Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A holdover franchisee is a franchisee who receives the benefits of an expired franchise agreement but fails to make payments to the franchisor per the agreement. Donut Holdings, Inc. (DHI) was the Nebraska parent corporation of LaMar’s Donuts International, Inc. (LaMar’s). LaMar’s was a franchise company with nine franchisees, including one in Springfield Missouri that was purchased by Risberg Stores, LLC, a Missouri entity, in 2002. At the time of the purchase, the store was operating under the terms of a 1994 franchise agreement entered into by Risberg Store’s predecessor. DHI filed a claim against Risberg Stores for royalty and marketing fees accruing after June 2009. Risberg Stores argued that it did not owe DHI fees because the parties’ written agreement ended in 2004. The district court ruled in favor of Risberg Stores, concluding that the franchise agreement ended in June 2009 and that DHI was not entitled to any payments thereafter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) DHI, the franchisor, did not have a breach of contract claim against Risberg Stores, the holdover franchisee; and (2) therefore, DHI was not entitled to fees under the contract. View "Donut Holdings, Inc. v. Risberg" on Justia Law

At the center of this dispute was defective rebar that was incorporated into the construction of concrete pile caps that would form support for the Pinnacle Bank Arena. Some of the pile caps had to be modified in order to provide the necessary structural support for the Arena. The general contractor paid the costs of the correction and sought reimbursement from Drake-Williams Steel, Inc. (DWS), which fabricated the rebar. DWS reimbursed the general contractor and sought coverage from its insurers. The insurers denied the claim and commenced this action to determine their obligations under the policies of insurance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no coverage under the policies. View "Drake-Williams Steel, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co." on Justia Law

RM Campbell Industrial, Inc. entered into a contract with Randall Kramer for construction work on an ethanol plant. The terms of the contract indicated that the contract was between Campbell and KL Process Design Group, LLC. Midwest Renewable Energy, LLC, paid the invoices. When Midwest stopped making payments and KL Process ceased work on the project, Campbell filed suit against Midwest for breach of contract. After a trial, the jury found for Campbell in the amount of $154,510.98. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) concluding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury question in whether KL Process acted as an agent of Midwest in entering into the subcontract with Campbell and whether there was an enforceable contract between Midwest and Campbell; and (2) not finding that Campbell had to prove substantial compliance with the subcontract and not instructing the jury on this. View "RM Campbell Indus. v. Midwest Renewable Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

The Weitz Company, LLC, a general contractor, submitted a bid on a planned nursing facility. Weitz’s bid incorporated the amount of a bid submitted to Weitz by H&S Plumbing and Heating for the plumbing work and the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning parts of the job. The project owner awarded the project to Weitz, but H&S reneged on its bid. Weitz used other subcontractors to complete the project at greater expense. Weitz later sued H&S, claiming breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The court determined that the parties had not formed a contract but enforced H&S’s bid under promissory estoppel, awarding Weitz damages of $292,492. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and the amount of damages, holding that the district court did not err by entering a judgment for Weitz on its promissory estoppel claim and correctly measured Weitz’s damages. View "Weitz Co., LLC v. Hands, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s employment as captain in the Washington County sheriff’s office was terminated after an investigation into his conduct. Plaintiff filed suit against the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 36 and Michael Robinson, the County sheriff, alleging (1) as against Lodge No. 36, breach of contract arising from the Lodge’s refusal to provide representation after he requested it, and (2) as against Robinson, interference with a business relationship, alleging that Robinson obstructed the Lodge’s ability to fulfill its duty of fair representation. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to file a grievance and in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) did not err in finding that Plaintiff was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. View "Lamb v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 36" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s employment as captain in the Washington County sheriff’s office was terminated after an investigation into his conduct. Plaintiff filed suit against the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 36 and Michael Robinson, the County sheriff, alleging (1) as against Lodge No. 36, breach of contract arising from the Lodge’s refusal to provide representation after he requested it, and (2) as against Robinson, interference with a business relationship, alleging that Robinson obstructed the Lodge’s ability to fulfill its duty of fair representation. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to file a grievance and in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) did not err in finding that Plaintiff was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. View "Lamb v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 36" on Justia Law

The Omaha Police Officers Association (Union) and the City of Omaha (City) entered into a collective bargaining agreement that was to remain in effect from 2008 until 2013. In 2014, the Union filed a complaint against the City requesting that the district court declare that the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the City had rolled over to the 2014 calendar year. In support of its complaint, the Union claimed that the City did not timely provide written notice of its intent to negotiate or modify the terms of the contract for 2014. The City, in turn, argued that the Union’s action was barred by the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel. The district court granted summary judgment to the Union. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City failed to establish the required elements of equitable estoppel; (2) the Union did not waive its stated intention to allow the Contract to extend for another year; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the parties to pay their own attorney fees. View "Omaha Police Union Local 101 v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a commercial dairy operation, sued Defendants, the manufacturer of a microprocessor-based milking control unit and the dealer of the unit, alleging breach of express and implied warranties and negligence and seeking damages for the allegedly negligent and defective installation and programming of its unit. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that improper settings caused the milking units to detach while under significant vacuum, thereby harming the teats of the dairy cows and lowering milk production. The district court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff did not rebut Defendants’ prima facie case that mechanic components of the milking system maintained by Plaintiff and not part of the microprocessor-based control unit were the proximate cause of the alleged damages. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, as Plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a jury could determine that the unit was the proximate cause of the alleged injury to Plaintiff’s cows; but (2) reversed the district court’s order granting prejudgment interest on the dealer’s counterclaim, as there was a reasonable controversy over Plaintiff’s right to recover. View "Roskop Dairy, LLC v. GEA Farm Techs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, homeowners, brought this action against Defendants, the company that constructed Plaintiffs’ home and the developer of the lot on which the home was built, alleging negligent construction of the home. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-223. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed as to the developer but reversed as to the construction company, finding the action against it was not barred by section 25-223. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to affirm the judgment of the district court, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the statute of limitations began to run on Plaintiffs’ claims at the expiration of the express one-year limited warranty issued by the construction company instead of the date the home was substantially completed. View "Adams v. Manchester Park" on Justia Law

Rent-A-Roofer, Inc. (Appellant) settled a lawsuit filed by the National Research Corporation (NRC) without notifying its insurer, Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Company (the Insurer), of the lawsuit. Appellant later notified the Insurer of its involvement in litigation and made a demand under Appellant’s policy with the Insurer. The Insurer declined coverage on the grounds that Appellant breached the policy’s notice provision and the voluntary payments provision. Appellant subsequently brought this action against the Insurer, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. The district court granted summary judgment for the Insurer. The district court first concluded that for an insurer to deny coverage based on breach of a voluntary settlement condition, the insurer must show prejudice in connection with its claim. The court then ruled that, where Appellant failed to meet both the notice and voluntary payments provisions, prejudice had been established as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that the Insurer was not liable for settlement by NRC against Appellant and not liable for Appellant’s defense costs. View "Rent-A-Roofer v. Farm Bureau Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law