Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Chad Norman pled no contest to third degree assault and was sentenced to probation for two years and jail for thirty days. After a hearing, the district court also ordered Norman to register under Nebraska's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Norman appealed the portion of his sentence requiring him to register, claiming he was denied due process. The Supreme Court reversed the registration order, holding (1) before a court orders a defendant to be subject to SORA pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4003(1)(b)(i), the court must make a finding whether the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact as part of the incident that gave rise to the defendant's conviction for one of the offenses not sexual in nature listed in section 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B); (2) the court must provide procedural due process when it makes this finding, including proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and (3) although the court in this case provided Norman with notice and a hearing, the court erred when it based its finding solely on statements in the State's factual basis for Norman's plea and explicitly ignored the evidence at the hearing. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Norman" on Justia Law

Jan Ginapp, a registered nurse, was injured on the job in a violent assault committed by a patient who had been admitted to the hospital after he was taken into emergency protective custody by the City of Bellevue police department. Ginapp sued Bellevue, alleging that her injuries resulted from the police department's negligence. The district court entered judgment for Ginapp against Bellevue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that the patient was in Bellevue's custody at the time of the assault and that Bellevue law enforcement acted unreasonably in transporting the patient to the hospital and permitting him to be admitted; and (2) therefore, the court erred in finding that Bellevue was liable for Ginapp's injuries. View "Ginapp v. City of Bellevue" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Matthew Fox was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Fox appealed, asserting that the district court erred when it found him competent to stand trial and when it allowed him to absent himself from major portions of the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it determined that Fox was competent to stand trial, and (2) the district court did not err when it found that Fox knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial and allowed Fox to absent himself from trial. View "State v. Fox" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Hessler was incarcerated and sentenced to death relating to the rape and murder of a fifteen-year-old. Hessler subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief. The district court granted an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to demand a competency hearing before the trial court allowed Hessler to waive counsel and represent himself at sentencing. The court then denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hessler failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the sentencing hearing, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying postconviction relief. View "State v. Hessler" on Justia Law

This appeal focused on the legality of a video gaming device known as Bankshot, which was developed and distributed by Appellees. Appellees filed this lawsuit after the State seized two Bankshot devices as alleged illegal gambling devices, seeking a declaration that they were not illegal. The state agencies and officers who were named as defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that Bankshot was a "game of chance" and therefore an unlawful gambling device. The district court (1) found that Bankshot was a game of chance when played in some modes but not when played by others; (2) ultimately concluded that Bankshot was a gambling device under Nebraska law; and (3) refused the State's request for injunctive relief, reasoning that there was no showing that Appellees knowingly used Bankshot to advance unlawful gaming activity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying injunctive relief because (1) where the Bankshot game was reconfigured to comply with the terms of the district court order, injunctive relief completely banning the development and distribution of Bankshot in any form was not warranted; and (2) Bankshot, as currently configured, was not a game of chance. View "Am. Amusements Co. v. Neb. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

An infant died while under the care of Carla McKinney, who operated a daycare center. Matthias Okoye, a pathologist who worked for Nebraska Forensic Medical Services (collectively, Appellees), reported in an autopsy report that the infant died of injuries from child abuse. McKinney was arrested and charged with felony child abuse, but the State later dropped the charges. McKinney sued Appellees for malicious prosecution. The district court dismissed McKinney's complaint, concluding that McKinney could not base an action for malicious prosecution on Okoye's statements because an absolute testimonial privilege shielded them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a person who gives information to a prosecutor that results in a criminal prosecution against another does not have an absolute privilege from liability for malicious prosecution. View "McKinney v. Okoye" on Justia Law

Lucky Iromuanya was convicted of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and two related counts of use of a weapon. The Supreme Court modified his sentence. Iromuanya subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel directed at his trial and appellate counsel. The district court overruled the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Iromuanya's motion without a hearing where, for all of his claims, Iromuanya either failed to allege facts that showed his counsel's deficient performance or failed to allege facts that showed he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficiencies. View "State v. Iromuanya" on Justia Law

Timmy Timmens was convicted of second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Timmens subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in several particulars and that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. The district court dismissed all but one of the claims without a hearing and denied the remaining claim following an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Timmens' appeal of the order denying all but one of his postconviction claims without a hearing was untimely; (2) trial counsel's performance with respect to Timmens' remaining claim was not deficient under the Strickland v. Washington standard, and therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective in not raising the issue of trial counsel's performance on direct appeal; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Timmens' motion to alter or amend the judgment. View "State v. Timmens" on Justia Law

A rental vehicle driven by James Nelson was stopped for speeding. A subsequent search disclosed a package of cocaine. After a jury trial, Nelson was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver or distribute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although Nelson was not the driver authorized on the rental agreement, he had permission from the authorized driver to drive the vehicle, and therefore, Nelson had standing to challenge his detention and the search of the vehicle; (2) the district court's denial of Nelson's first motion to suppress was not in error where an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer would have had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Nelson; and (3) the district court did not err when it denied Nelson's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence because the evidence at issue was not newly discovered evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2101(5), the evidence was not exculpatory, and its loss or destruction did not deprive Nelson of due process or a fair trial. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Ronald Smith was convicted of murder in the second degree and related offenses. Smith appealed his conviction for second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed after (1) reaffirming the holdings of State v. Pettit and Bosche v. State that an intentional killing committed without malice upon a sudden quarrel constitutes the offense of manslaughter, and overruling the holding of State v. Jones that the distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel is the presence or absence of an intention to kill; (2) holding that the step instruction given in this case was not a correct statement of the law because it (i) required the jury to convict on second degree murder if it found that Smith killed the victim intentionally but (ii) did not permit the jury to consider the alternative possibility that the killing was intentional but provoked by a sudden quarrel and, therefore, constituted manslaughter; and (3) concluding that because there was no evidence in the record upon which the jury could have concluded that Smith committed sudden quarrel manslaughter instead of second degree murder, the improper jury instruction did not prejudice Smith or affect his substantial rights. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law