Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The lead investigator for a law enforcement agency applied for and received a search warrant to search three computers Defendant owned for child pornography. Defendant admitted to the investigator to downloading and viewing child pornography and subsequently deleting the child pornography computer files. However, a forensic examination revealed remnants on Defendant’s hard drive. After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of knowingly possessing child pornography. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the earlier search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the investigator’s failure to explain in his affidavit that dynamic Internet Protocol (IP) addresses can change did not affect the probable cause determination; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. View "State v. Schuller" on Justia Law

In 1975, Appellant was convicted of sodomy, forcible rape, and robbery. In 2004, Appellant moved for testing under the DNA Testing Act (“Act”) of the biological evidence pertinent to his conviction. The district court granted the motion. The next year, DNA testing revealed that at least one stain of biological material was from a male who was not Appellant. The district court denied Appellant’s subsequent motion to vacate his convictions or grant a new trial, holding that the DNA test results were neither exonerating nor exculpatory because, among other things, the testing could not distinguish between semen and epithelial cells in older materials. In 2011, Appellant filed a second motion for DNA testing of the biological materials on the victims’ shirts, alleging that new more accurate testing techniques could lead to exonerating or exculpatory evidence, particularly because restesting could distinguish between semen and epithelial cells on the materials. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for resting under the Act, as, “[i]ndisputably, the requested retesting ‘may’ lead to exculpatory evidence.” View "State v. Pratt" on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant pled guilty to second degree murder. The district court sentenced Appellant to a term of imprisonment of fifty years to life. In 2012, Appellant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his sentence was excessive and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in connection with his sentencing. The district court dismissed the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief did not allege facts which constituted a denial of his constitutional rights, and that as to certain matters, the record refuted Appellant’s claims. View "State v. Dragon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree sexual assault and second degree false imprisonment. Appellant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief. The district court dismissed all but one of Appellant’s claims without an evidentiary hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s remaining claim regarding trial counsel’s failure to disclose an alleged plea offer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate to the defendant all formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the defendant; and (2) the district court did not clearly err in finding that the State made a formal offer, and therefore, trial counsel could not have been deficient in failing to disclose it to Appellant. View "State v. Alfredson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the offenses. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his sentence of life imprisonment was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, which was decided while Defendant’s appeal was pending. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated Defendant’s sentence for first degree murder, holding that the sentence of life imprisonment was unconstitutional under Miller. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and other offenses arising from three shootings that occurred at three separate locations. Defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, vacated all of the sentences, and remanded for resentencing, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions for mistrial and for new trial; (2) the two life imprisonment sentences without the possibility of parole imposed for the first degree murder convictions were unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama; and (3) the district court committed plain error in regard to the sentences imposed for the convictions of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, attempted second degree murder, attempted robbery, and criminal conspiracy. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for a murder he committed when he was sixteen years old. More than fifteen years later, Defendant filed an amended postconviction motion challenging his life imprisonment sentence. The district court denied the motion. After Defendant appealed, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a state sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender convicted of homicide. The Supreme Court reversed in this case, holding (1) the rule announced in Miller applied retroactively to Defendant; and (2) Defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional under Miller, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to be resentenced. Remanded. View "State v. Mantich" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and other charges arising from three shootings. At the time of the shootings, Defendant was fifteen years old. Defendant was sentenced to two life terms without the possibility of parole for the murder counts. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions in all respects but vacated the sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, holding that the life imprisonment sentences were unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile convicted of a homicide to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. View "State v. Castaneda" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to a 2012 driving under the influence (DUI) charge. During a sentence enhancement hearing, the evidence showed Defendant had previously been convicted of DUI in 2003, 2001, and 1999. Defendant argued that the 1999 and 2001 convictions were the same convictions referred to in the 2003 enhancement hearing, and because those convictions did not result in enhancement of the 2003 charge, the State was collaterally estopped from using them for enhancement of the 2012 charge. The trial court found Defendant guilty of fourth-offense DUI, holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar the use of two prior convictions for the purpose of sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that collateral estoppel did not bar the use of Defendant’s 1999 and 2001 DUI convictions as two of the three prior convictions necessary to enhance his 2012 conviction to fourth offense. View "State v. Bruckner" on Justia Law

After an infant boy died in the care of Plaintiff, a daycare provider, Plaintiff was charged with felony child abuse resulting in death. The charge was later dropped after two forensic pathologists retained by Plaintiff concluded that the infant’s cause of death was sudden infant death syndrome. Plaintiff subsequently sued the pathologist whose autopsy report was used to bring the criminal charges against Plaintiff and the pathologist’s wholly owned corporation (collectively, Defendants). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants where differing reasonable inferences could be drawn as to whether the pathologist knowingly provided false or misleading information to law enforcement in his autopsy report. View "McKinney v. Okoye" on Justia Law