Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, the district court filed a decree dissolving the marriage of Brenda Rice and Dale Rice that incorporated a property settlement agreement (“agreement”) previously entered into by the parties. Dale died one week later. At the time of his death, Dale owned two life insurance policies, both of which listed Brenda as the primary beneficiary. Brenda subsequently filed claims for the proceeds of the policies. The personal representative of Dale’s estate moved to enforce the dissolution decree, claiming that under the agreement, Brenda relinquished her beneficiary interests in the life insurance policies. The district court ordered Brenda to withdraw her claims under the policies and to renounce her rights to any property or interest in Dale’s estate and proceeds from any insurance policies on Dale’s life. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, Brenda relinquished all rights to Dale’s life insurance policies in the agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce decree; and (2) therefore, the district court did not err when it enforced the dissolution decree and ordered Brenda to withdraw claims to Dale’s life insurance policies.View "Rice v. Web" on Justia Law

William Weber and Dixie Weber irrigated eight tracts of water from the upper Taylor-Ord Canal under contract with North Loup Public Power and Irrigation District. In June 2010, flooding occurred that destroyed a diversion dam that North Loup had utilized to deliver water to irrigators. Due to the extent of the damage, North Loup concluded that water would not be provided to irrigators on the upper Canal during the 2010 irrigation season. At the time of the flooding, the Webers had not yet paid their 2010 irrigation charges. The Webers sued North Loup, alleging breach of contract and negligence and claiming damages resulting from reduced crop yields. The district court granted summary judgment for North Loup, concluding that because the Webers had not paid the 2010 irrigation charges, North Loup had no duty under the contracts to deliver water to the Webers during 2010. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Webers’ failure to pay was both a nonfulfillment of a condition and a material breach of contract that relieved North Loup of its duty to perform; and (2) the Webers’ negligence claim failed as a matter of law because North Loup owed no duty to the Webers. View "Weber v. N. Loup River Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

Appellees, husband and wife, entered into an agreement with Appellant under which Appellees were to purchase Appellant’s undivided one-third interest in a 160-acre parcel of real estate. Appellant subsequently backed out of the purchase agreement, and Appellees filed a breach of contract action against Appellant. A bench trial was held, at which time Appellant no longer had title to the property. The district court found in favor of Appellees and awarded damages, concluding that Appellant had breached the purchase agreement by refusing to sell her interest in the property to Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Appellant breached the purchase agreement and failing to find repudiation of the contract. View "Stauffer v. Benson" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1974, Douglas County’s retired employees paid the same amount as active employees for health insurance coverage. In 2009, the County Board of Commissioners adopted a resolution that charged retirees premiums that were higher than the rate paid by active employees. Shortly before the change was to take effect, retired employees of the County (Plaintiffs) sued the County. The district court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that equitable estoppel prohibited the County from increasing the premiums to be paid by the retirees above those paid by active employees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the retirees had no contractual right to pay the same premiums as active employees, the district court erred in using equitable estoppel to create such a contractual obligation. Remanded with direction to enter judgment for the County on Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Christiansen v. County of Douglas" on Justia Law

This case involved a parcel of real estate previously owned by Four H Land Company Limited Partnership (Four H). Four H twice applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a sand and gravel pit on the property. James Tierney and Jeffrey Tierney objected to the applications. To resolve their dispute, the Tierneys, Four H, and Western Engineering Company (Western), the operator of the sand and gravel pit, entered into an agreement in 1998 in which the Tierneys agreed to waive their right to appeal the issuance of the CUP, and Four H and Western accepted various conditions regarding operation of the sand and gravel pit. In 2009, the Tierneys brought an action for specific performance, alleging that Four H and Western had not fulfilled the conditions of the agreement. The district court dismissed the Tierneys’ complaint for specific performance, concluding that Four H and Western had not met the requirements of the 1998 CUP and the agreement but that specific performance was not an appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that specific performance was an appropriate remedy for Four H’s and Western’s breach, and the district court should have ordered it. Remanded. View "Tierney v. Four H Land Co. Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Russell Reichert sued Sherry Hara in small claims court, claiming that Hara owed him for a $4,000 loan he gave her. The court found the transaction was a loan and entered judgment for Reichert. Hara subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the district court, alleging that the $4,000 was a gift and not a loan. The district court dismissed Hara’s complaint, concluding that the action was barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) claim preclusion, but not issue preclusion, applies to small claims court judgments; and (2) the elements of claim preclusion were satisfied in this case, and therefore, the district court correctly dismissed Hara’s action. View "Hara v. Reichert" on Justia Law

Metropolitan Utilities District (MUD) distributes water and natural gas to businesses and residents in the Omaha metropolitan area. MUD contracts with Northern Natural Gas Company (Northern) to provide natural gas pipelines transportation services. In November 2012, MUD and Northern entered into an amendment to a contract providing that Northern would provide interstate natural gas transportation service to MUD for twenty years. Jason Bruno, an Omaha ratepayer and taxpayer who obtained gas and water services from MUD, sought a declaratory judgment that the 2012 amendment to the contract between MUD and Northern was void or voidable on the grounds that Neb. Rev. Stat. 14-2121 requires MUD to seek competitive bids for all contracts for work not performed by MUD employees. The district court determined that the statute does not require competitive bidding, but rather, grants MUD the discretion whether or not to go through the bidding process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that there was no statutory competitive bidding requirement with respect to the contract at issue. View "Bruno v. Metro. Utils. Dist." on Justia Law

Rick Wheeler had two liability insurance policies with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. Both Rick and his son Ryan were insureds under the policies. Both policies provided personal liability coverage and included exclusions for abuse and intentional injury. Both policies also contained a severability clause, which required that the insurance be applied separately to each insured. Joshua and Maren McCrary sued Rick and Ryan for Ryan’s alleged sexual assault of the McCrarys’ minor daughter. American Family filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that its policies did not provide liability coverage to Rick. The district court granted summary judgment to American Family. At issue on appeal was whether the severability clause changed the effect of, or rendered ambiguous, the exclusions that would otherwise bar coverage for Rick. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the severability clause did not affect the unambiguous language of the policies’ exclusions, which barred coverage for Rick. View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted with a shipper agent to move his household goods and personal property from Nebraska to Florida, but the movers who took possession of Plaintiff's property demanded additional payment before the property was delivered, and the property was never delivered to Florida or returned to Plaintiff. Plaintiff sought coverage under his homeowner's policy for loss of personal property due to theft. Insurer denied coverage, claiming that a theft had not occurred. Plaintiff sued Insurer for breach of contract and bad faith in denying the insurance claim. The district court granted summary judgment for Insurer, concluding that Plaintiff lost his property in a contractual dispute and that there was no showing of criminal intent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a theft occurred in this case. Remanded. View "Peterson v. Homesite Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Arlene Easter sold insurance for First Express Services Group, Inc. Arlene subsequently resigned from First Express and began to work for her son, Mark, who was a part owner of a competing agency. After resigning, Arlene took a customer list from First Express and transferred many of First Express' customers to Mark's agency. First Express sued Arlene for breach of contract and Arlene, Mark, and Mark's agency for misappropriation of trade secrets and unjust enrichment. After a jury trial, judgment was rendered for First Express on all claims. The Supreme Court (1) modified the judgment against Arlene, finding that Arlene was liable only for the portion of the judgment attributed by the district court to the breach of contract claim; and (2) reversed the judgment against Mark, holding that Mark was not liable for either misappropriation of trade secrets or unjust enrichment. View "First Express Servs. Group, Inc. v. Easter" on Justia Law