Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thunder Collins was convicted of first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, and use of a weapon to commit a felony. At the conclusion of the trial and after Collins' case was submitted to the jury, the jury was permitted to separate for the weekend and return to deliberate the next Monday, at which point it rendered its verdicts. On appeal, Collins contended that the district court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial on the basis that the court allowed the jury to separate during deliberations without Collins' express agreement or consent. The Supreme Court concluded that the rule stated in State v. Robbins, which holds that express agreement or consent is required by a defendant in order to waive his rights to have a jury kept together until they reach a verdict or are discharged by the court, was inconsistent with judicial efficiency and sound policy and, therefore, overruled Robbins to the extent it requires defendant consent to jury separation. Because the overruling of Robbins was prospective only, the court applied the Robbins rule and held that Collins was entitled to a presumption that he was prejudiced by the jury's separation. Remanded. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

A jury found Stephen Pullens guilty of killing his mother by throwing her over a balcony. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing hearsay evidence of a prior attempt by Pullens to throw his mother off a balcony; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence emails written by Pullens after finding that the State had made a showing that the emails were what the State purported them to be; (3) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on voluntary flight because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer flight; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Pullens' request for a continuance on the day of the sentencing hearing or in refusing to appoint a public defender for the sentencing hearing; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not affording Pullens an opportunity to review his presentence investigation report and by considering a letter written by someone not involved in the case; and (6) Pullens' arguments concerning ineffective assistance of counsel were not appropriate for review on direct appeal. View "State v. Pullens" on Justia Law

David Kass was found guilty of enticement by an electronic communication device under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-833, which proscribes a person age nineteen or older from knowingly and intentionally using an electronic communication device to contact a child under age sixteen or a peace officer whom the person believe to be a child under age sixteen, and using language that conjures up repugnant sexual images. The district court sentenced Kass to one year in prison and ordered him to register as a sex offender. Kass appealed, arguing that section 28-833 was facially overbroad, that the court erred in its jury instructions, and that his sentence was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad; (2) there was no plain error in the court's instruction on the elements of the crime or in the court's denial of Kass's request for a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment; and (3) given Kass's age, his education, the offense, and the fact that he was a police officer, the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Kass to one year in prison. View "State v. Kass" on Justia Law

After D.I. was convicted of sexual assault of a child and was adjudged to be a dangerous sex offender, D.I. was committed to secure inpatient treatment. Three years later, D.I. filed a motion for reconsideration before the mental health board, alleging that cause no longer existed to keep him in secure inpatient treatment. The mental health board denied D.I.'s motion for reconsideration, and the district court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the denial of a motion for reconsideration is a final, appealable order under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1902, the Court had jurisdiction to address D.I.'s claims; (2) the mental health board did not err when it found D.I. was still a dangerous sex offender; and (3) the mental health board did not err when it determined there was no less restrictive treatment alternative. View "In re Interest of D.I." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Cotton was severely injured in an accident that occurred when a pickup crossed the centerline and struck her vehicle. The pickup had been struck by a Ford Mustang driven by a man who was seeking to evade a state trooper. Cotton sued the state of Nebraska under the State Tort Claims Act, which makes the state liable for injuries to innocent third parties proximately caused by vehicular pursuit by a state-employed law enforcement officer. The district court entered judgment in favor of the state, concluding that (1) there was no vehicular pursuit under the statute, (2) Anson's actions were the sole proximate cause of the injuries to Cotton, and (3) Cotton failed to prove that the state trooper's actions were a proximate cause of the accident. Cotton appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that Anson's actions were the sole proximate cause of Cotton's injuries and that the state was not liable under the State Tort Claims Act. View "Cotton v. State" on Justia Law

Terence Nero was charged with burglary, a class three felony. Nero waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial followed. The district court declined to make a specific finding regarding which felony it determined Nero had intended to commit to support the charge of burglary. The court found Nero guilty of burglary, and Nero appealed the conviction. At issue was whether the state is required to specify the underlying felony it seeks to prove to support a charge of burglary. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) because the state did not specify the underlying felony it sought to prove, Nero was deprived of an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution; (2) because Nero's right to notice was prejudiced, the district court's denial of Nero's motion for a bill of particulars was not harmless error, and therefore the judgment should be reversed; and (3) the totality of the evidence admitted by the district court was sufficient to sustain Nero's conviction, and therefore the Double Jeopardy Clause does not forbid a retrial. Remanded. View "State v. Nero" on Justia Law

Eleazar Oceguera was convicted of DUI and operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. At the sentencing and enhancement hearing the State offered three certified copies of prior convictions, the first of which was for driving under revocation. The district court found the three exhibits were valid prior convictions of DUI. The State agreed that the district court erred and filed a motion for remand, which the court of appeals denied. At issue was whether the Supreme Court should remand the case for sentencing on DUI or remand for a new enhancement hearing. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred when it used a prior conviction for driving under revocation to enhance Oreguera's sentence for DUI; (2) the restrictions of 29-231.01 or 29-2316, which contain a stringent double jeopardy provision, are inapplicable in this case; and (3) because this case is more analogous to habitual criminal cases where the Court has remanded for a new enhancement hearing when the State has failed to produce sufficient evidence of the requisite prior convictions, the same procedure should be used here. Vacated and remanded with directions. View "State v. Oceguera" on Justia Law

Defendant Roy Ellis was convicted of first-degree murder in connection with the killing of a 12-year old girl. For this, he was sentenced to death. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court. Although many issues were presented on appeal, the primary issue for the Court to decide was whether the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence of Defendant's "prior bad acts," and whether that evidence prejudiced him. Defendant argued that the district court erred by allowing evidence of prior sexual assaults to his stepdaughters, and abused its discretion by denying two mistrial requests when that evidence was ultimately admitted. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and concluded that Defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. The Court found no merit to his other claims, and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence.

In 2008, Appellant Mauro Yos-Chiguil pled nolo contendere to murder and assault charges. The Court of Appeals dismissed his direct appeal as untimely. Appellant unsuccessfully sought relief under the state's immigration advisement statute. Appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court for post-conviction relief. He argued that the district court denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review most of Appellant's claims because they were included in his "untimely" appeal. The only claim the Court could review pertained to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court believed that claim alleged sufficient facts to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Lancaster County Mental Health Board (Board) determined that D.H. was a âdangerous sex offenderâ within the meaning of the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA) and should be committed for inpatient treatment. The determination was affirmed on appeal to the district court. D.H. appealed, arguing that the district court erred in affirming the Boardâs order for multiple reasons. The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented before the Board and the district court sufficient to support D.H.âs commitment. The Court affirmed the order of the Board and decision of the district court.