Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s convictions for first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony; (2) admitting certain evidence over Defendant’s foundation objection and relevance objection; and (3) instructing the jury on the elements of first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter and refusing Appellant’s proposed elements instruction. View "State v. Casterline" on Justia Law

Appellant shot and killed his father in the sight of Appellant’s three nieces. After a bench trial, the district court convicted Appellant of first degree murder, using a firearm to commit a felony, and three counts of negligent child abuse. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding that Appellant did not voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial or consent to a trial before a new judge to which the trial was reassigned; (2) excluding as unreliable Appellant’s expert witness’s opinion regarding Appellant’s mental state when he killed the victim; and (3) finding that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s first degree murder conviction. View "State v. Braesch" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment, forty to fifty years’ imprisonment, and ten to twenty years’ imprisonment, respectively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) overruling various pretrial motions, including a motion in limine and a motion to suppress; (2) instructing the jury; (3) overruling Defendant’s motion for a motion for a bill of particulars; (4) overruling Defendant’s motion to sever the conspiracy to commit robbery count from the other three counts for trial; and (5) admitting and handling certain evidence. View "State v. Henry" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). After an enhancement hearing, the district court used Defendant’s conviction from a Missouri court in which Defendant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated to enhance his sentence for DUI. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence, where Defendant’s initial encounter with the police did not implicate the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the district court did not err in using Defendant’s Missouri conviction to enhance his DUI sentence because a suspended imposition of sentence in a previous case qualifies as a prior conviction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.02. View "State v. Gilliam" on Justia Law

The district court found Defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, Defendant argued that the court erred in (1) finding that he was uncooperative with police and gave a false name during a traffic stop, and (2) overruling his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his person. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) law enforcement officers had sufficient probable cause to search Defendant and to arrest him for drug possession; and (2) the district court erred in finding that Defendant was uncooperative during the traffic stop, but the error did not affect the propriety of the court’s ultimate holding. View "State v. Perry" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to terms of life-to-life imprisonment for each murder conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing, primarily, that because sudden quarrel provocation negates the malice element of murder, the step instruction for first degree murder violated his due process rights because the jury was not instructed that the State had to prove that the killings were not the result of a sudden quarrel brought about by a sufficient provocation. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) when the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with premeditated and deliberate malice, the jury necessarily simultaneously found no sudden quarrel provocation beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Defendant’s remaining arguments lacked merit. View "State v. Hinrichsen" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault of a person at least twelve but less than sixteen years of age. Defendant filed a direct appeal, but his appeal was dismissed due to the untimely payment of a docket fee or the granting of in forma pauperis status. Defendant subsequently filed a motion seeking postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal and for various actions made or not made at trial. The district court denied most of Defendant’s motion without a hearing. Following an evidentiary hearing, however, the court awarded Defendant a new direct appeal. This was that appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court had jurisdiction to decide to decide this appeal; (2) Defendant’s sentence was not excessive; and (3) Defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by any deficient conduct on the part of trial counsel. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of terroristic threats, kidnapping, first degree sexual assault, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments and that Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object to the prosecutor’s improper comments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor’s statements, when considered in the context of all the trial proceedings, were not misconduct because they were not misleading and did not unduly influence the jury; and (2) because counsel cannot be deficient for failing to object to statements that were not misconduct, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance. View "State v. McSwine" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance and was sentenced to eight to ten years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s direct appeal was dismissed because his poverty affidavit was untimely filed. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied relief, concluding that Defendant failed to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient. Defendant appealed. The court of appeals vacated the district court’s order and remanded the cause for further proceedings after addressing the procedure the district court should follow when considering a postconviction motion that raises both an allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal and other ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, while this Court adopted a slightly different procedure than the one proposed by the court of appeals, the proper disposition of the appeal in this case was that the district court’s order denying certain of Defendant’s postconviction claims should be vacated and the cause remanded. View "State v. Determan" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of violating Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,198(1), which criminalizes the act of proximately causing serious bodily injury to another while driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to strictly construe the proximate cause element of section 60-6,198(1) to require a “but for” causal analysis of proximate cause, and that, had it done so, it could not have found him guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State met its burden of proving that Defendant’s act of driving while under the influence was both a “but for” cause and a proximate cause of serious bodily injury; and (2) because the serious bodily injury was a direct and natural result of Defendant’s act of driving while under the influence and there was no efficient intervening cause, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the State met its burden of proof on causation. View "State v. Irish" on Justia Law