Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother was an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. After Jassenia, who was allegedly eligible for enrollment in the tribe, was removed from Mother’s care, the State filed a petition for adjudication pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). At issue before the juvenile court was whether the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied to the adjudication proceeding. The juvenile court determined that ICWA applied to the proceedings. Jassenia’s guardian ad litem appealed, asserting that Mother’s intent to relinquish custody of Jassenia rendered ICWA inapplicable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the juvenile court’s order did not constitute a final, appealable order because the mere determination that ICWA applied, without further action, did not affect a substantial right. View "In re Interest of Jassenia H." on Justia Law

In one proceeding, the juvenile court of Douglas County terminated Mother’s parental rights to four of her children and Father’s parental rights to all of those children with the exception of Jahon. In a separate proceeding underlying this appeal, the same court terminated Father’s parental rights to Jahon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court in this case correctly determined that statutory grounds for termination existed as to Jahon; and (2) the separate juvenile court did not err in finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Jahon’s best interests. View "In re Interest of Jahon S." on Justia Law

Mother and Father were the biological parents of four children. In one proceeding, the juvenile court terminated the parents' parental rights to three of the children. In separate proceedings, the juvenile court also terminated their parental rights to their fourth child. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court in each case, holding (1) the juvenile court did not err in terminating Father’s parental rights to the three children involved in the first case; and (2) Mother’s sole assigned error that the State violated her due process rights on both cases by failing to base termination on Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-292(5) was not preserved for appellate review. View "In re Zanaya W." on Justia Law

Two days after Teresa S. gave birth to an infant, Teresa and Monty S., the infant’s biological father, each signed separate documents relinquishing their parental rights to the child and consenting to the child’s adoption by Jason W. and Rebecca W., the friends of Teresa and Monty. The parties had previously agreed to an “open” adoption. Nearly one year later, Teresa and Monty (together, Petitioners) filed a petition for habeas corpus seeking return of the child. As grounds for the writ, Petitioners alleged that their consents and relinquishments were invalid due to fraud, duress, and the failure to present the nonconsent adoption forms prior to signing the relinquishments. The district court rejected all of Petitioners’ allegations but nevertheless invalidated the relinquishments, concluding that the parties’ plan for an “open” adoption invalidated the relinquishments as conditioned upon the retention of some parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) excluding evidence of post relinquishment visits by Petitioners and why those visits were discontinued; and (2) concluding that the consents were conditioned upon the retention of parental rights and were therefore invalid. View "Monty S. v. Jason W." on Justia Law

Appellant, the ex-husband in this case, appealed from an order of the district court generally overruling his objections to garnishment upon a foreign dissolution decree. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant waived his argument that he was not properly notified of the registration of the foreign judgment and of the garnishment; (2) the lower court adequately addressed the percentage of Appellant’s wages that should be garnished; and (3) because Appellee, the ex-wife, did not meet the requirements of Neb. Ct. R. App. P. 2-109(D)(4) in her purported cross-appeal, the Court will not consider the merits of her cross-appeal. View "Friedman v. Friedman" on Justia Law

Kari and Elizabeth Johnson were divorced in 2010. The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their two children, and Elizabeth was awarded physical custody. The decree to required Kari to pay $3,000 per month in child support. Kari later filed an application to modify the decree. The parties stipulated to a modification of physical custody to a joint physical and legal custody arrangement. After a trial, the district court determined that Kari’s child support obligation should be set at $443 per month and that Kari was entitled to receive credit a result of his “overpayment” of child support obligations during the pendency of the modification proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Court of Appeals (1) correctly determined that the district court erred when it imputed to Elizabeth a wage-earning capacity of $52,000 per year; (2) did not err in affirming the district court’s conclusion that Kari should not be given a credit for Social Security benefits paid to the children; and (3) erred when it reasoned that, upon remand, Kari could not receive credit for overpayments made during the pendency of the modification proceedings. Remanded. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Wife and Husband’s marriage was dissolved via a decree entered in 2013. Prior to the decree, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement that required Wife to leave the marital home and required Husband to “assist” Wife in obtaining a bank loan to purchase a residence. The dissolution decree adopted the agreement. The bank, however, declined to make the loan without Husband’s cosignature. The district court granted Husband’s motion a modify the dissolution decree and vacated Husband’s obligation to assist Wife in obtaining a loan, concluding that Husband’s obligation to assist Wife in obtaining a loan was too vague to be enforceable. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding that although Husband’s obligation to assist Wife in obtaining a loan was ambiguous, such ambiguity did not provide a basis to modify the dissolution decree, and absent a finding of fraud or gross inequity, the district court abused its discretion in vacating the portion of the decree implementing the assistance clause. Remanded for the district court to determine whether the assistance clause had been satisfied. View "Ryder v. Ryder" on Justia Law

The juvenile court entered an order prohibiting Mother from homeschooling her daughter Moira B. and directing that Moira continue to be enrolled in an educational program as arranged or approved by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) pending further order of the court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s order was not a temporary order, but rather one that affected Mother’s substantial right to direct the education of her child, and therefore the order was final and appealable; and (2) the juvenile court did not err in prohibiting Mother from homeschooling Moira and ordering that Moira be enrolled in an educational program arranged or approved by DHHS. View "In re Cassandra B." on Justia Law

These juvenile proceedings involved the six minor children of Mother. The children were adjudicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) and placed in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. The juvenile court subsequently directed the parties to comply with a case plan, the goal of which was for Mother to appropriately care for her children and to reunify the children with Mother. Later, the juvenile court formally changed the permanency goal for the children to adoption for all children. Mother appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred in finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that the change in permanency objective was in the children’s best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the juvenile court’s orders affected Mother’s substantial right to raise her children, they were final and appealable; and (2) the evidence supported the juvenile court’s order changing the primary permanency objective from reunification with Mother to adoption. View "In re Interest of Octavio B." on Justia Law

Husband filed a complaint for dissolution of his marriage to Wife and sought sole custody of the parties’ child. Wife counterclaimed requesting sole custody. The trial court awarded Husband permanent legal and physical custody of the child, ordered Wife to pay child support, ordered Husband to pay alimony, allowed Wife to claim the dependency exemption in even-numbered years, and awarded Wife attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the court abused its discretion by ordering the parties to alternately claim the dependency exemption for their child but otherwise did not err in its judgment. Modified to award solely to Husband the dependency exemption attributable to the parties’ child. View "Anderson v. Anderson" on Justia Law