Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed, as modified by this opinion, the order of the district court dissolving Brian Osantowski’s marriage to Dori Ann Osantowski, dividing the martial assets and debts, and ordering Brian to make an equalization payment of $680,000, distributing the estate about equally. The Supreme Court held (1) contrary to Brian’s argument on appeal, the district court’s decision that stored and growing crops should not be treated the same as cattle herds for tracing purposes was not in error; but (2) the district court committed an abuse of discretion and plain error in its division of certain marital assets and debts. View "Osantowski v. Osantowski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the juvenile court finding allegations of domestic violence to be true, adjudicating Father’s child on those grounds, and ordering Father to undergo evaluations and to participate in an accredited domestic violence program. The court held (1) the juvenile court erred in finding sufficient evidence that Father’s faults or habits placed the children at risk for harm; (2) the district court erred in taking judicial notice of disputed adjudicative facts; (3) the district court erred in failing to provide notice and a hearing for disposition; and (4) the remainder of Father’s arguments were without merit. View "In re Interest of Lilly S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, to decline to adopt a case plan and court report recommended by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Instead, the juvenile court ordered certain other directives, including specifically ordering that DHHS update the children’s immunizations. The parents of the children appealed, arguing that the juvenile court was without authority to order DHHS to immunize the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-488(2), the juvenile court was authorized to require DHHS to immunize the children. View "In re Interest of Becka P." on Justia Law

In this divorce case, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment, and remanded the cause with directions to affirm the decree entered by the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in (1) determining that the entirety of the proceeds from a personal injury settlement should be included in the marital estate; (2) remanding the matter to the district court for recalculation of the value of the marital estate and redistribution of the assets and debts; and (3) remanding the matter for recalculation of Husband’s child support obligation. View "Marshall v. Marshall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Plaintiff inmates and grant of injunctive relief enjoining state officials and their agents from denying the inmates a marriage ceremony via videoconference or enforcing the Department of Correctional Services’ policy that interfered with Plaintiffs’ ability to marry. The Department denied Plaintiffs’ request to marry under an internal policy that it does not transport an inmate to another facility for a marriage ceremony. The inmates were also denied a marriage ceremony via videoconferencing because the Department interpreted Neb. Rev. Stat. 42-109 to require Plaintiffs to both appear physically before an officiant. Plaintiffs sued Defendants - state officials - in their individual capacities for interfering with the inmates’ request to marry. The district court concluded that the Department’s policy impermissibly burdened the inmates’ right to marry and that its interpretation of section 42-109 was constitutionally flawed and granted an injunction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting the inmates juncture relief because Defendants could only be sued for injunctive relief in their official capacities. View "Gillpatrick v. Sabatka-Rine" on Justia Law

Accrued investment earnings or appreciation of nonmarital assets during the marriage are presumed marital unless the party seeking the classification of the growth as nonmarital proves that the growth is readily identifiable and traceable to the nonmarital portion of the account and the growth is not due to the active efforts of either spouse.In this dissolution action, Husband, the cofounder and president of a C corporation who owned thirty-four percent of its stock, argued that none the nearly $5 million in appreciation of his stock interest during the parties’ twenty-five-year marriage was subject to equitable division. The trial court found that Husband’s thirty-four percent ownership interest in the corporation was, in its entirety, nonmarital. The Supreme Court reversed the division of the C corporation property, holding that, based on the active appreciation rule, the court should not have excluded the corporation of the marital estate. View "Stephens v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Charissa was pregnant when she married Erin. Several months later, Charissa gave birth to a daughter. Charissa listed Erin as the child’s father on her birth certificate. The parties later separated. One year later, Charissa filed a motion for genetic testing to determine the paternity of the child, which she requested in an effort to rebut the presumption of legitimacy concerning a child born during the marriage. Erin subsequently filed a complaint for dissolution of marriage. The court overruled Charissa’s motion for genetic testing. After a trial, the court entered a decree finding that Charissa had not rebutted the statutory presumption of legitimacy. The court further made an express finding that Erin was the child’s father. The court awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of the child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court’s denial of genetic testing was not an abuse of discretion; (2) Charissa failed to rebut at trial the presumption of legitimacy; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding joint custody. View "Erin W. v. Charissa W." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition against Mother and Father alleging that Child lacked prenatal care due to the fault or habits of Mother and Father. The juvenile court filed an ex parte order granting the State’s motion for temporary custody of Child with the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). More than eight months later, the juvenile court entered an order ordering that Child remain in the temporary custody of DHHS until further order of the court. The Supreme Court vacated the juvenile court’s order, holding that Mother’s procedural due process were violated by the unreasonable delay of more than eight months between the filing of the ex parte order for immediate temporary custody and the filing of the protective custody order. View "In re Interest of Carmelo G." on Justia Law

Douglas County challenged a district court order that required the County to pay an appointed attorney’s costs in the underlying divorce pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 42-358 because the spouse who was responsible for the payment of the appointed attorney’s fees was not indigent. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court and remanded with directions to vacate its order granting attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court lacked the statutory authority to order the County to pay fees in a dissolution action where neither party was indigent. Therefore, the district court erred in ordering the County to pay the appointed attorney for his appellate work in the underlying divorce case. View "White v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant seeking to establish paternity, custody, and support of the parties’ minor child. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved to disqualify Defendant’s privately retained legal counsel. The district court granted the motion. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. Defendant then filed a purported appeal from the court’s order, assigning seven errors relating to the district court’s disqualification of her attorney. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) this Court improperly exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority twenty years ago when it adopted the so-called Richardson exception to the final order requirement, and therefore, the Court’s line of decisions purporting to authorize an interlocutory appeal are hereby overruled; and (2) because the appeal from the order at issue in this case is not statutorily authorized, the appeal is dismissed. View "Heckman v. Marchio" on Justia Law