Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When approached by a police officer on suspicion of selling stolen goods, Defendant falsely told the officer that his name was “Daniel Jones.” Defendant later identified himself truthfully as “James Covey.” There was no evidence at trial that the name “Daniel Jones” corresponded to an actual person. Defendant was charged with criminal impersonation in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-638(1)(c). Defendant filed a plea in abatement and moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that criminal impersonation did not apply to the utterance of a name of a fictitious individual. The trial court overruled the plea in abatement and motion to dismiss. After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of criminal impersonation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to convict Defendant of criminal impersonation because the State failed to show that the false name Defendant provided to the police officer corresponded with any actual person. View "State v. Covey" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of third degree assault of an officer and one count of possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence gathered by a law enforcement officer, as the evidence was obtained in accordance with the protections set forth under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of third degree assault of an officer. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to three misdemeanor charges and was sentenced. The district court and court of appeals affirmed. In an order granting Defendant leave to proceed in forma pauperis on the second appeal, the district court intended to deny payment of attorney fees beyond the first appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the district court erred in ordering that his attorney fees would not be paid at public expense. The Supreme Court vacated the order to the extent that it may be construed as addressing attorney fees and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s order in forma pauperis did not have the legal effect of denying Defendant’s appellate counsel payment for their representation because the district court was not the proper court to address the issue, and no application for payment was made pursuant to the statutory procedure; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims regarding denial of permission to withdraw his guilty pleas and allegedly excessive sentences were without merit. View "State v. Ortega" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of use of a weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s sentences of life imprisonment without parole for the murder charges and remanded with instructions to sentence Appellant to life imprisonment on the murder charges. Appellant filed an amended motion for postconviction relief, alleging, among other claims, ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying relief, without an evidentiary hearing, on Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call certain witnesses; and (2) Appellant remaining assignments of error either lacked merit or were procedurally barred. View "State v. Thorpe" on Justia Law

In 1979, Appellant was convicted of uttering a forged instrument and second degree forgery. Appellant escaped from prison in 1987. In 1997, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder in a California court. In 2006, Appellant was granted a voluntary transfer to the Nebraska prison system. In 2013, Appellant filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus against certain officials of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, arguing that when he was transferred to Nebraska, he resumed serving his sentences for the 1979 Nebraska convictions and that the maximum term for those sentences had been completed in 2011. The district court denied and dismissed the petition, concluding that Nebraska was holding Appellant as an agent for California and that Appellant would not begin serving his Nebraska sentences until after he had been released from his California sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that Appellant was not entitled to habeas corpus relief. View "Johnson v. Gage" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony criminal mischief and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals vacated Defendant’s sentence for criminal mischief as well as Defendant’s conviction and sentence for use of a weapon to commit a felony and remanded for a new trial on the issue of the amount of pecuniary loss caused by Defendant’s criminal mischief. On remand, the district court found Defendant guilty of both felony criminal mischief and use of a weapon to commit a felony, finding that the pecuniary loss caused by the criminal mischief was equal to or greater than $1,500. The court imposed the same sentences that had been pronounced after the jury trial, including an order to pay restitution in the amount of $7,500. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the conviction for use of a weapon to commit a felony and remanded with directions to vacate the conviction, holding there was insufficient evidence presented at the new trial to support the conviction and that Double Jeopardy prevented prohibited a retrial on the charge; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the amount of restitution ordered with respect to the felony criminal mischief conviction. View "State v. Esch" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to attempted possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and was sentenced to one to two years’ imprisonment. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging that his immigration counsel provided ineffective assistance by providing erroneous advice regarding the immigration consequences of his conviction. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Defendant’s appeal as moot because Defendant had been released from prison and his parole had expired. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently decided Padilla v. Kentucky. Defendant moved to set aside his plea. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that Padilla was inapplicable to Defendant because his conviction was final prior to the Court’s decision in Padilla and that Defendant’s motion to set aside his plea was not timely for purposes of State v. Gonzales. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the constitutional right under which Defendant sought relief was inapplicable as a matter of law and the procedure set forth under Gonzales was unavailable. View "State v. Merheb" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Vasholz testified that she was living with her husband, Raymond, in their home when Defendant broke into the house, demanded money, assaulted her and Raymond, and set several objects on fire. Elizabeth escaped the house, but Raymond died from smoke inhalation. A jury convicted Defendant of first degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing two witnesses to testify about out-of-court statements made by Elizabeth. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly overruled Defendant’s hearsay objections on the ground that the statements were excited utterances; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Hale" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree sexual assault. Defendant was brought to trial on the charge two separate times. Each time, the trial ended in mistrial. After the first mistrial, Defendant filed a plea in bar to his retrial, alleging that double jeopardy barred retrial. The district court overruled the plea in bar, and the Supreme Court affirmed. After the second mistrial, Defendant filed a plea in bar arguing that double jeopardy barred retrial. The district court denied the plea in bar. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that double jeopardy did not bar a third trial of Defendant, and the district court did not err in overruling his plea in bar. View "State v. Muhannad" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and three counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Defendant then moved for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court denied postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Defendant’s allegations consisted solely of conclusory statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the alleged deficiencies of his counsel; and (2) Defendant’s claim of instructional error was not presented as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel before the district court and was therefore not preserved for review. View "State v. Sellers" on Justia Law