Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1971, David Rice was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2012, Rice filed a successive petition for postconviction relief. The petition was filed on Rice’s behalf by attorney Timothy Ashford. Ashford also filed on behalf of Rice a motion to appoint counsel on the basis that Rice was indigent. The court did not rule on the motion to appoint counsel prior to denying postconviction relief. Thereafter, the court entered an order finding that Rice should be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis and appointed Ashford as Rice’s counsel. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Ashford filed an application for the allowance of expenses and fees associated with the appeal. The district court denied the application, concluding that the claims for postconviction relief were frivolous, as was the appeal. Ashford appealed. While the appeal was pending, Rice died. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) no substitution of parties was necessary as a result of Rice’s death; and (2) because the district court appointed Ashford as postconviction counsel, the court was statutorily required to fix reasonable expenses and fees. View "State v. Rice" on Justia Law

The State filed an information charging Defendant, a Nebraska prisoner, with assault by a confined person. Defendant later filed two motions seeking relief under the speedy trial provisions of two different legislative acts. Specifically, Defendant filed a motion requesting absolute discharge under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1207 and a motion seeking to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-3805. The district court denied defendant’s motions, concluding that neither time limit required dismissal at the time Defendant filed his motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the speedy trial provisions of section 29-1207 had no application to Defendant; (2) the district court did not clearly err in determining that courtroom unavailability established good cause to extend the time in which to try Defendant; and (3) because the time to try Defendant had not expired when he filed his motion to dismiss the case, the district court properly overruled Defendant’s motion. View "State v. Kolbjornsen" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that sixteen-year-old Tyrone K. committed four counts of theft by receiving stolen property and one count of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. The prosecutor moved to transfer the proceedings to criminal court. The juvenile court granted the motion to transfer after conducting an evidentiary hearing. Tyrone appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to transfer his case to criminal court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the transfer order from which Tyrone appealed was not a final order. View "In re Interest of Tyrone K." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, use of a firearm to commit kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for the kidnapping conviction and ten to thirty years for the use of a weapon to commit a felony conviction, to be served consecutively. The court sentenced Defendant to thirty to fifty years’ imprisonment on the conspiracy conviction, to be served concurrently with the other sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant’s motion to quash, in overruling Defendant’s motion for directed verdict, and in sentencing Defendant for kidnapping; (2) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; but (3) the trial court plainly erred in sentencing Defendant for the conspiracy conviction. Remanded with directions to resentence Defendant to life imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction. View "State v. Betancourt-Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendants in these two cases both pled no contest to the refusal of a chemical test, with three prior convictions for driving under the influence (DUI), under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.03(8). In both cases, the pleas were accepted and Defendants were found guilty. Defendants filed pleas in bar and motions to quash alleging that application of section 60-6,197.03(8) was inappropriate because the “current violation” referred to therein must mean a current DUI violation and not a refusal violation. The courts denied the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, contrary to Defendants’ arguments, section 60-6,197.03(8) applies both to persons who violated the DUI statute, section 60-6,196 and to persons who violated the refusal statute, section 60-6,197. View "State v. Wagner" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the Mental Health Board of the Fourth Judicial District found that L.T. was a dangerous sex offender under Sex Offender Commitment Act and that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative for him. On appeal, the district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the Board’s determination and that there was clear and convincing evidence that L.T. could be treated on an outpatient basis. The district court then ordered L.T. unconditionally discharged from commitment as a dangerous sex offender. The State sought to appeal the district court’s order pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-1214. L.T. filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the State did not follow the proper appeal procedure and, therefore, failed to perfect its appeal. The Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the appeal, holding that the State failed to perfect an appeal under section 71-1214 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1912. View "In re Interest of L.T." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse resulting in death and intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury in connection with the death of his two-year-old grandson. On Defendant’s first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial. On retrial, Defendant was again convicted of the crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the was sufficient evidence to support both convictions; (2) any error in admitting testimony over Defendant’s objections was harmless; and (3) the district court’s sentences were not an abuse of discretion. View "State v. Draper" on Justia Law

In 2003, Defendant pled no contest to sexually assaulting J.B., a girl under sixteen years old. A jury trial was subsequently held in a second case, in which Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of another girl under sixteen years old, Heather Guerrero. In 2012, Defendant filed a “Verified Motion for Postconviction Relief and Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis” in the case involving the sexual assault of J.B. After an evidentiary hearing, the * court rejected Defendant’s claims, overruled his motion for postconviction relief, and denied his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in overruling Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief and denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. View "State v. Hessler" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in finding that Defendant was not deaf or hard of hearing under Neb. Rev. Stat. 20-152, and therefore, in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement; (2) in finding Defendant competent to stand trial at a competency hearing; and (3) in instructing the jury regarding the definition of the term “deliberation” and regarding sudden quarrel manslaughter. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence and refusing to submit to a chemical test. Both convictions were second offenses. Defendant appealed, challenging the county court’s refusal to grant his motion to quash the charge of refusal to submit to a chemical yes and his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his arrest. Specifically, Defendant argued that criminalizing refusal was a violation of the constitutional rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and that there was not probable cause to support his arrest. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the county court did not err when it overruled Defendant’s motion to quash and his motion to suppress; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Pester" on Justia Law