Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse that resulted in the death of an infant in her care. Defendant was sentenced to seventy years to life. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that evidence of the infant’s prior injuries while in her care should have been excluded as prior bad acts under Neb. R. Evid. 404. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial on the basis of allowing the admission of the prior injuries, as the prior injuries were inextricably intertwined with the charged crime; (2) there was no misconduct by the prosecutor during closing argument; (3) Defendant’s sentence was not an abuse of discretion; and (4) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. View "State v. Cullen" on Justia Law

After a bench trial in 1984, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2012, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing, inter alia, that his mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately inform him of his right to a jury trial. The district court denied postconviction relief, concluding that Defendant had no Miller claim because he was eighteen years old at the time of the crime for which he was convicted and that counsel was not ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in not granting a new sentencing hearing under Miller, as Miller applies only to individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time a crime punishable by a life sentence without the possibility of parole was committed; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "State v. Ware" on Justia Law

In 1986, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder. Defendant subsequently made numerous attempts to collaterally attack his convictions. The district court denied relief in each case, and the Supreme Court affirmed. These two appeals arose from Defendant’s fifth postconviction proceeding and were consolidated on appeal. The district court summarily overruled Defendant’s postconviction motion and denied Defendant’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order denying leave to proceed IFP, as Defendant’s second appeal lacked merit; but (2) held the first appeal under submission, as the statute permits Defendant, when he makes timely payment of the statutory docket fee, to proceed with the first appeal. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography, age nineteen and over, and sentenced him to three years’ probation. Appellant’s conviction caused him to be subject to the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-813.01 requires sufficient proof that Defendant had the specific intent to possess child pornography and not merely a general intent to download files that turned out to be child pornography; and (2) the State adduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Appellant knowingly possessed child pornography. In response to the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of 28-813.01, the State filed a petition for further review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person knowingly possesses child pornography in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-813.01 when he or she knows of the nature or character of the material and of its presence and has dominion or control over it. View "State v. Mucia" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to one count of operating a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device. When Defendant committed the criminal act, driving without an ignition interlock device was a Class IV felony. While Defendant’s case was pending, however, the legislature amended the statute to make the crime a Class I misdemeanor unless the offender had a breath alcohol concentration above a certain amount. Defendant appealed, arguing that the statutory amendment during the pendency of his case made his crime a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the amendment does not apply to Defendant because it substantively redefined the offense of operating without an ignition interlock device. View "State v. Duncan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery, first degree false imprisonment, third degree assault, third degree sexual assault, and carrying a concealed weapon. The parties subsequently entered into a sentencing agreement, pursuant to which Defendant waived his right to appeal. The district court imposed sentences in conformity with the sentencing agreement. Defendant subsequently appealed, arguing that the sentencing agreement was unenforceable because appeal waivers are against public policy. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal entered into as party of the sentencing agreement was enforceable. View "State v. Dye" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of burglary with habitual criminal enhancement and sentenced to ten to twenty years’ imprisonment with credit for time served. The State discharged Defendant from the custody of the Department of Correctional Services after erroneously calculating good time on the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. The district court granted the State’s motion to secure an arrest warrant, and Defendant was subsequently brought back into the Department’s custody. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that in calculating his mandatory discharge date, the Department’s reliance on State v. Castilla violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department did not violate Defendant’s due process rights when it calculated his mandatory discharge date in accordance with the calculation method set forth in Castillas. View "Caton v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his pretrial motions to suppress evidence obtained in the execution of four search warrants. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court’s implicit rejection of Defendant’s testimony claiming that his cell phone was taken from his person and not pursuant to a search warrant was not clearly wrong; (2) Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his cell phone; and (3) the warrants were either sufficiently particular, or if they violated the particularity requirement, exclusion was not required because the good faith exception applied. View "State v. Tyler" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with enhancement pursuant to the habitual criminal statute. The district court sentenced Defendant to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment, with credit for time served. The Nebraska Department of Correctional Services erroneously discharged Defendant from custody before Defendant had served the entirety of his sentence. The State filed a motion asking that the district court issue a warrant for Defendant’s arrest and commitment so that he could serve out the remainder of his sentence. The district court issued the arrest and commitment warrant. Defendant appealed the court’s order for an arrest and commitment warrant. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order, holding that the district court’s order for an arrest and commitment warrant was simply a temporary order of enforcement and not a final order, and therefore, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over the appeal. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-4,108(1)(b) for driving under revocation. Defendant pled no contest to the complaint. The county court found Defendant’s prior convictions for driving under suspension admissible for enhancement purposes, enhanced Defendant’s conviction to third offense, and sentenced him to thirty days’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that his prior convictions for driving under suspension under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-4,108(2) were valid convictions to enhance his conviction for driving under revocation under section 60-4,108(1). The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding that the county court erred in enhancing Defendant’s conviction to a third offense, as a violation of section 60-4,108(2) is not available to enhance a violation of section 60-4,108(1). View "State v. Mendoza-Bautista" on Justia Law