Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute underlying a judgment is permitted in a habeas corpus proceeding after the judgment becomes final. In 2011, Petitioner was convicted of unlawful discharge of a firearm under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1212.04 and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Petitioner was sentenced to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment on each conviction, to run consecutively. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner later filed a habeas petition in district court making a facial challenge to the constitutionality of section 28-1212.04. The district court dismissed Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when used to challenge a final conviction and sentence, habeas corpus is a collateral attack; (2) therefore, habeas corpus is not a proper remedy to challenge a petitioner’s detention pursuant to a final conviction and sentence on the basis that the statute underlying the conviction is unconstitutional; and (3) therefore, a final conviction and sentence entered upon an allegedly facially unconstitutional statute is not absolutely void, but is voidable only, and may not be attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding. View "Sanders v. Frakes" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with robbery and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time he allegedly committed the crimes. Defendant filed a motion to transfer his case to the separate juvenile court of Douglas County. The district court denied the motion to transfer. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court’s denial of the motion to transfer is not a final, appealable order because no substantial right was affected by the denial of Defendant’s motion to transfer. View "State v. Bluett" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction because the evidence established that the handgun at issue was not within Defendant’s immediate physical reach at the time he was stopped in a traffic stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in reversing Defendant’s conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence because the jury could have found that the handgun was on or about Defendant’s person, even though it was not within his reach while driving. View "State v. Senn" on Justia Law

In 1987, Defendant murdered his twelve-year-old sister. Defendant was fourteen years old at the time of the murder. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama. The district court vacated Defendant’s life sentence, finding that the sentence was within the parameters of the holding in Miller, that the rule in Miller applies retroactively, and that Defendant was therefore entitled to postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the relevant sentencing scheme mandated life imprisonment without the possibility for parole, the district court was bound by Miller. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Thieszen" on Justia Law

Sandrino T. and Remus M. were each charged in the juvenile court with six counts of ATM “skimming.” In each case, the State moved to transfer to county court. The juvenile court granted the motions. Both Sandrino and Remus appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal for disposition. The Court then dismissed each appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the orders transferring the cases from juvenile court to county court were not final and appealable because the transfer of the cases from juvenile court to criminal court did not affect the substantial rights of Sandrino and Remus. View "In re Sandrino T." on Justia Law

In 1971, David Rice was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2012, Rice filed a successive petition for postconviction relief. The petition was filed on Rice’s behalf by attorney Timothy Ashford. Ashford also filed on behalf of Rice a motion to appoint counsel on the basis that Rice was indigent. The court did not rule on the motion to appoint counsel prior to denying postconviction relief. Thereafter, the court entered an order finding that Rice should be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis and appointed Ashford as Rice’s counsel. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Ashford filed an application for the allowance of expenses and fees associated with the appeal. The district court denied the application, concluding that the claims for postconviction relief were frivolous, as was the appeal. Ashford appealed. While the appeal was pending, Rice died. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) no substitution of parties was necessary as a result of Rice’s death; and (2) because the district court appointed Ashford as postconviction counsel, the court was statutorily required to fix reasonable expenses and fees. View "State v. Rice" on Justia Law

The State filed an information charging Defendant, a Nebraska prisoner, with assault by a confined person. Defendant later filed two motions seeking relief under the speedy trial provisions of two different legislative acts. Specifically, Defendant filed a motion requesting absolute discharge under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1207 and a motion seeking to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-3805. The district court denied defendant’s motions, concluding that neither time limit required dismissal at the time Defendant filed his motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the speedy trial provisions of section 29-1207 had no application to Defendant; (2) the district court did not clearly err in determining that courtroom unavailability established good cause to extend the time in which to try Defendant; and (3) because the time to try Defendant had not expired when he filed his motion to dismiss the case, the district court properly overruled Defendant’s motion. View "State v. Kolbjornsen" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that sixteen-year-old Tyrone K. committed four counts of theft by receiving stolen property and one count of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. The prosecutor moved to transfer the proceedings to criminal court. The juvenile court granted the motion to transfer after conducting an evidentiary hearing. Tyrone appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to transfer his case to criminal court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the transfer order from which Tyrone appealed was not a final order. View "In re Interest of Tyrone K." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, use of a firearm to commit kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for the kidnapping conviction and ten to thirty years for the use of a weapon to commit a felony conviction, to be served consecutively. The court sentenced Defendant to thirty to fifty years’ imprisonment on the conspiracy conviction, to be served concurrently with the other sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant’s motion to quash, in overruling Defendant’s motion for directed verdict, and in sentencing Defendant for kidnapping; (2) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; but (3) the trial court plainly erred in sentencing Defendant for the conspiracy conviction. Remanded with directions to resentence Defendant to life imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction. View "State v. Betancourt-Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendants in these two cases both pled no contest to the refusal of a chemical test, with three prior convictions for driving under the influence (DUI), under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.03(8). In both cases, the pleas were accepted and Defendants were found guilty. Defendants filed pleas in bar and motions to quash alleging that application of section 60-6,197.03(8) was inappropriate because the “current violation” referred to therein must mean a current DUI violation and not a refusal violation. The courts denied the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, contrary to Defendants’ arguments, section 60-6,197.03(8) applies both to persons who violated the DUI statute, section 60-6,196 and to persons who violated the refusal statute, section 60-6,197. View "State v. Wagner" on Justia Law