Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The juvenile court found Tavian B. to be a child who lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his parents and to be in a situation dangerous to life or limb or injurious to his health or morals. The State subsequently filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of both parents. Father filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Oglala Sioux Tribal Juvenile Court pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Before the juvenile court ruled on Father’s motion to transfer, the State withdrew its motion to terminate parental rights. Thereafter, the juvenile court concluded that good cause existed to overrule Father’s motion to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court because the proceedings were in “an advanced stage.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State did not meet its burden of establishing good cause to deny transfer to tribal court, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to transfer. View "In re Interest of Tavian B." on Justia Law

Anne and Adam have been married since 1995. From 2003 to 2004, Anne and Bryan engaged in an extramarital affair, during which time Anne had regular sexual intercourse with both Bryan and Adam. In 2004, Anne became pregnant and gave birth to T.B. Adam has raised T.B. with the belief that he is T.B.’s father. In 2012, Bryan requested a DNA test, which revealed a 99.9 percent chance that Bryan is T.B.’s biological father. In 2013, Bryan filed a complaint seeking to establish paternity of T.B. and custody, claiming (1) the four-year statute of limitations provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-411 should be tolled based on misrepresentations of Anne that he was not the father, (2) he should be entitled to bring the action as the next friend of T.B., and (3) section 43-1411 is unconstitutional. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bryan cannot bring this action as the next friend of T.B. under section 43-1411; (2) under the circumstances, Bryan has shown no basis to toll the statute of limitations; and (3) section 43-1411 is constitutional. View "Bryan M. v. Anne B." on Justia Law

After being married for approximately twenty years, Shelley and Kirk Brozek divorced. The divorce decree divided the marital estate and ordered Kirk to buy some of Shelley’s separate property. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree and the court’s order awarding Shelley attorney fees, holding that the district court did not err in (1) ordering Kirk to buy Shelley’s shares in a closely held farming corporation for a price higher than the value determined under a stock redemption agreement; (2) dividing the marital estate and declining to give Kirk credit for premarital property he disposed of during the marriage; (3) awarding Shelley attorney fees after Kirk filed a notice of appeal; and (4) not awarding Shelley alimony, a cash award for the inadequacy of the marital estate, or attorney fees in the decree. View "Brozek v. Brozek" on Justia Law

After Eric Zornes won a lottery, Eric and his wife, Julia, commenced a gifting plan to Andy Wolfe, Jason Wolfe, and Jason Reed. These gifts were structured as loans, and each borrower made a promissory note for his loan, payable to Julia’s and Eric’s revocable trusts jointly. Andy’s note was secured by a deed of trust for real property. Julia and Eric later divorced pursuant to a settlement agreement. When Eric found that Andy’s house had been sold and that Julia had retained the proceeds of the sale, Eric filed this complaint alleging that Julia had converted the proceeds of Andy’s note. Julia counterclaimed for partition of the Jason Wolfe and Jason Reed notes. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Julia, concluding that even if Julia had converted the proceeds, the settlement agreement operated as an accord and satisfaction. The court also ordered partition of the promissory notes for Jason Wolfe’s and Jason Reed’s loans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Eric was not entitled to summary judgment on his conversion claim; (2) the settlement agreement did not constitute an accord and satisfaction; and (3) the lower court erred in the method by which it partitioned the Jason Wolfe and Jason Reed notes. View "Zornes v. Zornes" on Justia Law

Damian and Tiffany, who were never married, had a child together, Jakai, born in 2009. In 2011, the district court filed a decree awarding joint legal custody to the parties and awarded primary physical custody to Tiffany. The decree also incorporated a previous order requiring Damian to pay child support. Damian subsequently filed a complaint to modify the decree, requesting that he be granted sole legal and physical custody and seeking an order requiring Tiffany to pay child support. Tiffany filed a cross-complaint seeking an increase in Damian’s child support obligation. After a modification hearing, the district court denied a change of custody and increased Damian’s child support obligation. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that a modification of custody was not warranted and adjusted child support. View "State ex rel. Jakai C. v. Tiffany M." on Justia Law

The juvenile court determined that it had jurisdiction over Child, an infant, because of the faults and habits of Mother. The court gave the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services temporary custody of Child. The Department subsequently placed Child with Foster Parents. Foster Parents filed a complaint to intervene to object to any placement change. Mother subsequently moved to place Child with Aunt, who did not live in Nebraska. The court dismissed Foster Parents’ complaint to intervene and approved Aunt for placement. Foster Parents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Foster Parents lacked standing to appeal the order changing Child’s placement; and (2) Foster Parents were not entitled to intervene as of right, and the juvenile court lacked the power to allow them to equitably intervene. View "In re Interest of Enyce J." on Justia Law

Mother was the biological mother of three minor children. The State, alleging that Mother had substantially and repeatedly neglected and refused to give necessary parental care and protection to the children, filed an amended petition alleging that the children came within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-292(2) and that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children were within the meaning of section 43-292(2) and that it was in their best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) clear and convincing evidence established that Mother substantially and repeatedly neglected to provide the children necessary parental care and protection; and (2) clear and convincing evidence established that Mother’s parental rights be terminated. View "In re Interest of Joseph S." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition seeking to adjudicate Child as a child under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), alleging that Father had abused and neglected Child. The motion was granted. Mother subsequently filed a motion for custody of Child. Following an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating Child and placing her in the temporary custody of the Department of Health and Human Services with placement to exclude the parental home. The juvenile court also denied Mother’s motion for custody. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order of adjudication; but (2) reversed the denial of Mother’s motion for custody, as the juvenile court erred to the extent it concluded that Mother needed to file a motion to intervene in this case and erred in overlooking Mother’s status as Child’s mother in making its custody determination. Remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Interest of Sloane O." on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, the court granted Mother custody of the parties’ minor daughter and ordered Father to pay child support. The court subsequently raised Father’s child support obligation. After Father’s income substantially decreased, Father filed a complaint to modify his child support obligation. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Father might be entitled to a modification under the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines but that a deviation from the guidelines was warranted because Father owned non-income-producing real estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deviating from the guidelines because of Father’s financial resources, including his equity in non-income-producing real estate. View "Stekr v. Beecham" on Justia Law

The district court issue a decree of dissolution dissolving the marriage of Dale Coufal and Lavon Coufal. The court included in the marital estate the increase in value of the premarital portion of Dale’s public employee’s retirement account. Prior to the parties’ marriage, the increase in value was fixed and guaranteed by statute, but the interest accrued during the marriage. The district court concluded that the increase in value was part of the martial estate because it was accumulated and acquired during the course of the marriage through the joint efforts of the parties. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court abused its discretion by including as a marital asset the increase in value of the nonmarital portion of the retirement account, as such increase in value was not due to the efforts or contribution of marital funds by the parties during the marriage and was readily identifiable and traceable to the nonmarital portion of the account. View "Coufal v. Coufal" on Justia Law