Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Because third degree sexual assault is not a lesser-included offense of first degree sexual assault, the juvenile court erred in adjudicating Jordan B. based on its finding that he committed third degree sexual assault when the only law violation alleged in the petition was first degree sexual assault.The county attorney filed a petition asking the juvenile court to adjudicate Jordan as a juvenile who committed an act that would constitute a felony pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(2). The felony alleged was first degree sexual assault, as described in Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-319. The juvenile court found that the State failed to prove Jordan committed acts constituting first degree sexual assault as charged. Nevertheless, the court raised sua sponte the “lesser included offense” of third degree sexual assault and adjudicated Jordan as a child within the meaning of section 43-247(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court adjudicated Jordan on grounds for which he had no notice, in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Nebraska and United States Constitutions. View "In re Interest of Jordan B." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal from a sentence imposing both imprisonment and postrelease supervision was the fees and payments required under the postrelease supervision order.Defendant entered a no contest plea to a felony. The district court imposed a sentence of one year in prison followed by eighteen months of postrelease supervision. The court ordered Defendant to pay a number of fees in connection with the postrelease supervision, including an administrative enrollment fee, a monthly programming fee, and a monthly fee for chemical testing. The court also ordered Defendant to pay costs associated with any counseling, evaluations, or treatment undertaken at the direction of Defendant’s postrelease supervision officer. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by imposing costs and fees of postrelease supervision upon her. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its imposition of conditions of postrelease supervision regarding fees and payments. View "State v. Dill" on Justia Law

At issue was whether Defendant implicitly consented to a mistrial and, if not, whether there was manifest necessity for a mistrial.In this criminal case, the trial court declared a mistrial after determining that defense counsel’s questioning of a witness was improper and that the prejudice could not be remedied by a curative jury instruction. Defense counsel did not explicitly object to a mistrial but apologized for the improper questioning and presented for the court’s consideration three cases where curative instructions were held to be sufficient to remedy improper references to inadmissible evidence. Defendant then filed a plea in bar alleging that there was no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. The court denied the plea in bar on the ground that manifest necessity justified the mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that Defendant consented to the mistrial, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying the plea in bar. View "State v. Leon-Simaj" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences for first degree murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm, and other crimes, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court’s instruction regarding transferred intent, when read with all the instructions, did not misstate the law; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm; and (3) Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were either without merit or could not be determined based on the record. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for operating a motor vehicle during a time of suspension, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia.Defendant was sentenced to a combined twenty-two to twenty-two months’ imprisonment with periods of postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences as modified, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to relief on her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the district court improperly imposed an indeterminate sentence where the applicable statutes for the convictions on three of the counts require determinate sentences. View "State v. Vanness" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court vacating Defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) and granting him a new trial on the grounds that his warrantless blood draw was unlawful and inadmissible in light of Birchfield v. North Dakota, __ U.S. _ (2016).After Defendant’s issues on appeal to the district court had been briefed, the United States Supreme Court released its opinion in Birchfield. Based on Birchfield, the district court reversed the conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred by vacating Defendant’s DUI conviction without considering whether his blood draw was voluntary or whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied; and (2) the good faith exception applied to the pre-Birchfield warrantless blood draw in this case, and therefore, the district court erred in reversing Defendant’s conviction and vacating his sentence. View "State v. Hatfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s sentence of seventy years to life imprisonment imposed for a murder he committed at the age of fourteen.Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder. In 1988, the district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the murder conviction. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to the decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The district court vacated Defendant’s sentence. At the time of resentencing, Defendant was forty-four years old. The district court sentenced Defendant to seventy years’ to life imprisonment for first degree murder. Defendant’s primary complaint on appeal was that his sentence was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentence was not excessive, did not amount to a de facto life sentence, and was not disproportionate to the offense. Defendant’s remaining claims of error were similarly unavailing. View "State v. Thieszen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s sentence of seventy years to life imprisonment imposed for a murder he committed at the age of fourteen.Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder. In 1988, the district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the murder conviction. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to the decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The district court vacated Defendant’s sentence. At the time of resentencing, Defendant was forty-four years old. The district court sentenced Defendant to seventy years’ to life imprisonment for first degree murder. Defendant’s primary complaint on appeal was that his sentence was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentence was not excessive, did not amount to a de facto life sentence, and was not disproportionate to the offense. Defendant’s remaining claims of error were similarly unavailing. View "State v. Thieszen" on Justia Law

The district court did not err when it used Defendant’s Missouri conviction as a prior conviction to enhance his sentences for his present driving under the influence (DUI) convictions.In each of these separate cases, Defendant pled guilty to three DUI charges. With regard to each conviction, Defendant was found to have had two prior convictions as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.02(1)(a). On appeal, Defendant argued that a prior conviction in Missouri should not have been used for purposes of enhancing his sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s use of the Missouri conviction as a prior conviction in these cases was not in error; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant in these cases. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

The stop of Defendant’s vehicle for the purpose of gathering information about the presence of stolen firearms and other criminal activity at the residence Defendant drove from, for which a search warrant was being sought, did not violate Defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Nebraska Constitution.The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court convicting Defendant of felony possession of a controlled substance, holding (1) the application of the balancing test set forth in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), which recognizes that warrantless seizures without reasonable suspicion may be reasonable under certain circumstances, was appropriate under the facts of this case; and (2) the stop was reasonable under Brown. View "State v. Sievers" on Justia Law