Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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The defendant was charged with two counts of theft by shoplifting, third or subsequent offense, after stealing sunglasses from an optometrist’s office, and an additional count of resisting arrest. He ultimately pled guilty to one count of theft by shoplifting, with the other charges dismissed as part of a plea agreement. At sentencing, the court considered evidence of his prior convictions, making the current offense a Class IV felony. The defendant requested a continuance to attend inpatient substance abuse treatment, citing recent efforts to address his addiction, but the court denied the request, noting inconsistencies in his statements about substance use and skepticism about his motives.Previously, the District Court for Lancaster County accepted the defendant’s guilty plea, found him guilty, and, after an enhancement and sentencing hearing, sentenced him to a determinate term of two years’ imprisonment. The court found substantial and compelling reasons why probation was not appropriate, including the defendant’s criminal history, risk of reoffending, and doubts about his sincerity regarding treatment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying his motion for a continuance, failing to follow statutory requirements for sentencing, and not providing required advisements.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion, as the defendant failed to show prejudice and had control over the timing of his treatment efforts. The court also found that the district court sufficiently stated its reasoning for denying probation and imposing imprisonment, and that any errors in failing to provide advisements were forfeited and, in any event, harmless. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "State v. Dawn" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case concerns a man who was convicted of first degree murder for killing his wife in 2023. On the night of the incident, the couple went out to dinner and then to a bar, where both consumed alcohol. The husband became angry, accusing his wife of infidelity. After leaving the bar together, they returned home, where two altercations occurred. The next day, the wife was found dead on the bedroom floor, having suffered blunt force head injuries and manual strangulation. The husband admitted to hitting her but denied intending to kill her, and claimed not to remember strangling her. Forensic evidence indicated defensive wounds on the victim, and the husband’s statements and injuries were consistent with him being the aggressor.The District Court for Hamilton County held a jury trial, during which the prosecution introduced evidence of the husband’s prior acts of domestic abuse: one incident in 1997 involving his ex-wife, and another in 2015 involving the victim. The court found these prior acts were proved by clear and convincing evidence and admitted them for purposes other than propensity, such as intent and motive, providing limiting instructions to the jury. The jury found the husband guilty of first degree murder, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment, initially granting credit for time served. The defendant appealed, challenging the admission of prior bad acts evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence for premeditation, the refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense, and the denial of a change of venue.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior bad acts evidence, as it was relevant for proper purposes and not unduly prejudicial. The court also found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of premeditation, and that a self-defense instruction was not warranted by the evidence. The denial of a change of venue was upheld. However, the Supreme Court found plain error in granting credit for time served against a life sentence and modified the sentence to eliminate that credit, affirming the judgment as modified. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The defendant in this case was on federal supervised release when he absconded, leading to the issuance of a federal warrant for his arrest. Upon being located and arrested in Nebraska, drugs were found in his possession, resulting in state drug charges. After his arrest, he was initially held in a county jail but was soon transferred to federal custody. While in federal custody, Nebraska authorities charged him with a state offense and obtained a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to temporarily transfer him from federal to state custody for prosecution and sentencing on the state charge. He spent 638 days in the county jail under this arrangement before being sentenced in state court.The District Court for Lancaster County considered whether the defendant should receive credit against his state sentence for the time spent in county jail while he was “borrowed” from federal custody. Defense counsel requested such credit, but both the court and counsel acknowledged uncertainty about whether the time should be credited to the state or federal sentence. The district court ultimately declined to award any credit for time served, finding no clear basis in the record to attribute the time exclusively to the state case. The defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment to run consecutively to any other sentences, with no credit for time served.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the statutory and common law principles governing credit for time served, particularly in cases involving multiple sovereigns. The court held that when a defendant is borrowed from federal custody under a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the primary jurisdiction remains with the federal authorities, and any credit for time served during that period is attributable only to the federal sentence, not the state sentence. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny credit for time served on the state sentence. View "State v. Leatherwood" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involved a defendant who was charged with first degree sexual assault of a child, incest with a person under age 18, and tampering with physical evidence. The victim was the defendant’s daughter, who was under 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident. The events in question occurred in the early morning hours, when the child’s mother observed the defendant leaving the children’s bedroom and later questioned her daughter, leading to a disclosure of sexual abuse. The mother examined the child and noticed redness, and the child was subsequently taken to a hospital and a child advocacy center for examination and forensic interviews. The defendant pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.The District Court for Douglas County presided over the trial. During the proceedings, the defense objected to certain hearsay testimony and to questions by the prosecution regarding a separate alleged incident of sexual assault. The court overruled some hearsay objections and sustained others, but did not provide limiting instructions or grant a mistrial. The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree sexual assault of a child and incest, but not guilty of tampering with evidence. The court sentenced the defendant to consecutive prison terms within statutory limits. The defendant, represented by new counsel at sentencing, appealed, raising issues including sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial misconduct, sentencing, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, as the child’s testimony and corroborating circumstances met the required elements. The court found that any hearsay admitted was cumulative and its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct were reviewed for plain error due to lack of a mistrial motion, and no plain error was found. The sentences were within statutory limits and not an abuse of discretion. The court found the record insufficient to resolve two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but rejected the others. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "State v. Hagens" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case concerns a father whose two young children were found dead in his Nebraska home during his court-ordered visitation week. The children’s mother, living in Illinois, became alarmed after missing scheduled video calls and being unable to reach the father. Welfare checks by police initially did not result in entry to the home, but friends of the mother later entered and discovered the children deceased in their beds. The father was located and arrested in California, where he had interactions with two Catholic priests and made statements to law enforcement. The autopsies determined the children died from asphyxia due to smothering.The District Court for Sarpy County conducted a jury trial, during which the father was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to consecutive life terms. The defense raised multiple pretrial and trial objections, including challenges to the admission of 911 calls, body camera footage, and statements to priests and police, as well as concerns about juror impartiality, media coverage, and the defendant’s competency following a medical incident during trial. The court overruled these objections and denied motions for mistrial and new trial. The defense also objected to the sentencing process, and the State argued that the trial court erred by granting credit for time served against the life sentences.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions and consecutive life sentences, but modified the sentence to remove credit for time served, holding that such credit is not permitted against a life sentence. The court found no abuse of discretion or reversible error in the admission of evidence, handling of juror and media issues, or in the court’s rulings on competency and mistrial motions. The court also held that the defendant’s statements to law enforcement were voluntary and not obtained in violation of Miranda rights, and that any privilege regarding statements to clergy was either waived or, if error, harmless. View "State v. Price" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involved a defendant who was convicted of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and first-offense driving under the influence. The defendant, who had a prior felony conviction, was found driving a borrowed vehicle that became stuck on railroad tracks. Law enforcement responded, conducted DUI tests, and allowed a passenger to search the vehicle for his keys and phone due to extreme cold. During this search, an officer assisted and discovered a firearm in the center console. The prosecution also introduced Facebook messages, purportedly sent by the defendant, to establish knowing possession of the firearm.The District Court for Lancaster County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearm, finding that the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle based on the odor of marijuana. The court also admitted the Facebook messages into evidence, overruling objections regarding foundation, hearsay, and the Confrontation Clause. On appeal, the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the search was constitutional under both the consent and automobile exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that the Facebook messages were properly authenticated and admissible.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the admissibility of the firearm and Facebook messages. The court held that the officer’s search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a community caretaking function, not based on the passenger’s consent or the automobile exception. The court also held that user-generated social media records are not self-authenticating business records under Nebraska’s evidence rules, but found that the Facebook messages were sufficiently authenticated and admissible as statements by a party opponent. The court further found no Confrontation Clause violation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the convictions was affirmed. View "State v. Falcon" on Justia Law

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A woman was involved in a car accident in which her passenger suffered severe injuries. She admitted to consuming alcohol and marijuana before driving, and chemical tests confirmed her blood alcohol content was above the legal limit. The passenger was hospitalized in a vegetative state and died several months after the accident. Initially, the woman was charged and convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) resulting in serious bodily injury, for which she received a sentence of incarceration, post-release supervision, and license revocation.After the passenger’s death, the State charged her with motor vehicle homicide while operating under the influence. She argued that this subsequent prosecution violated her double jeopardy rights. The District Court for Douglas County agreed and dismissed the new charge, finding the two offenses to be the same under the Blockburger v. United States test. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court, referencing Diaz v. United States, reversed that decision, holding that double jeopardy did not bar the second prosecution because the death, a necessary element of the more serious charge, had not occurred at the time of the first prosecution.On remand, the district court held a bench trial and found her guilty of motor vehicle homicide/DUI, relying on expert testimony that the collision was the proximate cause of the passenger’s death. The court sentenced her to probation, to run concurrently with any other sentence. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the expert testimony was admissible, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, and that cumulative punishment for both offenses was permitted because the legislature clearly authorized it. The court affirmed her conviction and sentence. View "State v. Lewis" on Justia Law

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On July 30, 2020, two individuals, Michael Harbour and Nicole Hatten, were shot and killed in the parking lot of a hotel in Omaha, Nebraska. John L. Parks, Sr., was seen on surveillance video with the victims shortly before the shootings. A subsequent search of Parks’ hotel room uncovered a firearm and cocaine. Parks was charged with two counts of first degree murder and several related felonies. Initially represented by appointed counsel, Parks’ case involved multiple pretrial motions, including several continuances and motions to depose witnesses, some of which Parks later claimed were made without his knowledge or consent. Parks also sought personal access to discovery materials while incarcerated, which was denied.The District Court for Douglas County granted the continuances, finding that Parks’ counsel had confirmed Parks’ understanding and consent to tolling his speedy trial rights. Parks later retained new counsel, who also filed pretrial motions and requested further continuances. On the eve of trial, Parks moved for absolute discharge, arguing that his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights had been violated because delays from his counsel’s motions should not be attributed to him. The district court denied the motion, attributing the delays to Parks and finding no violation of his rights. Parks appealed, and the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the delays were properly excluded and that Parks’ claims regarding his statutory speedy trial rights were without merit. The court also found it lacked jurisdiction to consider his constitutional speedy trial claims on interlocutory appeal.On further appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that Parks’ statutory speedy trial claims were foreclosed by the law-of-the-case doctrine, as they had been conclusively resolved in the prior appeal. The Court further held that Parks had permanently waived his statutory speedy trial rights by seeking discharge and pursuing an interlocutory appeal, which resulted in a trial date outside the statutory period. The Court also found no violation of Parks’ constitutional speedy trial rights, as the delays were attributable to defense motions and not to the State or the court. The denial of Parks’ motions for personal access to discovery and for a mistrial were upheld, and his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were rejected. The Supreme Court affirmed Parks’ convictions. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The defendant was charged with first-degree murder, discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle, and two counts of using a firearm to commit a felony. The charges stemmed from a shooting incident where two vehicles were struck by gunfire, resulting in one death and one injury. The defendant claimed self-defense, stating that he fired shots after being shot at first. Law enforcement found multiple firearms and shell casings at the scene, and the defendant was interviewed after being detained.The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress statements made during his custodial interrogation, finding that he had not effectively invoked his right to counsel and that his statements were voluntary. The court also denied the defendant's motion challenging the jury panel's racial composition, concluding there was no systematic exclusion of minorities in the jury selection process.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that even if the defendant had invoked his right to counsel, he reinitiated the conversation with law enforcement, and his Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's sentencing, which was within statutory limits and considered relevant factors.The main holdings were that the defendant's statements were admissible, the jury selection process did not systematically exclude minorities, and the sentences imposed were not excessive. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "State v. Sutton" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Jacob Edward Dolinar was charged with various drug offenses in the county court, and the case was later bound over to the district court, where an information was filed on November 16, 2021. Dolinar initially entered a plea of not guilty but later withdrew it and filed a plea in bar, which the district court overruled. Dolinar appealed this decision, and the appellate court affirmed the district court's order on September 15, 2023, issuing a mandate on October 16, 2023. The district court entered its judgment on the mandate on January 31, 2024, and set the trial for June 24, 2024. Dolinar filed a motion for absolute discharge on June 17, 2024, arguing that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.The district court overruled Dolinar's motion for absolute discharge, finding that the State had shown sufficient excludable time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a). The court identified various proceedings and calculated the number of excludable days, concluding that a total of 715 days were excludable, extending the last day for trial beyond the statutory 6-month period. The court also found that Dolinar had waived his right to a speedy trial under § 29-1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory period.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order, holding that Dolinar was deemed to have waived his right to a speedy trial under § 29-1207(4)(b) when he requested a continuance on March 25, 2022, which extended the trial date beyond the statutory 6-month period. The court found that the district court had properly advised Dolinar of his right to a speedy trial and the consequences of waiving it, and that Dolinar had voluntarily waived his right. The court concluded that the State had met its burden of showing sufficient excludable time periods and that Dolinar was not entitled to absolute discharge. View "State v. Dolinar" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law