Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Omaha Police Officers Association (Union) and the City of Omaha (City) entered into a collective bargaining agreement that was to remain in effect from 2008 until 2013. In 2014, the Union filed a complaint against the City requesting that the district court declare that the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the City had rolled over to the 2014 calendar year. In support of its complaint, the Union claimed that the City did not timely provide written notice of its intent to negotiate or modify the terms of the contract for 2014. The City, in turn, argued that the Union’s action was barred by the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel. The district court granted summary judgment to the Union. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City failed to establish the required elements of equitable estoppel; (2) the Union did not waive its stated intention to allow the Contract to extend for another year; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the parties to pay their own attorney fees. View "Omaha Police Union Local 101 v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a commercial dairy operation, sued Defendants, the manufacturer of a microprocessor-based milking control unit and the dealer of the unit, alleging breach of express and implied warranties and negligence and seeking damages for the allegedly negligent and defective installation and programming of its unit. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that improper settings caused the milking units to detach while under significant vacuum, thereby harming the teats of the dairy cows and lowering milk production. The district court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff did not rebut Defendants’ prima facie case that mechanic components of the milking system maintained by Plaintiff and not part of the microprocessor-based control unit were the proximate cause of the alleged damages. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, as Plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a jury could determine that the unit was the proximate cause of the alleged injury to Plaintiff’s cows; but (2) reversed the district court’s order granting prejudgment interest on the dealer’s counterclaim, as there was a reasonable controversy over Plaintiff’s right to recover. View "Roskop Dairy, LLC v. GEA Farm Techs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, homeowners, brought this action against Defendants, the company that constructed Plaintiffs’ home and the developer of the lot on which the home was built, alleging negligent construction of the home. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-223. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed as to the developer but reversed as to the construction company, finding the action against it was not barred by section 25-223. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to affirm the judgment of the district court, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the statute of limitations began to run on Plaintiffs’ claims at the expiration of the express one-year limited warranty issued by the construction company instead of the date the home was substantially completed. View "Adams v. Manchester Park" on Justia Law

Rent-A-Roofer, Inc. (Appellant) settled a lawsuit filed by the National Research Corporation (NRC) without notifying its insurer, Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Company (the Insurer), of the lawsuit. Appellant later notified the Insurer of its involvement in litigation and made a demand under Appellant’s policy with the Insurer. The Insurer declined coverage on the grounds that Appellant breached the policy’s notice provision and the voluntary payments provision. Appellant subsequently brought this action against the Insurer, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. The district court granted summary judgment for the Insurer. The district court first concluded that for an insurer to deny coverage based on breach of a voluntary settlement condition, the insurer must show prejudice in connection with its claim. The court then ruled that, where Appellant failed to meet both the notice and voluntary payments provisions, prejudice had been established as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that the Insurer was not liable for settlement by NRC against Appellant and not liable for Appellant’s defense costs. View "Rent-A-Roofer v. Farm Bureau Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Otoe County School District 66-0111 (the District) and Facilities Cost Management Group, LLC (FCMG) entered into a contract whereby FCMG provided services in connection with the construction and renovation of three schools within the District. FCMG later filed suit against the District, alleging breach of contract for the District’s failure to pay the full amount due under the contract. The parties filed cross-motions for partially summary judgment on the issue of whether the contract was ambiguous, specifically sections 11.2 and 12.7. The district court determined that sections 12.7 and 11.2 were not ambiguous and granted summary judgment in favor of FCMG. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it determined that section 12.7 of the contract is not ambiguous, but the court erred when it determined that section 11.2 is not ambiguous; and (2) therefore, the district court committed prejudicial error when it instructed the jury that “the contract in this case is not ambiguous.” Remanded for a new trial. View "Facilities Cost Mgmt. Group v. Otoe Cty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2000, Employee began working for Employer on Employer's farmland. Employee alleged that Employer promised him eighty acres of farmland if he continued his employment for ten years. Although Employee worked for Employer for more than ten years, Employer never signed over the eighty acres to Employee and subsequently terminated Employee’s employment. Employee filed a complaint against Employer for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the part performance exception to the statute of frauds applied in this case and granted Employee specific performance of the contract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeal improperly relied upon Employee’s testimony as to his intent because to prove part performance, the alleged acts of performance must establish the exception without the aid of such testimony; but (2) there was other sufficient evidence to support the grant of specific performance in Employee’s favor. View "Ficke v. Wolken" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained injuries at a motel while he was on duty for Union Pacific Railroad Company. Plaintiff sued Union Pacific and the motel. The parties later settled. Thereafter, Union Pacific asserted a contractual right of subrogation to the extent of medical payments made on Plaintiff’s behalf by the Union Pacific Railroad Employees Health Systems. The contract created a lien or right of reimbursement if a third party is liable but not if Union Pacific is liable. The trial court concluded that Union Pacific did not have a valid lien, right of reimbursement or right of subrogation because it was party to the settlement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the unambiguous terms of the contract, Union Pacific did not have a lien or right of reimbursement. View "Kasel v. Union Pacific R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Castellar Partners LLC was retained by appellees (collectively, the AMP parties) to review a “hedge fund portfolio” and the services being provided by another advisor. Castella and one of the AMP parties - AMP Capital Investors Limited (AMPCI), a subsidiary of AMP incorporated in Australia - executed an “Advisory Agreement” under which Castellar was required to provide its services regarding the fund in exchange for certain fees. The AMP parties terminated their relationship with Castellar the next year. Castellar filed suit, alleging that the AMP parties had “recklessly and willfully” misled it in order to obtain its services with regard to the fund. The district court dismissed one of Castellar’s claims, concluding that due to a forum selection clause, the claim for breach of contract was required to be litigated in New South Wales, Australia. The district court certified the dismissal of that claim as a final judgment, and Castella appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the certification was improper, as Castellar’s claims entailed “similar issues” and “related facts,” and all of the parties remain involved in the litigation before the district court. View "Castellar Partners, LLC v. AMP Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff donated 159 acres of land to the Nebraska National Trails Museum Foundation (NNTM). At the time of the donation, NNTM leased the land back to Plaintiff and allowed him to farm the land. Plaintiff’s subsequent upgrades to the land caused the number of certified irrigated acres (CIAs) assigned to the land to almost double. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that NNTM would be unjustly enriched if it were allowed to maintain possession of the CIAs. The district court entered judgment in favor of NNTM. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that Plaintiff was not entitled to the CIAs; and (2) the district judge who heard the case did not err in not recusing himself from the proceedings after the judge had a conversation with the manager of another natural resources district regarding Plaintiff. View "Kalkowski v. Neb. Nat’l Trails Museum Found., Inc." on Justia Law

Chad Johnson and Stewart Minnick entered into an agreement whereby Johnson would purchase farmland he had been renting from Minnick and Minnick’s sister after Minnick’s death. The purchase price of the farmland was to be funded by an insurance policy owned by Johnson on Minnick’s life. After Minnick died, the insurer paid the policy proceeds to Johnson. Johnson tendered the the proceeds of the policy to the personal representative of Minnick’s estate, but the personal representative refused to convey the farmland. Johnson brought this action for specific performance and other relief. The district court concluded that the purchase agreement was unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed but under different reasoning from that of the district court, holding (1) the purchase agreement was not specifically enforceable as a matter of law because Johnson lacked an insurable interest in Minnick’s life; and (2) Johnson’s claim for damages was time barred. View "Johnson v. Nelson" on Justia Law