motion for a bill of particulars was not harmless error, and therefore the judgment should be reversed; and (3) the totality of the evidence admitted by the district court was sufficient to sustain Nero's conviction, and therefore the Double Jeopardy Clause does not forbid a retrial. Remanded. View "State v. Nero" on Justia Law

Eleazar Oceguera was convicted of DUI and operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. At the sentencing and enhancement hearing the State offered three certified copies of prior convictions, the first of which was for driving under revocation. The district court found the three exhibits were valid prior convictions of DUI. The State agreed that the district court erred and filed a motion for remand, which the court of appeals denied. At issue was whether the Supreme Court should remand the case for sentencing on DUI or remand for a new enhancement hearing. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred when it used a prior conviction for driving under revocation to enhance Oreguera's sentence for DUI; (2) the restrictions of 29-231.01 or 29-2316, which contain a stringent double jeopardy provision, are inapplicable in this case; and (3) because this case is more analogous to habitual criminal cases where the Court has remanded for a new enhancement hearing when the State has failed to produce sufficient evidence of the requisite prior convictions, the same procedure should be used here. Vacated and remanded with directions. View "State v. Oceguera" on Justia Law

Defendant Roy Ellis was convicted of first-degree murder in connection with the killing of a 12-year old girl. For this, he was sentenced to death. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court. Although many issues were presented on appeal, the primary issue for the Court to decide was whether the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence of Defendant's "prior bad acts," and whether that evidence prejudiced him. Defendant argued that the district court erred by allowing evidence of prior sexual assaults to his stepdaughters, and abused its discretion by denying two mistrial requests when that evidence was ultimately admitted. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and concluded that Defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. The Court found no merit to his other claims, and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence.

In 2008, Appellant Mauro Yos-Chiguil pled nolo contendere to murder and assault charges. The Court of Appeals dismissed his direct appeal as untimely. Appellant unsuccessfully sought relief under the state's immigration advisement statute. Appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court for post-conviction relief. He argued that the district court denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review most of Appellant's claims because they were included in his "untimely" appeal. The only claim the Court could review pertained to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court believed that claim alleged sufficient facts to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Lancaster County Mental Health Board (Board) determined that D.H. was a âdangerous sex offenderâ within the meaning of the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA) and should be committed for inpatient treatment. The determination was affirmed on appeal to the district court. D.H. appealed, arguing that the district court erred in affirming the Boardâs order for multiple reasons. The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented before the Board and the district court sufficient to support D.H.âs commitment. The Court affirmed the order of the Board and decision of the district court.