Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Shasta Linen Supply, a California corporation, applied for workers’ compensation insurance coverage from Applied Underwriters, a Nebraska corporation. Shasta accepted Applied’s proposed policy through an agreement entitled a Request to Bind Coverages & Services. On the same day, Shasta entered into a Reinsurance Participation Agreement (RPA) with Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company (AUCRA), Applied’s subsidiary and a British Virgin Islands corporation. The request to bind and the RPA contained conflicting provisions regarding the parties’ arbitration process for resolving disputes. After a dispute arose regarding the amount of money that Shasta owed to Applied, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) acknowledged receipt of AUCRA’s demand for arbitration. Shasta filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the request to bind required arbitration by "JAMS" in Omaha, Nebraska and injunctive relief from the AAA arbitration. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to decide which contract provision controlled and issued a temporary injunction and stay of the AAA arbitration until it decided the parties’ rights. Applied and AUCRA appealed, arguing that the court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the parties’ contract dispute and granting a temporary injunction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the court’s temporary injunction and stay was an interlocutory order that was not appealable. View "Shasta Linen Supply, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a franchisor of professional cleaning and maintenance services, granted Appellee a franchise in the Omaha, Nebraska area. After Appellant discovered that Appellee was diverting Appellant’s customers to his new business, Appellant terminated its relationship with Appellee. Appellant then filed this lawsuit against Appellee seeking to enforce and receive damages from the breach of the noncompete clause in the franchise agreement. The district court entered judgment for Appellee, concluding that the noncompete clause included an unreasonable restraint on competition. In so ruling, the court refused to sever the offending subpart from the larger noncompete clause. The Supreme Court affirmed after reaffirming its stance against severability of noncompete clauses, holding that the noncompete covenant was invalid and unenforceable and that the district court correctly refused to sever the offending subpart from the larger noncompete clause. View "Unlimited Opportunity, Inc. v. Waadah" on Justia Law

Buyers purchased a building from Seller that had formerly been leased as a dental clinic. Buyers planned to transform the building into their personal residence. After the parties closed on the property, Buyers discovered that the interior doors had been removed. Buyers commenced a small claims action against Seller seeking damages or the return of the property. The county court entered judgment in favor of Buyers. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of merger was inapplicable in this case because Seller had a duty to disclose that the interior doors would be removed, and Seller’s nondisclosure amounted to a misrepresentation; (2) the doors were fixtures rather than trade fixtures and thus were not removable by the former tenant; and (3) the county court’s award of damages was supported by competent evidence. View "Griffith v. Drew’s LLC" on Justia Law

Kyle Kercher sued the Board of Regents at the University of Nebraska and the University of Nebraska at Omaha (collectively, “the University”), alleging that the University breached his employment contract when it removed him from his appointed professorship that he alleged was a part of his tenured appointment as a faculty member. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Kercher on the issue of liability. Damages were stipulated by the parties, save for the issue of attorney fees. The University appealed the judgment against it, and Kercher cross-appealed the district court’s order awarding him attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted Kercher’s motion for partial summary judgment and did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorney fees for Kercher. View "Kercher v. Board of Regents" on Justia Law

William Gross executed an agreement with David Fiala, Ltd. (FuturesOne) setting forth the terms of Gross’ employment with FuturesOne. The agreement contained an arbitration provision. FuturesOne later filed a complaint against Gross and three other individuals who had signed similar agreements with FuturesOne, alleging that after the defendants had resigned from FuturesOne they failed to pay amounts owed to FuturesOne and violated the agreement by competing with FuturesOne. Gross moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the claims in this action were not subject to arbitration under the arbitration provision of the agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred as a matter of law when it failed to determine that the arbitration provision was ambiguous and to thereafter resolve the ambiguity by considering appropriate extrinsic evidence. Remanded. View "David Fiala Ltd. v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Synergy4 Enterprises, Inc. brought an action against Pinnacle Bank on claims of promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud, alleging that Pinnacle Bank caused damages by orally assuring Synergy4 that Pinnacle would provide a $1 million credit line and then only providing $400,000 provided for in a commitment letter. The district court sustained Pinnacle’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Synergy4’s claims were barred by Nebraska’s credit agreement statute of frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Synergy4’s claims were based on a credit agreement that was not in writing, they were barred by Nebraska’s credit agreement statute of frauds. View "Synergy4 Enters., Inc. v. Pinnacle Bank" on Justia Law

Buyer entered into a contract with Seller under which Buyer agreed to purchase certain product manufactured by Seller. Buyer rarely purchased the contractual amount of 2,500 tons of product per month. Seller field an amended complaint against Seller, claiming breach of contract and alleging that Buyer’s failure to comply with the contract forced Seller to sell over 9,000 tons of product at prices significantly below the price Seller was guaranteed by the contract. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Seller, concluding, as a matter of law, that Buyer materially breached the contract. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the district court regarding Buyer’s liability for its material breach of the contract; but (2) reversed the court’s award of damages and prejudgment interest, holding that the court erred in awarding damages and prejudgment interest at the summary judgment stage due the existence of questions of fact relevant to Seller’s losses. Remanded. View "Siouxland Ethanol, LLC v. Sebade Bros., LLC" on Justia Law

A Landlord leased separate properties to two different sets of Tenants using nearly identical written documents. This appeal concerned a dispute between the Landlord and Tenants regarding whether the leases were enforceable for their stated five-year terms or whether a clause providing for “annual review of rental rates” resulted in unenforceable “agreements to agree.” The Landlord sued the Tenants in separate actions, seeking a declaratory judgment to determine its rights under the leases. The district court concluded that the leases were valid and enforceable for their five-year terms. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the terms of the leases were clear and unambiguous and contemplated only an annual review without requiring an annual agreement. View "Gibbons Ranches, LLC v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Appellee was employed by Appellant on two separate occasions. On each occasion, Appellee signed a noncompete agreement. After Appellee’s second term of employment ended he filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the noncompete agreements were unenforceable. The district court entered declaratory judgment in favor of Appellee, determining that the noncompete agreements were unreasonable and unenforceable because the scope of the noncompete agreements was greater than reasonably necessary to protect Appellant against unfair competition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the applicable noncompete agreement was greater than reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of Appellant and was therefore unreasonable and unenforceable. View "Gaver v. Schneider’s O.K. Tire Co." on Justia Law

Jack Irwin owed a warehouse that Shade rented to store personal property. West Gate Bank held notes payable from Shade that were secured by Shade’s personal property. Shade later defaulted on the notes. Irwin and West Gate subsequently agreed to move Shade’s personal property pursuant to an “Abandonment” document. When Shade filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved distribution of the proceeds in Shade’s personal property to West Gate, concluding that the Abandonment document was not an assignment or release of West Gate’s perfected security interest. Thereafter, Irwin filed this action against West Bank in district court alleging that West Gate breached its obligations under the Abandonment document by failing to pay the proceeds to Irwin. The district curt entered judgment in favor of West Gate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s determination regarding the preclusive effect of the bankruptcy court’s ruling with respect to an assignment or release of West Gate’s security interest in Shade’s property was not relevant to this appeal; and (2) the district court did not err in concluding that the Abandonment document was not an enforceable contract or a warranty.View "Irwin v. West Gate Bank" on Justia Law